The European Union's Involvement in the Security Sector Reform of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Advancing Human Security through Building a Robust State?

Matti Karvanen
University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Political and Economic Studies
Development Studies
Pro Gradu Thesis
February 2015

HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO
HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty	Laitos – Institution – Department
Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta	Politiikan ja taloudentutkimuksen laitos

Tekijä – Författare – Author
Karvanen Matti

Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title
The European Union's Involvement in the Security Sector Reform of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Advancing Human Security through Building a Robust State?

Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject
Kehitysmaatutkimus

Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level	Aika – Datum – Month and year	Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages
Pro Gradu Thesis	Helmikuu 2015	120

Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

Tämä tutkielma tarkastelee Euroopan Unionin toimintaa Kongon Demokraattisen Tasavallan turvallisuussektorin reformissa tukitoimissa (Security Sector Reform, SSR). Tutkielma keskittyy tarkastelemaan EU:n normatiivisen inhimillistä turvallisuutta korostavan lähestymistavan implementointia Kongon kontekstissa. Sen tutkimuskysymys on, missä määrin EU:n SSR-tukitoiminta Kongossa on onnistunut omaksumaan ja toteuttamaan lähestymistapaa, joka keskittyy turvallisuussysteemiajatteluun ja laajan turvallisuuden käsitteeseen, sekä pyrkii edistämään inhimillistä turvallisuutta.

Tutkielma lähestyy tutkimusaihettaan laadullisin menetelmin. Se totetuttaa tapaustutkimuksen EU:n toiminnasta Kongon turvallisuussektorin reformissa. Aluksi tutkielma keskittyy EU:n normatiivisten inhimillistä turvallisuutta käsittelevien politiikkadokumenttien tarkastelemiseen. Pääaineistona tutkielmassa käytetään EU:n tukea toteuttavien haastattelujen analyysia. Lopuksi em. tutkimuskysymykseen vastataan.

Tutkielman tärkein johtopäätös on, ettei EU:n käytännön toiminta Kongon turvallisuussektorin reformin tukemisessa vastaa politiikkadokumenttien normatiivisia tavoitteita.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
European Union, Security Sector Reform, SSR, human security, CSDP, Statebuilding, Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC.

HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO
HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty	Laitos – Institution – Department
Faculty of Social Sciences	Department of Political and Economic Studies

Tekijä – Författare – Author
Karvanen Matti

Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title
The European Union's Involvement in the Security Sector Reform of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Advancing Human Security through Building a Robust State?

Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject
Development Studies

Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level	Aika – Datum – Month and year	Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages
Pro Gradu Thesis	February 2015	120

Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

This thesis examines the European Union's involvement in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It focuses on the implementation of the EU's normative human security approach in the context of the Congo. In particular, the thesis asks, to what extent the EU security sector reform support action in the DRC has succeeded in understanding and adopting an approach that focuses on security system thinking and the concept of broad security, and that seeks to promote human security.

The study has adopted a qualitative research approach that aims to look at the implementation of the EU SSR policies from a case-specific point of view. Firstly, it examines the EU SSR policy documents and other sources outlines the normative aspects of the EU SSR approach. This is followed by an analysis of the primary data, obtained through key stakeholder interviews with the identified EU officials in the DRC. Finally, it presents the findings by answering the above-presented research question.

The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of this study is that the practical implementation of the EU SSR appporach in the DRC does not correspond to the normative aspirations spelled out in the policy.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
European Union, Security Sector Reform, SSR, human security, CSDP, Statebuilding, Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC.

The European Union's Involvement in the Security Sector Reform of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

Advancing Human Security through Building a Robust State?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing this thesis has been a long journey. It has taken significant amount of time that could have been used so much better. Therefore, the author wants to apologise to all the concerned, for all the missed dinners, board game sessions and running sessions. In addition, the author wants to express his sincere gratitude to everyone who have commented or reviewed the draft versions of this study. My special thanks goes to Professor Juhani Koponen, the supervisor of this thesis, for his insightful comments, and for his particularly long patience in supervising my work.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Evolution of EU SSR Concept; Congo as its Test Case

Since the turn of the millennium, in the aftermath of the devastating Congo Wars that had claimed the lives of millions of people, the European Union (EU) has allocated substantial resources for the post-conflict statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A significant share of this statebuilding support provided by the EU has been allocated to a recently emerged policy concept branded as *Security Sector Reform* or *Security System Reform* (SSR).

Supported through its development and security policy instruments, the EU has rapidly emerged as the lead donor in the support of the Congolese SSR. Since 2005, the European Council has established two Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, former ESDP) civilian crisis management missions, *the European Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (EUPOL RD Congo) and *the European Union Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (EUSEC RD Congo), to support a comprehensive reform of the Congolese police and military respectively (Council Joint Actions 2004/847/CFSP, 9 December 2004; and 2005/355/CFSP, 2 May 2005). The European Commission, in turn, has supported the Congolese SSR by complementing the CSDP missions' actions in military and police sectors, as well as by strengthening the justice system through its development assistance instruments (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5). The other EU actors, such as the EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region (EUSR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), have been mandated to support the coordination of the EU SSR activities, while some EU Member States have complemented the EU action with their own assistance. (More & Price 2011, 17–19).

Interestingly, the EU engagement in the Congolese security sector reform is in fact the first time that the EU has engaged in a military reform in a third country through a CSDP mission (Clément 2009, 243), and the first time that the EU has supported a police reform through a CSDP mission in Africa (More & Price 2010, 11). Furthermore, this has been the first time that the EU actors responsible for the implementation of

development and security policies have formally tried to develop a coordinated joint-approach for any third country's comprehensive SSR (Keane 2008, 224).

However, the EU's significant support to the Congolese SSR can not be interpreted as having emerged in a vacuum or being a mere coincidence. In fact, the post-conflict statebuilding in the Congo has coincided with the evolution of the EU's SSR approach, and has therefore provided an ideal test case or "*laboratory*", as Knutsen (2009, 456) argues, for the EU to try out its emerging SSR policies and instruments in practice.

When approaching the emergence of the security sector reform as an EU policy concept through a historical perspective, it becomes clear that the concept has since the 1990s gradually become an increasingly important tool for the EU's engagement in fragile states through its development and security policies. This development stems from three overlapping structural processes that have taken place in the post-Cold War world. Firstly, it can be seen as a practical effort for the EU to respond to the challenges posed by emerging fragile states that are cursed with civil wars, and to prevent the escalation of such internal conflicts through statebuilding. Secondly, it links to the EU's inter-institutional development and the deepening merger of its development and security policies, as well as to the attempt to increase collaboration between the institutions responsible for these policies and competencies. Thirdly, it can be interpreted as an ideological shift in the post-Cold War development thinking, which emphasises conflict prevention through a building of a robust liberal democratic state, and sees this statebuilding as a panacea to various development and security challenges.

Whether the emerging EU SSR approach is interpreted as the EU's effort to respond to state fragility in the post-Cold War context, as the EU's inter-institutional development, or as a merger of development and security policies following a larger ideological paradigm shift, on a policy level this shift is not limited to the European Union's action. On the contrary, the EU approach to Security Sector Reform follows closely the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance in a number of ways. For example, the EU approach to SSR is based on the concept of *broad security*, which particularly focuses on how security is produced in a given context, and how the *security system* operates. Understanding which actors,

formal and informal, take part in the production of security and approaching the reform through a system-focused approach have therefore key importance (OECD 2004a, 11).

Furthermore, the notion of security in the EU approach to SSR is also based on the concept of *human security*, following once again the OECD DAC Guidelines[1]. For human security, security is not only regarded as the survival and security of the state and a particular regime but above all as security of the citizens and as protection of their fundamental rights (Buxton 2008, 27–29). Furthermore, for this concept, security is not only regarded as an absence of '*fear*' and violence but also as an absence of '*want*': As an absence of extreme poverty and vulnerability. Security and development, or lack of those, are therefore regarded as mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent processes (OECD 2005, 12).

Furthermore, the EU policy documents[2] call for adoption of a *comprehensive approach* for the EU engagement in any third country SSR. In the DRC context this means that the Commission and the Council have – for the first time in the EU's history – adopted a *'Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC*' joint-document that guides the EU action in the Congolese SSR (Keane 2008, 224). In particular, it seeks to ensure that all the EU actors support the reform in a comprehensive and coordinated manner (ibid. 2008, 224).

The EU's comprehensive approach to SSR is very normative regarding its language. For example, it sees security in a broad manner and builds on the concept of human security, stating that a key principle for the EU action is to ensure '*that Congolese security actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for [the Congolese] citizens'*. National ownership, good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and strengthening the governance of security institutions are among other key priorities identified in the document. (Keane 2008, 224–225)

[1] The EU SSR approach is based particularly on Council and Commission SSR Concept documents as well as a joint-EU concept document, which all explicitly use the DAC guidelines as a key reference point.

[2] As will be presented later in more detail, in 2005 and 2006 the Council and the Commission each adopted their SSR policy documents, which claim the legal basis for the EU SSR action, and which call for a development of country-specific comprehensive approach concepts. In November 2008, the Council and the Commission adopted a 'Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC', a joint-document to guide the EU's SSR support specifically in the Congo.

1.2 Research Questions; Relevance of Research for Development Studies

The focus of this study is in the EU officials' *understanding* and *implementation* of the normative aspects of the EU SSR policy in the DRC. First, the study aims to assess how the EU officials understand the normative aspects of the EU SSR policy. The second objective of the study is to find out how the EU actors impelementing this normative policy actually succeed in their task. In other words, the study explores the EU engagement in the Congolese SSR and scrutinises to what extent the practice, the EU's practical engagement, corresponds with the theory, i.e. the normative policy objectives. In particular, the thesis asks the following question:

> To what extent the EU security sector reform support action in the DRC has succeeded in understanding and adopting an approach that focuses on security system thinking and the concept of broad security, and that seeks to promote human security?

The topic and the research questions for this thesis have been selected on normative grounds. The study is being undertaken as part of the Master's degree studies in Development Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The author wants to carry out a study that would both be of a great interest to himself, as well as possibly be of use for the practitioners. In particular, the aspiration of the author is that the study would help identifying possible shortfalls and gaps in the implementation of the EU's normative security sector approach. Moreover, the author also tries to explain some of the factors contributing to the potential gaps, which would allow the practitioners to design and implement their work.

In addition, the research focusing on the EU statebuilding policy implementation in the Congolese SSR is highly relevant to the discipline of development studies. Firstly, the EU together with its Member States is currently by far the largest provider of development assistance in the world (Commission 2014, 3). Moreover, the EU's development policies reflect and influence the policies of its Member States, including Finland. Therefore it is particularly interesting to see in what ways the EU is possibly refocusing its resources allocated to development and to civilian crisis management support, and how the Union is redetermining its policies and approaches. Furthermore, as the Congolese SSR is the

first time the EU support is actually based on a jointly-stated comprehensive approach (Keane 2008, 224), it is relevant to find out how this policy, based on the principle of human security and the concept of broad security, is implemented in the DRC context.

This research is also timely for the discipline of development studies because it directly links to the larger debate regarding the increasing merger of security and development policies. The linkage is particularly relevant to the ongoing discussion on the *security-development nexus*, which considers development and security as mutually reinforcing and dependent processes (OECD 2005, 11–12). While this thesis does not specifically focus on the larger discussion around the security-development nexus, and the sometimes feared *securitisation* of development funding, it has to be noted here that this perception of the inter-connectedness between development and security is inherent in the concept of human security. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage extensively in this debate it should be remembered that the concept of security-development nexus is not necessarily an entirely unproblematic perception[3].

Another important debate for development studies that is also relevant for this particular study, includes the discussion regarding statebuilding and the role of the state in providing prosperity and protection to its citizens. First of all, it should be noted that the concept of a Western liberal democratic state is based on what Weber (1964) has conceptualised regarding the capabilities of a modern nation state. This state possesses a monopoly of a *legitimate* use of force within its boundaries. This type of a nation state has historically emerged in a very different setting than that of the contemporary Congo. On the contrary, in the context of the Congo, and particularly in some of its more remote regions, state has never really enjoyed a particularly high legitimacy as a provider of protection and welfare to its people, as will be discussed later. Therefore important questions are whether, to what extent, and in what cost, can statebuilding even be transferred and reproduced in the context of a multi-ethnic Congo, where the concept of state has practically been imported by the colonial master.

[3] For example, according to Koponen (2010, 23–26), and Bueger & Venneson (2009,4), the notions and the characteristics of the concepts of security and development, as well as the linkage connecting the two are rather broad, elusive and ill-defined, and therefore the argued interconnection should not be taken for granted.

1.3 Data and Methodology

The study has adopted a qualitative research approach that aims to look at the implementation of the EU SSR policies from a case-specific point of view. Case study as a method seeks to provide a deep understanding of a particular phenomenon or event. As Devine (in March & Stoker 2002, 207) writes, the advantage of this type of method is "*to explore people's experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to establish their meaning for those concerned*".

The starting point for carrying out this study are the various EU policy documents defining the EU action in the DRC, as well as other relevant sources that shed light into the EU action in the Congo. After a careful desk review and a construction of understanding of the actual EU support activities, interviews have been carried out with the key officials implementing the EU action. The data gathered through these stakeholder interviews has been codified and categorised, and interpreted and analysed. The author's aspiration has been that the findings would reveal something about the implementation of the EU comprehensive approach in the DRC.

As noted by Devine (2002, 207) the findings and results achieved through qualitative methods cannot be easily generalised as such to other phenomena and events. The aim of this study is therefore not to try to understand or explain how the EU comprehensive action is operating everywhere in the world, nor to argue that the findings of this thesis would apply to the EU action in other countries as such. However, even though the thesis focuses on the EU SSR action and its possible successes and challenges in the context of the Congo, it could nevertheless open some avenues and discussion points for future studies that focus on the implementation of the EU security and development policies in other countries. Furthermore, as many of the principles and policies discussed in this thesis do apply to the EU SSR action in other countries as well, and as the EU action in the DRC has often been quoted as a model for the EU comprehensive approach, the findings of this study can possibly reveal something about the direction the EU external action is currently moving towards. In this way, the findings of this thesis might be of a value to anyone interested in the future of the EU security and development policies in a more general level.

The work on the methodological part of the study was initiated by carrying out an extensive literature review that focused on the following topics: the history of the conflict and insecurity in the Congo; the merger of the EU security and development policies; the key EU SSR, statebuilding, conflict prevention and development policy concept documents; and the various articles and academic papers focusing on the EU SSR support in the DRC. This was complemented by studying various internet and other sources to achieve a proper understanding of the actual EU activities in the Congo: the websites of the Commission and the Council; the various EU policy and strategy papers; as well as statements and press releases. Some of the key documents reviewed for the purposes of this analysis include the European Security Strategy, the Council and the Commission concept documents on Security Sector Reform, the EU joint-document on Security Sector Reform, and the '*Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC*' joint-strategic document that presents the EU's approach in the Congolese SSR.

However, some key documents relevant to the analysis of this thesis, including the above-mentioned 'Comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the DRC', were not easy to access. After several requests both to the Commission and the EEAS, and after months of waiting, the EEAS responded that the document in question is "*classified as 'RESTREINT UE', which means that the unauthorised disclosure of the information they contain could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States*". Furthermore, the letter, sent by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, signed by the Jakob Thomsen, stated the following:

> Full release of these documents, which contain internal information and assessments, would still weaken the position of the European Union at the international level and in particular affect relations with the DR Congo. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 4(1)(a), third indent of the Regulation (protection of the public interest with regard to international relations), the General Secretariat is unable to accede to your request. However, pursuant to Article 4(6) of the Regulation, you may have access to those parts of the documents which are not covered by this exception. Enclosed you will find the partially accessible version of the documents in question.

(Council 2012c)

In practice, this meant that a full access to the document in question was effectively denied, as the interests of the EU could be compromised. This obviously made it more difficult to study the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach. Fortunately the "*partially accessible document*" did contain enough information to reveal the main objectives and the key principles. Furthermore, secondary sources, such as David Spence & Philipp Fluri's brilliant "*The EU and Security Sector Reform*" (2008), and particularly its chapter 11, on the "*SSR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the role played by the European Union*", by Rory Keane, turned out as extremely valuable sources, presenting an excellent overview of the EU comprehensive approach document. With the help of such sources, and combined with other general EU SSR policy documents and analyses, it was possible to achieve an adequate understanding of the EU approach.

After completing the desk review, a method used to obtain the primary data for the purposes of this study was semi-structured interviews with the key EU officials implementing the EU SSR in the DRC. The objective was to interview enough senior-level EU officials to gain a good understanding of the EU's SSR policy implementation in the country. The Head of the EU Delegation (HoD), as well as the heads of the two EU CSDP civilian crisis management missions (HoMs) operating in the Congo (the EUPOL RD Congo and the EUSEC RD CONGO) were approached by letters, in which the objectives of the study were presented. The HoD and the HoMs were requested to be kindly interviewed, or alternatively to identify some senior level officials who could speak on behalf of each organisation. The letter introduced the main topics to be covered in the interview and explained the purposes of the study.

Initially the author was planning to conduct a much larger number of stakeholder interviews than what eventually was possible. Moreover, the initial thought was to carry out the stakeholder interviews in Kinshasa, in the capital of the DRC. This, however, proved unexpectedly difficult: Obtaining a visa to the DRC beforehand was particularly challenging, as the Congolese Embassy in Stockholm that was supposed to handle the visa application had apparently literally vanished, and despite numerous phone calls to

various Congolese embassies and even a visit to Sweden to the supposed-address of the Congolese Embassy in Stockholm, the persons responsible for visas were never reached. At the same time, getting the interview permits from the different EU entities took longer than expected, and agreeing the interview times with the extremely busy EU officials during a period of a few days, proved nearly impossible. As it began to seem impossible to fill all the planned interviews in a few days of time (that the author could have afforded to spend in Kinshasa due to the limited research budget), and as time was of the essence, it was decided to carry out the interviews via phone.

Eventually four senior-level officials were identified from the various EU organisations: A senior official working at the EU delegation, one from each of the two CSDP missions, and one working as an advisor for both missions. The four interviewed officials included three men and one woman, and three of them were currently working with the EU in the DRC, while the fourth one had already returned to Europe. All the identified interviewees were sent an informed consent-form before hand, ensuring their understanding of the voluntariness of participation, the nature of the study, as well as their role within it. The interviewees were also informed that they will remain anonymous and that they have a right to decline to answer any particular question(s) or withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to themselves. In addition, the main topics to be covered during the interview were presented in the information document (Annex I). In addition, the participants were asked to fill in a background information form that provided sufficient information about the tasks and responsibilities of the official himself/herself. Finally, the interviewees were informed that the interviews will be recorded and that portions of them will be transcribed. All this information was also repeated in the beginning of each interview.

The collection of the primary data followed a method of semi-structured interviews: The main interview topics were divided in three groupings of questions, which focused on the interviewees' views and opinions regarding the root causes and factors behind Congo's insecurity; the extent the EU action has succeeded improving the Congolese human security; and the possible challenges to the implementation of the EU comprehensive approach in the DRC. No strict pattern or order for posing the questions was applied during the interviews but the only aim was to cover all three groups of

questions. Follow-up questions were asked based on the interlocutors' answers. The purpose here was also to ask as much open-ended questions as possible, to keep the conversation free-flowing, to avoid leading the interviewees towards certain "*expected*" answers, as well as to leave space for arising of possibly unexpected themes (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2008, 47).

The specific times for the phone interviews with the three officials working in the Congo were agreed separately with each of the interviewees, and carried out over a course of four weeks between March and April, 2012. The fourth interview was done face to face in a coffee shop in a European capital around the same time. None of the participants were offered any monetary rewards for participation. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2.5 hours, depending on the schedules of the officials, and their willingness to continue discussion. During the interviews, the officials spoke surprisingly openly. The expectation, perhaps even a fear, had been that the officials would follow the usual EU Lines-to-Take (LTTs) and not reveal any particular problems regarding the EU action, or say anything critical in general. On the contrary, many of them discussed the challenges of the EU action in length, and some of them occasionally even mentioned that they were talking about "*sensitive*" or "*secretive*" matters, and that their identities should not be revealed. The author has been careful in protecting the anonymity of respondents. For example, all the names, nationalities, sexes, and exact titles are hidden, and later in the analysis the interviewees are only identified as officials from CSDP mission/EU delegation.

Regarding the possible limits of the used methods, the fact that most of the interviews were eventually carried out over the phone has consequently limited the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, as well as hidden possible non-verbal communication, such as impressions and looks. Furthermore, the phone connection to the DRC was at times weak, and during some interviews the connection was actually interrupted several times, the call having to be reconnected again. The language used in the interviews was normally English. It should also be noted that as this was not the mother tongue of any of the interlocutors, it might have affected their capability to express themselves, or to use certain exact words and idioms in their responses. The same also applies to the interviewer. Moreover, the positionality of the author might

have affected the data collection and the received responses. Before carrying out the interviews, the author was an outsider to the EU action: a Master's student from Finland without any formal connection to the EU. For example, during the interviews, the personal qualities of the interviewer, including his gender, age, nationality and social status, might have influenced the interviewees' attitudes and answers.

The recorded interviews were normally transcribed in the same or the following days, which also practically started the analysis of the raw data. However, carrying out the analytical part of this study was completed only in late-2014 and early-2015. This was due to the fact that in May 2012 the author was offered a position in Nairobi to support the management of the Finnish government's development assistance to Somalia. By early-2013, this position had changed to another position with the European Commission, as the author was offered a position with the EU delegation's Statebuilding and Security Sector Reform section. In other words, writing a thesis on the EU engagement in the DRC's SSR had strangely turned into implementation of the EU SSR support to Somalia. The particular task of the author was to manage the delegation's human rights and maritime security portfolios, and to contribute to the management of the statebuilding and SSR portfolios. Among else, this meant supporting the mainstreaming of human rights into EU action accross sections, and representing the EU in the donors' main human rights coordination mechanism, the Somalia Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), established by the EU to conduct policy dialogue with the authorities and the civil society of Somalia on the country's human rights situation.

The possibility to actually work with the EU Somalia delegation on statebuilding and security sector reform was at the same time a very strange coincidence and a huge opportunity. Strange, as it is always easier to point out the problems and to criticise the chosen actions as an outsider. An opportunity, as it could also provide valuable insights regarding the EU comprehensive approach in action. In particular, this experience could possibly help the author to understand some of actions and decisions that the EU actors are taking in the DRC's security sector reform. This is also the reason why the analysis of this study focuses on the EU action before mid-2012: All the data for this thesis was collected by May-2012, and since the author was working on Somalia until the fall of

2014, the thesis has been completed only by early-2015. In practice, the time-span that the study covers focuses particularly on the period between 2007 and mid-2012.

Moreover, the time spent in the Horn of Africa before completing the study might have affected the relevance of the findings in 2015. For example, the officials implementing the EU action have already changed, particularly in the CSDP side. This might also have affected the EU's subsequent approach and the activities. Furthermore, over the two and a half years, the political and the security situation in the Congo have been evolving. The disappearance of the rebel group *National Council for the Defence of the People* (CNDP), as well as the emergence of a group M23, and the subsequent fighting, are certainly new developments (Wilen 2015). Moreover, the 2015 elections might again provide a new window of opportunity for important reforms to be carried out. Nevertheless, surprisingly little has actually changed regarding the larger security-political context: in particular, the formal security providers remain fragile and malfunctioning, and incapable of protecting the citizens. As Wilen (2015) notes, the SSR in the DRC is "*a never-ending story*". Therefore the author believes that the findings of this study continue to have relevance at the time it is published in early-2015.

The approach of this thesis can be described as inductive in that the data and the findings have guided its final argument (Hirsjärvi et al. 1996, 248). However, the selection of the research questions and the formulation of the theoretical framework for the study have nevertheless influenced the analysis of the content. In practical terms, the research questions and the central themes of the theoretical part for this study have for the most part been written in 2012, and those sections have guided the selection of topics and issues emphasised when carrying out the actual data analysis. In other words, data has been reflected against the theoretical framework of the study (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2008, 150). Upon returning to Finland in late-2014, the raw analysis was continued, as all the formerly transcribed interviews were read again. The central themes were then codified and finally categorised based on the interviewees' answers. The writing process of the analysis took two to three months, during which the categorisation was adjusted when necessary. Finally, based on the analysis, the research questions were answered, and the thesis was finalised.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

The study is structured as follows: After presenting the research questions and the methological considerations in the Introduction chapter, the author presents the theoretical foundations and the contextual environment of this study. In particular, chapter 2 focuses on the evolution of the EU's normative SSR policy, and its key concepts of *human security* and *security system thinking*.

In chapter 3, focus is turned into a system approach for security analysis, based on the work of Kalyvas and Autesserre. Through this type of system-focused approach, and based on extensive literature regarding the Congo's history, a context of the Congo is presented that aims to offer a balanced view of the production and reproduction of insecurity in the country.

Chapter 4 introduces the EU's involvement in the DRC's security sector reform. In particular, the first part of this chapter explains the background of the EU's support to the Congolese security sector reform, while the second part presents the key EU actors implementing the reform action, as well as the main activities they have been carrying out.

In chapter 5, the EU action is analysed and the research questions are answered. In particular, in this chapter the nature and the main characteristics of the EU SSR action in the DRC are assessed against the normative policy objectives. Furthermore, based on key stakeholder interviews, the EU officials' understanding of the normative EU policy is analysed. Moreover, based on the interviewees' responses, different factors are identified that may explain the presented outcomes.

Finally, the study is concluded with a short discussion focusing on some of the themes and questions that have risen during the writing process, including the possibilities regarding the implementation of the normative EU policies in the Congo, and the prospects for statebuilding in this same context.

2 EVOLUTION OF EU SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICY

2.1 Introduction: Merger of Security and Development in EU policy

The European Union's growing involvement in the third countries security sector reforms since the 1990s provides a prime example of how the EU's development and security policies have become increasingly merged as a response to the greater structural transformations that have influenced the patterns in which today's conflicts take place. This chapter provides first a brief overview of the increasing merger of the European Union's security and development policies since the early-1990s, through the incorporation of such concepts as *conflict prevention* and *human security*, which then culminated in the formulation of the EU's SSR policy concepts, and in the development of various EU SSR instruments during the first decade of the new millennium.

As will be discussed later in chapter 3, by the early-1990s the state authority was in crisis in much of the developing countries, and new non-state and inter-state forms of authority were rising. Massive internal crises, such as the early-1990s civil wars in Yugoslavia and Somalia, and the civil war and genocide in Rwanda, in which the international community and particularly the EU could not respond effectively, were clear indications that the existing conflict management instruments were out to date. Within the EU, such internal crises were increasingly interpreted as being triggered by state failures, and particularly the Yugoslavian conflict gave an impetus to rethink the Union's security policies (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006, 36): the EU had been incapable in reacting rapidly to such state failure in its own backyard, having eventually had to resort to the NATO's support, and give green light to a US intervention.

As a response, addressing the root causes of conflicts, the state failures, was incorporated into the EU's security analyses: In order to prevent violent internal conflicts from erupting, which often took place in the context of failing states, links between security and development needed to be understood, and addressed. The assumption was that development and security actors could both gain from cooperation. Building democratic governance and improving life conditions in general depended on a peaceful environment. Similarly, conflicts could not be eradicated without addressing the root causes that were often linked to development failures (Hänggi 2004, W).

As will be discussed in the following chapter, in the field of development the emergence[4] of this '*security-development nexus*' took place in the context of failing structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which had emphasised market-oriented economic growth as the prime vehicle for development. Instead of having brought prosperity for the majority of the people in the developing world, the drastic privatisation and liberalisation policies of the 1980s had often only worsened their standards of living, as public services and subsidies had been scaled down (Hewitt 200, 300–304). Furthermore, together with the intensifying globalisation and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, such policies had contributed to the eradication of the state authority, which in turn had allowed the emergence of new internal security threats, as new sub-state authorities began to challenge the state's monopoly over violence (Duffield 2001, 146–151). As the understanding was growing regarding the inter-linkages between development failures and the production of insecurity, the one-eyed focus on market-oriented economic growth as a development paradigm started gradually to give room to governance-focused poverty-reduction approaches, as well as to an inclusion of development aspects into the security programming, and vice versa (Gourlay 2008, 80–82).

Reflecting the increasing merger of the development and security agendas, the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 stated that insuring '*freedom from want*' and '*freedom from fear*' for all persons is the most effective way to tackle the problem of global insecurity. This new approach was essentially based on a broader conception of security, as it included development objectives – '*freedom from want*' – and argued that there could be no security without development. Furthermore, this so-called human security approach essentially held that a proper referent for security should be an individual rather than the state, and argued that a people-centred security approach, which recognised the links between security and development, and focused on improving the lives of the most vulnerable, was necessary for national, regional and global stability (Buxton 2008, 27–29).

[4] However, as Koponen (2010, 23–26) notes, the considerations in the current discourse around security-development nexus cannot necessarily be taken to be new as such. Rather, what is new is that they now appear in a new configuration.

As a consequence of the growing understanding of the interlinkages between the development failures and the emergence of conflicts, or development and security, the EU's development and security policies started to increasingly merge. A good example of this is the emergence of *conflict prevention* as a new policy objective. This is well reflected in the High Representative Javier Solana's contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa (2005), as he stated that for sustainable European Security and Defence Policy missions, civil and military initiatives need to be better linked to the EU's longer term conflict prevention and development programmes; while development and conflict-prevention initiatives have to similarly support the crisis management missions' objectives (Solana 2005, 2–4).

In fact, with regards to the evolution of the EU's security policy, as early as in 1992 (at the time when the conflict in Yugoslavia was intensifying), the Western European Union (WEU) Council meeting at the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn had agreed on certain humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks that could be supported militarily, among them conflict prevention. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, these '*Petersberg tasks'* were incorporated in the Treaty of Amsterdam (amending the Treaty of European Union or the Maastricht Treaty), which came in force in 1998. The new Treaty defined the European Security and Defence Policy, (ESDP), now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The ESDP/CSDP was incorporated in the European/Common Foreign and Security policy (EFSP/CFSP), the EU's '*second pillar'*. This was followed by creation of civilian crisis management mechanism and establishment of concrete '*Civilian Headline Goal'* in the 1999–2000 European Council meetings. Since then, the ESDP/CSDP has provided an operational framework for the EU's military and civilian crisis management efforts. (Law and Myshlovska 2008, 14)

A good example of the adoption of conflict prevention as an EU security policy objective, and of the inclusion of development agendas such as prevention of state failure into the EU security policies, is provided in the 2003 '*European Security Strategy' (ESS)*. Firstly, state failure, is listed as a key security threat for Europe in the document. Furthermore, all the other security threats for Europe identified in the document (Council 2003a, 3–4), such as the emergence of terrorist groups and their acquiring of weapons of mass destruction, growth of organised crime, and regionalisation of conflicts, are at least

indirectly linked to state failures. Moreover, instead of tackling these threats purely militarily, the Strategy proposes a use of mixture of instruments, including political solutions, humanitarian assistance, and economic/development instruments, as well as military and civilian crisis management (Council 2003a, 7).

Conflict prevention, and the inclusion of security objectives, has similarly become mainstreamed in the EU's development policy: For example, the '*Commission Communication from 1996 on peacebuilding and prevention of African conflicts'* states that development has a key role in conflict prevention and regulation in Africa (Commission 1996, 2–3). A major shift in the Commission's development policies took place in 2000, as the development policy objectives were formally redefined to include security and conflict prevention (Santiso 2002, 6). As a result, already in 2000, the DG Development, the Commission's unit responsible for development cooperation with African, the Caribbean, and the Pacific States (now part of the Development and Cooperation Directorate General – EuropeAid) took conflict prevention on its agenda. Soon after, in 2001, the DG Relex, the Commission's External Relations Directorate General, created a Conflict and Peacebuilding Unit (Weiler 2009, 11).

The subsequent Commission communications have similarly emphasised the linkages between security and development, and the importance of conflict prevention for development. For example, The Commission's '*Communication on Conflict Prevention*' (2001), '*the Communication on Governance and Development*' (2003), '*the Communication for Policy Coherence for Development*' (2005a), '*the Communication on a Strategy of the External Dimension of Freedom, Security and Justice*' (2005b), '*the Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development*' (2006b), as well as the EU joint-statement (the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament) on the European development policy, the '*European Consensus on Development*' (2005), all endorse the importance of understanding of the linkages between development and security, and emphasize the importance of addressing development failures to prevent conflicts.

2.2 EU and Emergence of Security Sector Reform Concept

2.2.1 Emergence of Human Security-focused SSR Concept

In the context of increasingly merging development and security policies since the 1990s, security sector reform has emerged as a central concept for the EU to address conflict prevention, human security, and governance issues simultaneously. In practice, the Union's involvement in the third countries' security sector reform (although not yet conceptualised as such) begun with its projected enlargement to the former communist states of the Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bailes 2008, xiv–xv). In order to qualify for the EU membership, the candidate countries had to achieve certain accession criteria, defined in the Copenhagen summit in 1993. First of these so-called Copenhagen Criteria concerned the '*stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities*'. In particular, the document required that the candidate countries had to reform their institutions, including their defence, police, and justice sectors in order to to fulfil the membership criteria (Buxton 2008, 30).

The first time the concept of security sector reform was approached through a explicit human security perspective was in 1998, as the British Development Cooperation Minister Clare Short described how such a reform should particularly improve the security of the citizens (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 39). Since then, and reflecting the increasing merger of the EU's development and security policies, the EU SSR policy, as well as its SSR instruments have been developing rapidly, and today the EU has a wide range of security and development instruments and policies available to support third countries' security sector reforms in a broad manner.

2.2.2 SSR in EU's Organisational Structure; SSR Funding & Instruments

With regards to the EU institutions' involvement in third countries' SSR-support activities, the European Commission (the Commission) and the Council of the European Union (the Council), are the key actors. Within the European Union's organisational structure the EU's development policy has traditionally been defined belonging under the European Communities' (the former first pillar) competence, meaning that the responsibility to manage the EU's development programmes has traditionally belonged

to the Commission. In addition, the Member States have their own development policy instruments. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (the former second pillar), under which budget line the CSDP civilian missions fall, has in turn been conducted inter-governmentally through the Council (Derks & More 2009, 1). In the EU, the division between development and security policies has traditionally been rather strict, meaning that the Council has not been entitled to implement any projects that can be understood as falling under the development policy line (although management of the EDF, discussed later, is an exception to this), whereas the Commission-controlled development assistance has traditionally been restricted to cover only Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligible activities, leaving out any security-focused action (Gourlay 2008, 81).

However, the increasing merging of security and development agendas since the 1990s has made it increasingly difficult to draw a clear line between development and security policies. The ensuing ambiguity has in fact resulted in an inter-institutional 'turf-war', which even led to the Commission taking the Council to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the so-called ECOWAS/SALW case in 2006. This particular case concerned the dividing line between security and development policies and the division of responsibilities, after a CSDP mission had supported ECOWAS in the framework of its Moratorium on small arms and light weapons (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 52).

With the Lisbon Treaty having come into force in December 2009, the pillar system has formally been abandoned, and certain units from both the Council and the Commission have been partly integrated to the European External Action Service (EEAS/EAS), the new EU 'foreign ministry', which formally started operations in December 2010. However, following the Maastricht Treaty's provisions, development policy still generally belongs to the EC competence, whereas primarily security-related actions are conducted by the Council. This division between security and development policies, as the ECOWAS case shows (and as will be discussed further when the EU's SSR action in the DRC is discussed), certainly brings additional challenges to the adoption of a coordinated and comprehensive EU security sector reform approach.

The Council-led CSDP missions, which draw their personnel from the Member States' experts, are divided into military and civilian missions. While the military action can take various peace enforcement forms, the civilian missions are the Council's key tool to support SSR projects in third countries. The first CSDP civilian missions, including the very first mission '*the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina'* (EUPM) in 2003, were predominantly aimed at enhancing policing capacities in target countries (Gourlay 2008, 92–93). Later on, the scope of the civilian missions has gradually broadened, and the Council has established missions that have included support for rule of law (RoL), border monitoring, and demobilisation. As will be discussed later, the EUSEC RD Congo, established in 2005 and a focus of the analysis of this thesis, was the first CSDP mission in which the EU seeks to support a comprehensive military reform (Clément 2009, 243). By April 2012, the Council had established 24 CSDP missions, of which 16 have been civilian missions, seven military missions, and one combined both civilian and military aspects.

The CSDP missions are established by CFSP joint-Actions, approved by the government representatives of each Member State in the Minister Council meetings. Missions have generally a short-term focus (whereas the EC assistance is more long-term-oriented) as they are planned to last for one to three years (although in practice many of the CSDP missions' mandates, including the SSR missions in the DRC, are often extended). The Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC) has been tasked to monitor the international situation of the CFSP/CSDP action and to advice the Council to define CFSP policies (Gourlay 2008, 92).

In May 2006, the EU institutions (the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 2006, 1–17) constructed an inter-institutional agreement on the EU's financial framework for the period of 2007-2013, which introduced the agreed EU action priorities for the period in question. Among the identified four priorities were two segments that are particularly relevant for security and development: the completion of the EU's common area of 'freedom, security and justice' and the establishment of the 'EU as a global player' (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 59–60). While the former accounts for the EU budgeting on the Union's internal security and justice aspects, the

latter one represents the EU's external action spending through the EU budget[5]. This includes the EU's SSR-related support activities in third countries, either through external assistance instruments, or through the CFSP budget line.

As the CSDP civilian missions belong to the budget line of the CFSP, or the former second pillar, their common costs are funded from the EU budget, while the running costs are generally carried by the participating Member States (Bloching 2011, 6). However, while having grown steadily since the early-2000, the whole CFSP budget for 2012 was standing only at EUR 363 million, accounting for a mere four percent of the '*EU as a global player'* segment[6] (Commission 2011, 36–37).

The planning process of the CFSP joint-actions has also been rather complex: While the decision-making is inter-governmental (taking place at the Council/the PSC), the administrative responsibility for the execution of the CFSP budget has rested with the Commission's DG Relex (integrated into the new External Action Service in December 2010). Before implementation, the decision is still subject to various procedures by the Court of Auditors, European Court of Justice, and the Parliament, meaning that the process to establish a new mission has often been a rather time-consuming endeavour. According to Gourlay (2008, 92–93), this inflexibility, together with the CFSP's modest budget, has limited the use of CSDP missions for SSR support activities. Furthermore, mainly due to the complicated decision-making procedure, some of the instruments that formerly belonged to the CFSP budget line, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), were transferred from the CFSP budget to the Community budget for the budget period of 2007–2013. (Gourlay 2008, 92–93)

Together with the transfer of the EIDHR into the Community budget, other reforms were also completed to make the EC involvement in the third countries' SSR more

[5] It is important to note that the EU's external action comprises also activities that do not originate from the EU budget, such as the European Development Fund (EDF)-allocations, which come from financial contributions from the Member States (European Commission 2008, 373), and the CSDP military missions, which are funded through a separate Athena Mechanism and are thus not accounted for the CFSP budget (Wouters 2008, 18).

[6] For comparison, as is discussed below, the Commission's external assistance instruments (including humanitarian aid) account for the rest EUR 8.64 billion of the EUR 9 billion '*EU as a global player'* budget, for 2012 (European Commission 2011, 36–37), and the budget of Member States-funded 10th European Development Fund (EDF), stands in EUR 22.7 billion for the five-year period of 2008–2013, averaging around EUR 4.5 billion annually (European Commission 2008, 373–375).

effective for the 2007–2013 budget period. For example, several of the Commission's previous instruments got merged into new ones and civilian aspects of SSR support were included in the strategy papers of many of the geographic and thematic instruments. This reflects the increasing merger of development and security agendas in the EU, and particularly the 2005 extension of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility criteria to cover several aspects of the area of security (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 40–47). This extension meant that a substantially wider spectrum of security-related activities could be financed through development cooperation funds than before. For example, the Commission concept for EC SSR support (Commission 2006a, 6–7), discussed below in detail, states that the EU's development support can be directed into security sector reforms, "*encompassing all civilian aspects of SSR, as well as activities in relation to democratic and civilian control of the military parts of SSR, including financial and administrative management of defence issues"*. Only direct support to the armed forces is basically excluded.

For the budget period of 2007–2013, the Commission-controlled or administrated geographic instruments that can be used for SSR support include the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), and the European Development Fund (EDF)[7], while the thematic instruments suitable for SSR-support activities are the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). While the geographic instruments are used mainly for long-term ODA eligible development financing, particularly the IfS has enough flexibility to be used for short-term support, especially in post-conflict settings (Buxton 2008, 27–30), and it can sometimes even bypass the ODA eligibility criteria (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 40–47).

As the EC's external aid programming is generally based on the agreed principles of aid effectiveness (the Paris Declaration), all the ODA eligible programming has to be

[7] The EDF is funded separately from the EC budget by Member States, and managed inter-governmentally by the Council as well as by a specific EDF committee. However, as presented later, it is administrated by the Commission's DG for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, which is responsible for programming and implementation of the projects (European Commission 2008, 376).

established in close cooperation with the beneficiaries – in order to ensure local ownership (OECD 2008, 3–4). The procedure typically starts with drafting of a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) together with the partner country's government (and sometimes a Regional Strategy Paper [RSP]). The CSP/RSP covers the whole budget period of the relevant instrument, and identifies specific objectives, as well as focal and non-focal sectors for the EU support (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 42)

Following the increasing inclusion of conflict prevention and security provisions into the EU's development policies, the Commission has since the late-1990s provided support for numerous third countries in SSR activities. The majority of the supported countries have been '*stable countries in transition to liberal democracies*' (reflecting particularly the support given to the former Soviet states), and most of the SSR assistance continues to be given through the regional instruments (Buxton 2008, 27–30). Nevertheless, the support for post-conflict countries' SSR has also been steadily increasing, particularly due to the establishment of the IfS, and its predecessor, the Rapid-Reaction Mechanism (RRM) (Gourlay 2008, 81).

In practice, however, the mainstreaming of security-related aspects (such as SSR provisions) in development programmes varies widely between the different partner countries. Gourlay (2008, 99–101) argues that there are several factors that might contribute to this: First of all, the political context, including the need to reform the security system, and the willingness (or reluctance) of partner governments to include SSR aspects to the CSP or RSP largely determines the scope of such reforms. Furthermore, the EU's other interests and objectives, such as economic and trade interests, may influence how sensitive issues such as defence reform are addressed in the country strategy paper negotiations. Finally, the partner countries' leverage to determine the CSP provisions varies greatly, and it is no coincidence that the CSPs for China, Brazil or India do not include any aspects of the SSR, whereas the CSPs for many sub-Saharan African countries do so. (Gourlay 2008, 99–101)

Of the EC administrated instruments particularly the regional instrument EDF, and the thematic instruments IfS and EIDHR, are relevant for the purposes of this study, as the

EC assistance for the DRC is basically directed through them. Therefore a closer examination of these instruments is provided below.

The European Development Fund is the main instrument for providing EU development assistance for 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and 20 overseas countries and territories (OCTs). Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, its support is directed to the areas of economic development, social and human development, as well as regional cooperation and integration.

The 10th EDF is based on the Cotonou agreement, signed in 2000 and revised in 2005. It covered the budget period of 2008–2013. The budget of the 10th EDF was EUR 22.7 billion, and unlike other EC regional instruments, it was separate from the Community budget (and also differs from the EC budget cycle of 2007–2013). This means that the EDF continues to be funded by the Member States according to their agreed proportions (Commission 2008, 374–376). However, over the past decades the Commission has in several occasions tried to integrate the EDF into the general budget, without succeeding to do so (ibid. 2008, 374). Therefore the EDF remains subject to its own financial rules, and is managed formally by the Council, by the Committee of Ambassadors, as well as by a specific EDF Committee, which is headed by an EEAS official and consists mainly of Member State representatives (as well as a few representatives from the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank).

However, the Commission's DG for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, has a key-role in the everyday management of the fund, setting programming priorities, and formulating the CSPs/RSPs, as well as the annual action plans (in cooperation with partner countries). After Commission's formulation, the EDF Committee has the right to approve (or disapprove) the proposal. The decision-making in the Committee follows a weighted voting procedure, in which the respective voting power depends on each Member State's contribution to the EDF. The CSPs/RSPs are considered approved when a Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) of two-thirds does not reject the EC proposal. (Commission 2008, 376)

Although the Cotonou agreement's provisions are not explicit on SSR activities, the Article 11, which aims at strengthening the linkage between development issues and

conflict prevention, management and resolution, provides a strong legal underpinning for EDF SSR support (Gourlay 2008, 100). Furthermore, following the 2005 extension of ODA eligibility criteria, a variety of SSR activities can be funded through the EDF, and already during the 9th EDF (2002–2007), some 35 ACP countries received SSR assistance through the Fund. In most cases the SSR-related funding has been rule of law support through justice and police reform, or capacity building. However in a few countries, such as in Kenya and Chad, civilian oversight mechanisms have also been funded. In post-conflict countries SSR support is allocated increasingly through Multi-Donor Trust Funds. In practice, however, support for governance reforms has until recently received only a relatively minor allocation from the EDF budget even in post-conflict countries, as most funding has been directed on 'traditional' (non-security-related) development support, such as infrastructure building projects. (Gourlay 2008, 99–100)

The vast majority of the EDF funding is consistent with the (extended) ODA eligibility rules (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 62). However, since 2004, a portion of funding has been used to support non-ODA eligible security-related initiatives, such as peace-support military operations, and military aspects of SSR. This sort of non-ODA eligible EDF-funding is often diverted through '*the African Peace Facility*' (APF), a special instrument within the EDF, established in 2004 by the Council "*to ensure rapid and efficient response to situations of violent conflict"*, as stated in the Council Decision 3/2003 (Council 2003b, 108). In practice, the facility was created to fund peace support operations carried out under the authority of the African Union. Its initial budget under the 9th EDF was EUR 250 million (Council 2003b, 109), which was later increased by another EUR 190 million to a total of EUR 440 million (Commission's website on the APF, accessed 4 April, 2012).

In 2007, when the 9th EDF was drawing to its end, and reflecting once again the increasing inclusion of security provisions into the EU's development policies, the APF was strengthened further. Partly as a response to criticism from the development community, which saw the African Peace Facility on merely focusing on short-term peacekeeping than on preventive action or long-term capacity building (van Eekelen 2012, 276), the scope of the Facility was broadened to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. This included capacity-building activities in the area of peace

and security and support to coordination processes. The extended scope was in line with the newly-issued '*Africa-EU Joint Strategy*' (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007), which first priority concerned the '*Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability*'. Here, the strategy stated that the '*two continents have laid the foundation for successful cooperation based on the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts"* (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007, 5).

Under the current 10th EDF, EUR 300 million was allocated to the APF, adding up the total EDF support through the APF to EUR 740 million. Of these, around EUR 600 million have been allocated to peace support operations, which continues to be considered as the '*core activity*' of the APF. A total amount of EUR 100 million has been budgeted for capacity building. (Commission's website on the APF, accessed 4 April, 2012)

Another concrete example of the increasing inclusion of security considerations into the EU's development policy is the establishment of the above-mentioned Instrument for Stability, designed to address various security-related challenges in a flexible manner. The objectives of the IfS are two-fold, meaning that it has both a short and a long-term component. The short-term component is meant to address crisis or emerging crisis situations, and to provide rapid and flexible response to such situations. It is not constrained by the ODA eligibility criteria, and that it can avoid the cumbersome decision-making procedures entailing '*comitology*'[8] (Gourlay 2008, 96). This flexibility enables the Commission to take a relatively rapid action. In practice, security-related activities can be supported through the short-term component in a comprehensive manner for up to 18 months (Buxton 2008, 30).

The long-term component, in turn, is focused on conflict-prevention. It covers '*stable countries*' and trans-regional cooperation, including SSR-support activities to strengthen the law enforcement, judicial and civil authorities' capacities to address organised crime,

[8] The cumbersome inter-institutional committee procedure through which the EC development projects are typically implemented.

terrorism, human trafficking, drugs, firearms, explosives and illegal trade and transit (Buxton 2008, 30). The long-term measures of the IfS need to follow the normal comitology process (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 63), meaning that their implementation is not as flexible.

However, there are certain limitations with the use of the IfS in general, and of the short-term component in particular. First, the instrument is meant only to complement the EC's regional instruments, and should not be used when it is possible to use any of the geographic tools (Commission 2011, 11). Furthermore, due to the traditional division of security and development policies within the EU system and the ongoing inter-institutional 'turf war' between the Council and the Commission, the scope of the short-term component's army-support has practically been limited to "*complement*" CSDP civilian missions (Gourlay 2008, 96). In other words, the IfS short-term component can only engage in military support activities through so-called '*flanking measures*', meaning that it has to complement the objectives of an existing CSDP mission. In practice, this has ususally meant that the IfS short-term component can be only used to start the preparations for a more comprehensive SSR in a post-conflict situation. The work initiated with IfS support is then taken over by a CSDP mission, and possibly later followed up with the Commission's long-term funding (Gourlay 2008, 97).

Another thematic EC-instrument that can be used for SSR support in some cases is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Its objective is '*to provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries*' (Commission website on the EIDHR, accessed 6 April, 2012). As the EIDHR is a thematic instrument, similarly to the IfS, it is not geographically restricted to a certain region, but complements the EU's other external instruments. It was established in 1994 by an initiative of the European Parliament. Since its adoption, the EIDHR has been strengthened and revised on several occasions. Of these, the latest was in 2007, as the Instrument was transferred into the EC budget line. The budget of the EIDHR for the period of 2007–2013 is EUR 1.1 billion. (Commission's website on EIDHR, accessed 6 April, 2012)

Differently from the most regional instruments' programming, the programming of the EIDHR is not conditioned upon the approval of the partner country's government On the contrary, the instrument can support CSOs throughout the world even when the partner countries' governments do not wish to welcome such support. Furthermore, the EIDHR can even support non-legal entities and individual '*human right defenders'* in third countries (Commission's website on the EIDHR, accessed 6 April, 2012). However, despite its transfer under the EC common budget for the 2007–2013 budget period, the EIDHR support implementation is not particularly flexible, but has to go through the normal comitology process.

As the EIDHR focuses on supporting civil-society organisations it cannot be used to support comprehensive SSR programmes. Morevoer, due to the slow implementation process, the EIDHR support cannot be deployed rapidly. Nevertheless, the Instrument can contribute to some crucial aspects of SSR programming, such as the civilian accountability and oversight aspects, by providing support to organisations that seek to strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Buxton 2008, 30).

To conclude on the EU SSR tools and measures, it is clear that the EU institutions today possess a wide range of instruments and other measures to support human security-oriented security reforms in third countries. As has been presented here, the inclusion of conflict prevention and state failure prevention provide prime examples of the inclusion of development considerations into the EU's security policy since the 1990s.

Similarly, reflecting the increasing inclusion of security considerations into the EU development policy since the 1990s, the EC has recently introduced completely new instruments to promote conflict prevention and to 'complement' the CSDP-driven post-conflict crisis management. While none of the Commission's instruments focuses exclusively on SSR, a number of SSR-related activities can now be supported through the EC-administrated regional instruments, particularly since the extension of the ODA eligibility criteria in 2005. For example, many of the ACP countries' CSPs include EDF-funded SSR-activities, and funding has been allocated particularly to justice and police reforms. In post-conflict situations, the EC assistance has also been directed to the relevant executive branches of government as well as to democratic oversight

mechanisms. Furthermore, with the establishment of the new 'peace-support' tools within the regional instruments, such as the APF, as well as due to the creation of the new security-oriented thematic instruments, including the IfS, the EC-assistance can in some cases even bypass the ODA-eligibility criteria. As a result, the EC is becoming increasingly capable in supporting conflict prevention and SSR-activities, and to some extent even military reforms and military crisis management.

2.3 EU SSR Policy Framework

2.3.1 OECD SSR Guidelines

As was discussed above, the EU's conflict prevention and practical post-conflict reconstruction involvement has became increasingly focused around SSR activities since the late-1990s. At the same time, the EU institutions' instruments that can be used to support SSR activities have been evolving. As a result of these developments, the need to introduce legal concepts that define the precise EU SSR support principles, norms and objectives increased.

During the first years of the new millennium, the then fifteen EU Member States that were part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), were leading the work to adopt Committee's Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (Law & Myshlovska 2008, 11). Already since the mid-1990s the DAC had started to include conflict prevention and security aspects increasingly into its development policy formulation[9], and security sector/system reform had emerged as a practical concept for this new focus area. In April 2004, the DAC High Level Meeting adopted the OECD DAC Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance, which was then published as '*DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance'* in early-2005 (the same year when the Committee extended the ODA eligibility criteria to cover broad range of SSR activities). This document became the basis for the EU's own SSR concept, and a "*key point of reference for all SSR practitioners*" (Law & Myshlovska 2008, 11).

[9] Reflecting the increasing development-security merger, the OECD DAC had already in 1997 created a Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), which focused on conflict prevention. SSR had soon emerged as the Network's core focus area (OECD DAC Policy Statement 2004, 3), and it was the CPDC's Task Team on SSR, who formulated the DAC SSR Guidelines (OECD DAC SSR Guidelines 2005, 5).

The 2004 High Level Meeting policy statement expressed the need to understand the linkages between security and development. To address various security challenges, the DAC donors expressed in the document their commitment to "*structure thinking"*, which was "*founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies*', and which "*integrates development and security policies*'. Furthermore, the structure thinking aims to "*improves civilian involvement and oversight*" over the security sector. Other explicitly stated principles that should guide any SSR support activities were listed as transparency, accountability, as well as "*clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively"*. (OECD 2004, 4–6)

Furthermore, in the document the donors stated their strong commitment to a "*people-centred and locally owned*" security system reform, which is "*based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law"*. In fact, the document is based on an explicit *human security approach*, which understands security in a broad manner:

> Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. The security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. A wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and used by development actors.
>
> (ibid. 2004, 11)

Similarly, the definition of a security system, as the previous quotation already hints, is based on a broad conception, including all the state and non-state actors, who take part in the production of security in the given society. These include the 'core security actors'; the security management and oversight bodies; the justice and the law enforcement

institutions; as well as the non-statutory security forces[10]. (ibid. 2004, 11) This broad understanding is in fact highlighted even in the way the DAC uses the term '*security system*', instead of the '*security sector*'. For DAC, such reforms should focus on the whole system, through which security becomes produced.

> Security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.
>
> (ibid. 2004, 11; 2005, 20)

Due to this broad understanding of *security system*, which acknowledges the need to understand the "*major security challenges confronting the country*", and the actual forms through which security and insecurity are produced, the document also stresses the importance to develop context-specific and comprehensive SSR approaches: "*It is critical to look at how their [security] systems work, including the power relations among individuals and institutions. This kind of knowledge cannot be acquired through short missions or shorter-term technical assistance. Understanding how systems work requires close contact over an extended time*." Therefore the document invites donors to adopt comprehensive approaches that extend beyond all the security system's sectors, and to develop multi-sectoral strategies, which link the various security 'sectors' that are reformed under one such '*overall SSR strategy*'. Finally, in order to realise such a comprehensive and context-specific SSR approach in partner countries, the document invites donors to improve their cooperation. (OECD 2004, 19; 29; 31)

[10] The core actors include among else armed forces; police; intelligence and security services; border guards; and local security units. Security management and oversight bodies include the Executive; national security advisory bodies; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society organisations. Justice and law enforcement institutions include judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions; customary and traditional justice systems. Non-statutory security forces include liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias. (OECD 2004, 11)

2.3.2 EU SSR Concepts

Soon after the publication of the OECD DAC principles, the Council adopted its Concept on SSR. It was soon followed by the Commission's Concept, as well as a Commission–Council joint-SSR Concept, an overarching EU SSR policy document in mid-2006.

The Council concept paper, '*the EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform'*, adopted in 13 October 2005, lists the general SSR principles and norms for the CFSP/CSDP-supported SSR activities. Referring to the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the document states that a support to SSR in partner countries is one of the core areas for the EU action, and a major concept to promote human rights, democracy, peace and stability (Council 2005a, 4).

As all the EU policy documents on SSR, the Council document is based on the above-presented OECD DAC's SSR Guidelines. For example, the document defines security broadly, adopting a human security approach by arguing that the CSDP action in security sector reform should concern "*not only state stability and regime security of nations but also the safety and well-being of their people*", and that such reforms should always be "*based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law*" (ibid. 2005a, 9).

Furthermore, the document strictly follows DAC's broad definition of the security system, by defining security sector as consisting of the core actors, justice and law enforcement institutions, security management and oversight bodies, and the non-statutory actors. By referring to DAC Guidelines, the Concept explicitly stresses the importance of taking such broad and holistic multi-sectoral approach:

> Following the OECD guidelines there is a need to take a broad approach, engaging all these actors in reform efforts. Rather than focussing on a limited number of key sectors, a holistic, multi-sectoral approach is advocated. This approach includes the need to develop a clear institutional framework for providing security, strengthening of governance and political oversight of the security institutions, effective civilian control, as well as the need to build a capacity throughout the security system both accountable to civil authorities and capable of carrying out the required operational tasks.

(ibid. 2005a, 10)

Furthermore, the Concept stresses the importance of any SSR reform to address the normative aspects of the SSR, the "*issues of how security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled"* (ibid. 2005a, 9).

The principles guiding the ESDP/CSDP SSR support, presented in the Concept, include respect of local ownership, measuring progress, holistic approach, tailored approach, and coordinated approach – all in fact aspects that can be found in the OECD DAC SSR Guidelines. With regards to local ownership, the Concept stresses the importance of integrating SSR to national development plans and broader multilateral frameworks, and states that ESDP action can only support the local actors if it is formally invited by the partner government, or authorised by the UN Security Council. According to the concept, the holistic and tailored approach refers to the comprehensive, multi-sectoral and context-specific SSR action that ultimately "*addresses the security concerns of the people"*, and in which SSR activities are "*tailored to the specific needs of an individual state and its people as well as to its political environment both nationally and regionally*". (ibid. 2005a, 11–12, 17, 21)

However, while defining security broadly as human security, and the security sector as consisting all the relevant state and non-state entities who contribute to the production of security, there are still certain exclusively *state-centric* elements present in the document. For example, on page 9, it is stated that the "*security sector reform seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs"*, suddenly narrowing down the actual SSR-activities to concern only the state actors.

Soon after the Council had adopted its Concept for SSR, the Commission followed. In May 2006, it released its communication for the EC support for SSR, setting out the guiding principles, roles and activities for the Commission's SSR support. Similarly to the Council document, the Commission's concept follows the OECD DAC's human security approach, stating that the security of individuals should be at the centre of any national security agendas:

> For the EC, security is not limited to the territorial security of the state or to the security of a particular regime; it includes both the external and internal security of a state and its people. Thus, it focuses on human security (freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf), putting the security of citizens at the centre and thus complementing state security.
>
> (Commission 2006a, 4)

Following again the DAC's broad definition of the security sector, the Commission concept defines the security sector, or the security system[11] as including all the state and non-state actors contributing to the production of security (ibid. 2006a, 5). The concept also provides an exact definition for the SSR, describing it as "*transforming the security system, which includes all these actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well functioning security framework*" (ibid. 2006a, 5).

According to the Commission Concept, and still reflecting the DAC Guidelines, SSR activities should always aim to contribute to strengthening of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights (ibid. 2006a, 5). Furthermore, for the Commission, civilian control and oversight of the security sector are regarded as key aspects of SSR. Other guiding principles for the EC SSR support include the local ownership (based on a political dialogue with each partner county), as well as taking into account the local context, gender sensitivity, efficient use of public resources, and accountability and transparency across the public sector (ibid. 2006a, 7–8).

While certain state-centrism can be found also in the Commission's policy document[12], it is perhaps more careful in narrowing down the actual EC SSR action to concern only the state actors, which occasionally happens in the Council Concept. On the contrary,

[11] The concept document notes that these two terms, 'security sector' and 'security system', can be used inter-exchangeably (Commission 2006a, 3).

[12] For example, following the OECD DAC Paris principles the principle of ownership is interpreted as the ownership of the national leaders, and the EC-supported SSR-activities and priorities are, as discussed earlier, defined in CSPs together with the partner countries' governments.

according to the document, the role of the civil-society and "*other non-state structures of governance"* have to be taken into account in the development and implementation of national SSR programmes. Furthermore, the document calls for a context-specific SSR-support, which addresses the "*diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, [and is] based on a gender-sensitive multi-sector approach*". The document also recommends the EC to strengthen its short to medium-term engagement through development of relevant tools and instruments. Finally, the Concept calls the relevant EU actors to expand their expertise in SSR, and to mainstream it into programming (ibid. 2006a, 7; 9; 11)

Compared to the Council Concept, the Commission Communication provides perhaps a more specific overview of its available SSR-support tools, which include SSR-related activities through the various instruments. This is however understandable, as during the drafting of the Concepts, the first ESDP civilian missions were only taking shape, while the Commission's expertise on SSR-related support activities through its various instruments was already extensive[13].

Furthermore, both the Council and the Commission SSR policy concepts underline the need to enhance EU's inter-institutional cooperation, in order to make the EU action more coherent and effective. As the II pillar was now becoming more active in SSR-related activities, and as the scope of the EU SSR support was increasingly broadening to cover *human security*, as well as to address the whole *security system*, the both concepts seemed to understand the increasing importance of a coordinated effort. This was particularly important due to the still existing division of competencies between security and development-related actions in the EU external action but also because the Council's CSDP missions were meant to operate in a short to mid-term range, while development support was more long-term-oriented. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, due to the ongoing inter-institutional turf-war, there had rarely been effective inter-pillar coordination in the past (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven 2008, 52).

[13] According to the document, EC SSR support had in early-2006 been already allocated to over 70 countries through EC's thematic and regional instruments.

Therefore, a major objective for the joint-EU SSR policy framework, adopted in June 2006, was to ensure greater coherency and coordination between the pillars (as well as with the Member States' bilateral support). The EU SSR Framework became the overarching policy document for the EU SSR activities. It acknowledged the importance of the both pillars, and the both Concepts, and saw them complementing each other (Council 2006a, 2).

The three-page Framework document repeats the EU's commitment to the OECD DAC's broad conception of security sector, and similarly draws from the DAC's SSR Guidelines by restating the EU SSR-support 'principles', including national ownership, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights, nationally owned concept of security, the need to target the reforms in key sectors, parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector with accountability and transparency, and political dialogue (ibid. 2006a, 2–3). Furthermore, while the term human security is not explicitly spelled out, the document does refer to the importance for the EU SSR-support to address "*development and security concerns"*, and the "*security challenges facing states and their populations"*, which practically refers to human security (ibid. 2006a, 3).

In addition, the SSR Framework calls the EU institutions to adopt a "*gender-sensitive multi-sector approach to the provision of security and access to justice"*, and to take a "*case-by-case analysis based on a situation specific approach"*. Furthermore, the document calls for an approach that addresses security in a broad manner, and takes into account the "*role of civil society and other non-state structures of governance*" (ibid. 2006a, 3). Finally, it stresses the importance of a coordinated and coherent EU external action, which is based on case-specific analysis "*on a situation specific approach"* to determine whether action should be taken through the "*ESDP or the Community action or a combination of both"* (ibid. 2006a, 3).

In policy terms, the EU Policy Framework for SSR is definitely a major breakthrough for the integration of the Commission's and Council's SSR approaches. The document provides the EU actors common conceptual guidance by defining the principles for EU engagement in SSR and underlying the importance of a comprehensive and cross-pillar approach. However, the Framework's practical guidance for effective coordination

between the Council and the Commission remains low, as it does not specify in detail which pillar should be used in which case. The document only states that the Council and the Commission should "*ensure consistency between their activities in accordance with Article 3 of the TEU [The Treaty of European Union or the Maastricht Treaty]"* (ibid. 2006a, 3). The Article in question, in turn, only presents the various Community activities, including development policy, and states rather ambiguously the following:

> In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
>
> (Treaty on the European Union 1992, 3–4)

Therefore the Framework does not solve the practical problem of how to implement coherent and comprehensive SSR programmes between the different EU institutions. As Doelle & Gouzée de Harven (2008, 52) argue, the Framework "*clearly does not deliver all the expected results and is merely a declaratory document, in practice risking the status of wishful thinking"*.

3 SYSTEM APPROACH TO SECURITY ANALYSIS AND THE CONGOLESE SECURITY SYSTEM

3.1 Importance of a Systems-Focused Approach to Security Analysis

As the previous chapter showed, the EU has developed a widening set of instruments and policies to address development and security challenges in third countries in a holistic, comprehensive and context-specific manner. In particular, the EU approach seeks to address how insecurity is actually being produced and reproduced in a given security system, and to focus on addressing the root causes behind this insecurity. The second part of this chapter will therefore provide a system-oriented historical overview of the production and rootcauses of insecurity in the contemporary Congo, focusing particularly on the ongoing large-scale violence in the Eastern Congo, as this is the area where most of the today's violence occurs.

Before going to the actual overview, the first part of this chapter presents a framework, based particularly on Kalyvas' (2003) and Autesserre's (2010) thinking, to approach the production of insecurity in a given context through a system-perspective. Such an approach acknowledges that the rootcauses of the Congolese human insecurity have to be identified and addressed in order to create sustainable development and security. Therefore focus should be on the whole system, and on all the actors and factors that have the potential to contribute to the production of security and insecurity.

By focusing on the *security system,* this framework emphasises the dynamic causality, holism, and interconnectedness of the different social phenomena. It therefore provides a good starting point to analyse the continuing insecurity in a given context. In particular, it provides a basis for understanding how the different levels from global to local interact; and how those maintain or transform the social, political and economic realities in which the people in a given context live.

In order to study a particular social phenomenon, such as an eruption of a conflict or consolidation of peace in a given society, it is necessary to first recognise and understand the plurality of other social phenomena, and the various actors and structures, which influence in transforming or maintaining the existing social reality. This interconnectedness between the social phenomena, and between the various

actors capable in influencing each other, is the starting point of such an analysis: Social phenomena do not exist in a vacuum but are essentially connected to other social phenomena.

At the same time, it is important to address the dynamics of the different levels in which the various actors operate, and the linkages that these actors form, within and across the different levels. These levels include the individual, local, national, regional, as well as global, and the importance of actors operating at different levels varies over time, depending on how the social structures become transformed, and how the linkages, the alliances and the cleavages, between the various actors evolve.

For example, while the changing global structures or evolving regional relationships may contribute in the emergence of a conflict in a national level at one point of time, local cleavages or evolving relationships between the local and the national actors may influence on the continuation and transformation of the same conflict in another time. Similarly, while local disputes may trigger a conflict, the global structural transformations might help to sustain it. The point is that there hardly ever is just one contributing factor in the emergence of a particular social event, but various events and actors at different levels, whose combined influence generates the phenomenon in question.

Before moving on to the history of the Congolese (non-)state, and to the analysis of the various explanatory factors contributing to the creation and continuation of insecurity and poverty, one important consideration has to be made: Between the experts, and reflecting the wider divisions among the social scientists in general, there are considerably differing interpretations on the underlying factors explaining the emergence and continuation of insecurity and underdevelopment in any given context, including in the DRC.

First, there are commentators emphasising *internal factors* in explaining the problems related to insecurity and lack of development of the fragile states such as the Congo, as well as ones focusing on *external* or *structural* causes. A second distinction can be made between the commentators emphasising the significance of *macro-level* events behind the Congo's misery; and the others arguing for the importance of *micro-level* dynamics.

These explanatory factors – the emphasis on internal or structural factors, and the importance of the macro or micro level dynamics – are then combined and emphasised in different ways by academics and practitioners to form coherent narratives of the Congo's continuing violence, depending on the ontological assumptions and the ideological standpoint of each analyst. While lack of space forbids a comprehensive introduction of even the more important of such narratives, a few general marks have to be made here.

The importance of internal and structural factors in the production of insecurity and underdevelopment in African states such as the Congo is a widely debated topic. This debate has many variations, but broadly speaking the camp focusing on internal factors conceives the everlasting violence and poverty as resulting from issues indigenous to the country concerned. These include among else inefficient economic policies, high levels of corruption and lack of good governance [14]; the absence of the liberal democratic structures/institutions [15]; greedy, rent-seeking and criminal leaders benefitting from the corrupted system and from the insecurity itself[16]; and inefficient or 'primitive' practices, institutions or beliefs that are rooted in tradition and culture[17].

The approach focusing on external (or structural) issues, owing to the structuralist approaches of the 1970s, in turn emphasises the significance of structural transformations, particularly those in the global level, in explaining the development and security provision failures in fragile states such as the Congo. Such structural factors often include the legacy of colonialism (in destroying the African traditional social order and institutions, and replacing them with states and European-modelled institutions ill-suited for African realities); the unequal character of the global trade regime; the imposition of the 'new public management/policy' (NPM) to the South [18]; the 'grievances', or the growing sentiments of inequality felt by certain social or ethnic groups due to such global or national level structural transformations[19]; as well as the

[14] Emphasised particularly in the neoliberal economic approach, see Hewitt (1998, 300–307).
[15] See for example, the Liberal Peace thesis presented by Michael Doyle (2012).
[16] The 'greed' side of the greed versus grievance debate.
[17] Particularly emphasised by the new barbarist school.
[18] See for example, Duffield (2001, 48).
[19] The 'grievance' side of the greed versus grievance debate.

eroding effects of the economic globalisation[20] (and the ending of the Cold War) for the authority and functioning of developing countries.

While the actual international development and peacebuilding practitioners' conceptions of the causes of insecurity and underdevelopment are of course a mixture of different internal and structural factors, it must be noted here that particularly in the 1980s and since then, the views that stress the importance of the former have gained influence at the expense of the approaches that focus on the latter. For example, the main international development actors have since the 1980s been emphasising internal policy reforms, and particularly privatisation and downsizing of the public sector, as engines for economic growth, while structural factors have remained less addressed. While in the field of development the focus has since the 1990s, due to the apparently failing structural adjustment programmes, turned from maximisation of the economic growth towards poverty reduction and statebuilding, the major emphasis is nevertheless still on internal factors. These factors include eradication of corruption, sound macro-economic management, liberal democratic institutions and promotion of good governance (Hewitt 1998, 304–308).

Furthermore, with the increasing merging of the development and security actors' agendas over the past decades, the security provision-failures have similarly become interpreted as resulting largely from similar internal causes, such as the absence of good governance and democratic institutions, and the prevalence of widespread corruption and greedy elites.

However, instead of arguing for the insignificance of such internal factors for the actual production of insecurity and development failures, it is important to also understand how the underlying structural factors are either indirectly contributing to the their production by enabling the above-mentioned internal factors to emerge, or how they might at times even directly contribute to their emergence. On the contrary, in order to really understand the rootcauses of human insecurity, and following the OECD DAC SSR approach reasoning, it is then necessary to understand how the whole security system

[20] See for example, Kaldor (1999, 2–4).

works, and how the various structural and internal factors are interconnected and often mutually reinforcing.

Such external or structural factors that possibly influence the production of the human insecurity in national or local levels are of course numerous, and cannot be even listed. However, a few influential ones, frequently appearing in the literature on African contemporary internal conflicts and development failures, include the legacy of colonialism, the challenges created by intensifying globalisation, the imposition of NPM to the South, and the Cold War geopolitics.

For example, the legacy of colonialism, of which the King Leopold's extremely brutal colonial rule in the Congo serves as a prime example, as will be discussed in the following chapter, has to be taken into account in order to really understand and address the actual rootcauses of insecurity in certain African weak states. The colonial legacy might include among else (as it does in the Congo) strengthening of the erosion of traditional social, political and economic order; the intensification of tensions over land ownership between different groups due to colonial land reforms; and the very creation of a state structure and an administrative culture that is primarily interested in profit maximisation of certain external entity/elite faction, with little interest in the promotion of general *human security*.

Similarly, certain more recent global level structural transformations have played a major role in the erosion of state authority and the redistribution of political power in various African countries. In fact, Mobutu's Zaire of the 1980s–1990s, as will be discussed in the following chapter, makes again a prime example of how many states in the global 'South' have weakened, and become non-integrated in the post-Cold War global economy in the process of globalisation[21], and through the imposition of the new public policy[22], or how globalisation has generally allowed new forms of sub- or trans-national authority to emerge and challenge the state's monopoly over violence.

---

[21]The term '*globalisation*' refers here to the '*world-wide economic and political convergence around liberal market principles and the increasing real-time integration of business, technological and financial systems*', following Duffield's (2001, 46) definition.

[22] The '*new public management*' (NPM) or '*new public policy*' refers to the neoliberal economic policies that became dominant in the 1980s among the Western states and the International Financial Institutions

For example, according to Mark Duffield (2001, 47–48), globalisation forces states both in the North and the South to rework their public policy and to cut their domestic welfare expenditure. Since the 1980s, privatisation – and when not feasible, marketisation, the introduction of private sector management and accounting techniques – of public services has become seen as a panacea to maintain economic growth and to increase the economic competitiveness in a globalising world:

> [P]ublic institutions have been corporatised and run as if they were capitalist enterprises. ...Increasingly, national economic strategy has shifted towards domestic budgetary restraint coupled with global trade liberalisation. By the beginning of the 1980s, this model had assumed a dominant position among the OECD countries and, through the efforts of the World Bank and IMF, has become the template in the South as well.
>
> (Duffield 2001, 48).

As a result of this downsizing of the public sector, the competence of the states both in the North and the South has eroded. However, due to the imposition of a much more extreme form of neoliberal structural adjustment in the South, coupled with an absence of "*mediating and compensatory mechanisms"* that exist in the North, the process has had much more devastating consequences in the South, often including a breakdown of the social cohesion and deepening poverty (Duffield 2001, 149).

In the process, part of the authority that previously belonged to states is turned over to various actors of multiple levels, such as the international organisations, the IFIs, multinational corporations (MNCs), private military companies (PMCs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), as well as a plethora of various sub-national actors: from wealthy businessmen and merchant networks to sub-national security and justice providers, and from religious leaders to local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While in the North the transnational networks – the "*global liberal governance"* – that these actors have formed, have become increasingly interconnected through the process of globalisation, much of the South has been integrated to the global economy

(IFIs), characterised by privatisation, marketisation and internationalisation (Duffield 2001, 49), and which emphasise '*domestic budgetary restraint and promotion of trade liberalisation'* (ibid. 149).

only through the informal economy. This phenomenon, in which the state- and non-state actors from both the North and the South become interconnected through the emerging transnational networks of formal and informal economy through the process of *globalisation* and due to the imposition of new public management, Duffield calls the "*expansion of transborder shadow economies"*. (ibid. 2001, 146–151)

Furthermore, in an inter-connected system, such massive structural transformations influence the processes through which national and even local security and insecurity are produced. For Mary Kaldor (1999, 2–4), processes related to globalisation, defined as "*intensification of global political, economical, military and cultural interconnectedness, and the ensuing changing character of political authority"*, are the key driving forces behind the contemporary conflicts, or the '*new wars'*. This refers to the post-Cold War low-intensity conflicts that involve myriad transnational connections, and therefore blur the lines between internal and external, and local and global.

Typically based around the disintegration of states, such '*post-modern conflicts'* generally take place between various state and non-state groups, each of which attempts to impose their own definition of the national identity of the state and its population. Furthermore, the increasing inter-connectedness and the fragmentation of states' political authority, caused by the intensifying globalisation, also changes the ways how conflicts are funded: While in the '*modern*' inter-state conflicts the war-economy was centralised and authartic, the new war economies are rather decentralised, and the fighting units now "*finance themselves through plunder, hostage-taking and the black market or through external assistance*". (Kaldor 1999, 10)

For Duffield, the emergence of transborder shadow economies caused by globalisation, and the imposition of the NPM provides the mechanism through which these post-modern conflicts are funded: As the state authority erodes and the old forms of state patronage networks and formal survival strategies become non-viable, new non-state networks and informal strategies emerge to replace them. For example, as the new public policy reforms downsize the public sector, the government officials, including the police and the military, have to find alternative sources of income. As existing survival strategies are undermined and as unemployment increases, the shadow economy might

be the only available alternative for survival. As the state's control over its territory and borders gets eroded, illicit resource extraction and transnational trade might offer an alternative survival strategy. Security actors may also, for instance, introduce informal taxes for local populations, or start selling arms to private actors, or even join the ranks of rebel movements who are now increasingly capable in challenging the state authority themselves. (Duffield 2001, 150)

While globalisation coupled with the implementation of the new public management, are probably the largest contemporary transformational phenomena redistributing the political and economic authority away from certain states, other structural level transformations are further strengthening the trend.

For instance, the Cold War geopolitics had tremendous influence on the existence of African socialist and developmental states, influencing the national-level dynamics throughout the continent, and therefore necessarily affected the ways conflicts took place. For example, as is also clear in the context of the Congo, the external superpower support affected greatly to the allocation of political power between different ideological, social or even ethnic factions within the society, as well as on their access to economic, including military, resources: During the Cold War, most African states were heavily backed by either the West or the Soviet Union. Such support was based purely on ideological fault lines, and basically given on the basis of membership in the correct ideological camp. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed in the early-1990s, the need for the West to support its former Cold War proxies decreased, which added greatly to the problems of many African states to maintain their extensive public sectors (de Waal 2000, 15).

With regards to the various internal factors' role in the production of insecurity in African 'fragile states', there has also been a tendency to focus particularly on national level processes, and see the civil wars as resulting from national (and possibly regional) level events, while micro-level dynamics get often rather ignored. In the case of the Congo, this trend is clear: The (often destructive) role of the national and regional actors

and particularly the one of national elites is strongly emphasised in the literature[23], while local dynamics are often seen merely as reflecting the national and regional events. Congo Wars of the 1990s, for instance, tend often to be depicted as having simply been caused by the Rwandan genocide's domino effect, as the Hutu refugees (together with the perpetrators of the genocide), fearing for the new Rwandan Tutsi regime's reprisals, fled to the Zairean side, which was followed by a Rwandan-masterminded invasion of the weak Zairean state. Local conflicts of the Eastern Congo are, in turn, generally seen as merely mirroring the national (or regional) cleavages and only having erupted due to the effective manipulation of the local groups by the national elites.

However, as Kalyvas (2003) and Autesserre (2010) have pointed out, while regularly neglected, local dynamics are often of a crucial importance both in the emergence and continuation of violence. Instead of merely mirroring the national '*master cleavages'*, they often have dynamics on their own that stem from micro-level issues, such as local land disputes or struggles over local political or economic authority (Autesserre 2010, 176). Furthermore, in weak states such as the Congo, local actors can in fact often even manipulate the national actors' behaviour in order to strengthen their own position, and thus influence themselves on the macro-level events (Kalyvas 2003, 484). The point is then that a simple top-down analysis is not sufficient in explaining the patterns that create and sustain violence in countries such as the Congo, but a more holistic and context-specific approach is needed, just as the OECD DAC SSR Guidelines calls for.

When assessing the capability of the various actors at different levels to influence on the social, political and economic realities in a particular context, a useful starting point is then to look at how the relationships between macro- and micro-level actors have evolved over time. Here the approach constructed by Kalyvas (2003) provides a useful conceptual basis. Rather than positing dichotomies between micro- and macro-level dynamics (or between 'greed and grievance') in the creation of violence, Kalyvas focuses

[23] Examples of the academics focusing on regional and national events while very much ignoring the local dynamics include Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2008; and Berkeley 2001. In addition, according to Autesserre (2010, 42–47), the Security Council Resolutions, most news items on the Great Lakes, as well as nearly all diplomats and UN officials working in the Congo during the Transition period adhere to a top-down view of the causes of insecurity and violence, which then affects to their peacebuilding priorities.

on the interaction between the macro- and micro-level actors, and between political and private identities.

According to Kalyvas (2003, 482; 486), the top-down accounts of emergence of African civil wars tend to focus mainly on a master cleavage – an overarching '*issue dimension*', such as ideology, religion, or ethnicity – in explaining the emergence and continuation of conflicts. Furthermore, in such analyses the agency tend to be located in the centre and the local dynamics are only interpreted as mirroring the macro-level events. However, adoption of a more holistic approach that focuses on the interaction between the macro- and the micro-levels, allows a more comprehensive account to the emergence of violence. Of a particular importance are then the changing alliances that the national (or regional) and the local actors form, in which the various actors in the centre are linked to the ones in the periphery through an interactive relationship.

Focus on the interaction and the alliances between the different levels' actors enables the analyst to locate the agency both in the centre and the periphery, and instead of focusing on one overarching issue, it allows to take into account a variety of factors that contribute to the emergence of violence:

> Alliance entails a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive local advantage; in exchange the former rely on local conflicts to recruit and motivate supporters and obtain local control, resources, and information – even when their ideological agenda is opposed to localism.
>
> (Kalyvas 2003, 486).

Alliances between the national and the local actors evolve and change over time, depending on how the different levels' actors can use them in furthering their interests (Kalyvas 2003, 484). Causality may, and does, therefore run into both directions, top–down and bottom–up.

Following Kalyvas' analysis, this study treats the Congo's recent conflicts, and particularly the ongoing violence in the Eastern Congo, not merely as a '*binary conflict*' with a master cleavage, but as an remarkably complex and ambiguous set of processes,

in which the local, national and regional actors with diverse motives interact and form alliances, in the context of constantly transforming global-level structures. Rather than seeing the Congo's insecurity as having simply been caused by national level events and a top-down master cleavage, the emphasis here is placed upon understanding the convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives, and of private and political issues, which together construct the patterns through which violence becomes produced.

The next chapter, following a system approach, provides a brief but contextual analysis of the Congolese insecurity and of the rootcauses of the ongoing violence in the Eastern Congo. This is the particular context in which the European Union is now operating, as it gets involved in the security sector reform in the DRC. The next chapter seeks to take into account both the internal and the structural explanatory factors, as well as the various events and actors at different levels, whose interactions and evolving relationships have generated the current social, political and economic realities that sustain and transform the everyday security and welfare – or insecurity and destitution – of the Congolese people. While the overall focus is on the system and its different levels, particular focus is given to the local level actors, as this level is often missing from analyses that seek to explain the ongoing violence in the Congo.

3.2 The Congolese Context: An Analysis of the Root Causes of the Congolese Human Insecurity through a Systems Approach

> « Enrichissez-vous et, si vous volez, ne volez pas trop en même temps. Vous pourriez être arrêté. Volez intelligemment, un peu à la fois »
>
> -- Mobutu Sese Seko[24]

> « Structural adjustment did not help. Over half of the national budget was devoted to debt service. The economic situation worsened, severe poverty became rampant and unemployment escalated. The development of informal economy...is a direct repercussion of a failed Structural Adjustment Programme »
>
> -- Theodore Trefon 2011, 24

3.2.1 The Colonial Legacy and the Local Conflicts in the East

As discussed in the previous chapter, in order to understand the continuing insecurity and development failure in the Congo, one has to focus on the various levels of the holistic system, and on both the different internal and structural factors, capable in creating, maintaining or transforming the existing social, political and economic realities. The importance of the different levels, the impact of the various overarching structures, and the capability of different actors to transform those structures changes undoubtedly over the course of time, depending on how the system as a whole evolves. To understand the emergence and continuation of insecurity in the Congo, it is then of a particular importance to address both the macro and the micro level dynamics, and to incorporate both the internal and the structural factors into the analysis. Following a system approach, and using the Kalyvas' analysis of the importance of changing alliances and cleavages between the different levels' actors in the emergence and continuation of conflicts, this section will seek to provide a contextual account of the Congolese insecurity.

[24] Mobutu allegedly encouraged his officials with these words to steal from the government. See for example Le Vine (1993, 273).

The history of the Congolese state's inability to provide security and welfare to its citizens traces back to the creation of the colonial Congo Free State in the late-19th century. In this private colony of the Belgian monarch Leopold II, millions of Congolese were brutally taken to forced labour by the 'Force Publique', the newly established colonial army. The few decades of forced labour and pillage during the Leopold II's regime eventually claimed the lives of millions of Congolese, perhaps even half of the contemporary population (Hochschild 2004, 285–286).

During the Belgian colonial enterprise of 1908–1960, the pattern of exploitation continued: profits from the extracted resources kept on flowing to Europe (Turner 2007, 44), or as Naniuzeyi (1999, 674) puts it: "*Belgian financial interests became, ipso facto, an integral part of the colonial enterprise"*.

Furthermore, while forced labour was technically abandoned during the Belgian colonisation, the colonial authority continued to transform the traditional order in a number of ways. Particularly in the densely populated Eastern Congo, access to land was, and remains today, a primary means to gain social status and secure resources – and in the end, key to survival and ability to feed one's family. While land conflicts between the different ethnic groups have to some extent existed in the Eastern Congo long before Europeans arrived[25], the arrival of colonisers often exacerbated such conflicts, as well as created completely new pressures. By transforming and undermining the traditional mechanisms to access land, and by drastically increasing the pressure for available land, the colonial rule effectively sowed the seeds of the contemporary Eastern Congo land conflicts, which today play a major part in the continuation of the violence in the East.

Firstly, Belgians declared all the uncultivated land a state property, distributing large parts of it to colonial families, taking it on the land market, or transforming it into national parks, therefore reducing the native communities' access to land drastically (Vlassenroot 2000, 62–63). Communities were also often forced to abandon their traditional ways of living, and start growing cash crops for the European market (Turner

[25] For example, according to Autesserre (2010, 173), conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, such as Hema and Lendu ethnic groups of the Ituri District, have existed for centuries.

2007, 111–112). For example, in Ituri district, the land conflicts between the various ethnic groups, and especially between the Hema and the Lendu intensified due to the colonial land reforms (Autesserre 2010, 170–173). In Katanga, in turn, land conflicts between the North and South exacerbated, and in all over the Eastern Congo, the conflicts between the other ethnic groups and the Pygmies, who often lived as hunterer-gatherers in forests, were increasingly intensifying due to colonial land reforms (ibid. 2010, 170–173).

Secondly, the colonists divided Congolese into ethnic communities, each with its own customary law and authority, and ruled them indirectly through the selected local chiefs, granting the chiefs the monopoly on administrative, executive and judicial power over their own community, including a right to grant their subjects access to land. This resulted in certain groups becoming excluded from land access, and led to a formation of the first grassroots militias, whose initial goal was to preserve the traditional order (Autesserre 2010, 130–131; Turner 2007, 108–114).

Thirdly, and particularly importantly with regards to the eruption of the Congo Wars and the ensuing contemporary violence in the Eastern Congo, the seeds of the so-called '*Banyamulenge question'* were sown, as the Belgians started transferring Rwandan migrant-workers to the Eastern Congo: While some Rwandophone[26] people had lived in the Eastern Congo already before the colonists had arrived (Turner 2007, 108–109), during the 1930s the colonial authority started transferring tens of thousands of Rwandans to the Eastern Congo to work in the plantations of the Kivus and the mines of Katanga. The status of these workers soon became ambiguous: As they were not considered as 'indigenous', they were generally not granted the ethnic citizenship,

[26] Rwandophone refers here to both the Tutsi and the Hutu population of the Eastern Congo, who originate from Rwanda or Burundi's territory and who speak the Kinyarwandan language. First of these people had already settled in the Eastern Congo before the colonists arrived. They had often been expelled from Tutsi kingdoms by the contemporary ruling elites, mainly due to political reasons. The second group (mainly Hutu, but some Tutsi too) consisted of labour migrants that were transferred to the Eastern Congo during the colonial era to work in the mines and plantations, as well as in the colonial administration. The third group consists of various waves of Hutu and Tutsi refugees who have fled Rwanda and Burundi due to the post-colonial violence. For example, at the eve of the independence, the Rwandan Tutsi had to flee the massive violence caused by the revolting Hutu, and in the 1970s thousands of Hutu from Burundi fled the Tutsi-initiated mass-killings. However, in everyday use, the the term Banyamulenge has become ambiguos and is often used to refer generally to the Rwandophone population in the Eastern Congo. (Turner 2007, 107–108)

which among else, remained the key factor in access to land and wealth at a local level through the customary authority. However, these Rwandans were often hired to the colonial administration, which in fact sometimes granted them more political and economic power than even the indigenous chiefs had received, and allowed the Rwandophone to access the land labelled as non-customary. This created tensions between the 'indigenous' groups and the Rwandophone people of the Eastern Congo (Autesserre 2010, 130–134).

Turner (2007, 111–112) accounts how such manipulations of traditional authority and of population increased the land pressure in Rutshuru territory in the North Kivu province:

> Rutshuru was apparently quite densely populated when the Belgians arrived, yet they proceeded to move people around in ways that greatly increased pressure on the land. They moved Rwandophone Hutu out, to clear space for European coffee planters (who received 60 to 70 hectares each) and to create...the Virunga Park. The new park occupied half of the Rutshuru territory and cut the Bwisha *chefferie* in half. The people displaced by these major projects were resettled in paysannats or state farms, where they lived alongside Nande, whose home territory is further north. The Hutu and Nande were forced to grow coffee.

Similar population transfers of Rwandans to the Eastern Congo, but in an even larger scale were repeated in the 1950s by the colonial administration, which further increased the pressure on land tenure and led to the first open land conflicts between the 'natives' (in this case the Hunde) and the Rwandophones in 1957 (Turner 2007, 113).

This Belgian manipulation of population and administrative units effectively laid the foundations of the today's land and resource conflicts in the Eastern Congo, many of which occur between the indigenous and the Rwandophone communities. Such conflicts exacerbated further in the post-colonial Zaire, eventually playing a major part in the escalation of the war in the mid-1990s, and continue to threaten the stability of the whole region today.

While the Belgian rule in the Central Africa was drawing to its end in the late-1950s, the local land conflicts of the Eastern Congo continued to evolve. In 1959, just before the Congo's independence, the Hutu populations of Rwanda started revolting against the Belgian colonial rule and the indirectly ruling Tutsi minority, causing an influx of tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees to the Congolese side (Turner 2007, 114–115)[27]. These rather macro-events again increased the local tensions between the 'natives' and the Rwandophone groups of the Eastern Congo, which in Masisi territory culminated in 1963 in the '*Kanyarwanda'* war that lasted for two years and saw "*tremendous violence on both sides*" (Autesserre 2010, 134).

3.2.2 Post-colonial Zaire, Mobutu's Patrimonialism and the Changing Alliances

The post-colonial Zairean state, organised around a presidential monarch Mobutu Sese Seko (who seized the power in 1965) with the 'approval' of the United States, continued to exploit the land and its population (Callaghy 1986, 221). Backed by the Western states in the context of Cold War geopolitics, Mobutu's Zaire adopted the Belgian colonial state structure and patrimonialised it by creating an administrative monarchy, which was then used to recentralize the coercive, administrative and financial power (Callaghy 1986, 221). Opposition was either eliminated, or used cleverly among factions of Mobutu's patronage network to neutralise the network's threat to the president (Reno 1998, 149). This '*divide and rule'* strategy, allowed the president and his associates to enrich themselves for decades, without having to fear the opposition of growing to threaten or challenge the president's authority.

Keeping the country together was however, a difficult task. Comprised of over 300 ethnic groups, of which most did not have much of a connection or affiliation to each other before the colonial era, the state of the Congo, or Zaire as Mobutu renamed it in 1971, was a rather artificial construction. Not surprisingly then, right after the Congo's independence in 1960, the mineral-rich province of Katanga tried to secede. The

[27] Interestingly, however, while in the newly independent Rwanda (and Burundi) the cleavage took clearly place between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups, in the Congolese side of the border cleavages have followed much more complex patterns. For example, until the 1980s, and despite the inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda, the various Hutu and Tutsi populations of the South Kivu have largely been cooperating, wanting to distance themselves from the Rwandan influence, and the cleavages have more often occurred between the indigenous populations and the Rwandophone populations, than between the Hutu and the Tutsi. (Mamdani 2001, 235; 246–249)

secession attempt ended only in 1963 after a UN mission with a peace-enforcement mandate, unprecedented in the Cold War geopolitical context, was sent to overpower the rebels. Further insurrections still took place in Katanga later in the 1960s and in the 1970s, some of which even the neighbouring countries, as well as the United States, France and Belgium got involved.

Independence did not bring an end to the land conflicts of the Kivus and the Province of Orientale. Quite the contrary, the Mobutu's patrimonial network depended on allies, and the changing alliances between national and local actors influenced the local conflict dynamics. Mobutu regarded the support of small minorities useful for consolidating his authority, as strong minority groups could keep the larger groups in check, but were however unlikely to grow influential enough to threaten the president's own position. In return the minority groups loyal to the president, such as the Rwandophone populations of the East, could use the state authority to improve their position at a local level. By the late-1960s, the Rwandophone had managed to win Mobutu's support, and Tutsis were increasingly nominated to high national positions. The central regime also allowed Rwandese immigration from Rwanda, and in 1972, all the Rwandophone people who had arrived in the Congo prior to 1950 were granted the Zairean citizenship. (Autesserre 2010, 135)

The alliance between Mobutu and the Rwandophone was strengthened by the Banyamulenge's support to the government's troops, after a clash between two local Fulero leaders had evolved into a rebellion against the government in the early-1970s. Thanks to the support of the Banymulenge, the government managed to end the rebellion by the mid-1970s. Needless to stay, this deepened the tensions between the Banyamulenge community and the 'indigenous' groups. Of these, particularly the Pembe, who had a long history of conflicts with the Rwandophone groups, were already antagonistic towards them. (Autesserre 2010, 138–140)

The post-colonial Zaire had initially kept the colonial system of land control, in which the 'native' groups were able to control some parts of the highly valued land, but Mobutu's land reform of 1973, the so-called 'Bakajika Law', which was planned by Barthélémy Bisangimana, himself a Tutsi, made all except the customary land a state

property (Autesserre 2010, 136). Particularly the Rwandophone groups benefited from the reform, as land was distributed to the political allies of the regime as a reward for their loyalty (Turner 2007, 117).

Furthermore, the prospering Rwandophone businessmen managed even to buy large sections of customary land from local chiefs "*through murky transactions"*, which resulted in creating overlapping ownership claims based both on modern and traditional law (Autesserre 2010, 136). Conflicts between the Rwandophone groups and the minority indigenous communities deepened, and both sides felt as victims: Rwandophone groups still remained excluded from traditional authority at the local level and the 'anti-Banyarwandan' sentiments were growing among the other groups. Indigenous minority tribes, in turn, regarded the Rwandophone as immigrants who were not entitled to the customary land, and accused the Tutsis of having cheated when acquiring their land. Furthermore, they saw the Rwandophone as preventing the indigenous groups' influence at the national level. (Autesserre 2010, 136–138)

At the same time, new fault lines were emerging within both camps. The tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi were resurrecting due to the violent clashes in Rwanda, as the arriving refugees from Rwanda increasingly imported such tensions to the Zairean soil as well. Furthermore, the immigrating, often rather wealthy Rwandans could afford to buy large pieces of land, while the Rwandophone groups who had lived in Zaire longer could necessarily not. This created new divisions among the Rwandophone people (Autesserre 2010, 136).

Similarly, the growing pressures on land tenure had exacerbated the conflicts among the different '*native*' groups since the colonial era all over the Eastern Congo. The colonial land reforms had often worsened the forest-dwelling Pygmies' access to land, and they continued to be conflicting with other ethnic groups in various parts of the Eastern Congo. In Ituri district, the land conflicts between the various ethnic groups had intensified due to the colonial land reforms, and similarly to the Tutsi of the Kivus, the Hema continued benefitting from belonging to Mobutu's patrimonial networks, which in turn generated deep resentments among other communities, and particularly among the Lendu. In Katanga, in turn, the rivalries between North and South Katangans

continued, as did the antagonism toward '*Kasaian groups*' by other groups. While lack of space forbids the detailed overview of the various micro-level conflicts, it should be noted that similar local disputes between different clans, tribes, and ethnic communities existed everywhere in the Eastern Congo. (Autesserre 2010, 170–173)

While Mobutu had managed to use the strategic alliances to consolidate his own position as a sovereign ruler at the national level, in the 1970s his authority started to erode slowly due to a number of factors. The unproductive character of its political autocracy, combined with its patrimonial nature, had made the regime extremely dependent on external allies, the Western powers. By late-1970s, Mobutu's extensive nationalisation policies and the ambiguous industrial development projects were apparently failing, and Zaire's external debt was soaring (Turner 2007, 35). Reinvestment in basic infrastructure nearly halted, and by mid-1980s, only 15 percent of the roads inherited from the colonial rule remained passable (Ayoade 1988, 106).

Lack of reinvestment also led to a rapid erosion of the crucial mining infrastructure, which was compounded by the sharply falling copper world market prices during the 1970s (Wrong 2000, 94). By the mid-1980s, the mineral exports had fallen drastically (Reno 1998, 151), and the economy was in the verge of collapse, further undermining the state's ability to perform its functions, such as providing security to its people.

3.2.3 State Collapse

Against this background – and as the neoliberal macro-economic policy line was gaining strength in the Western world in the 1980s, the debtors started insisting on economic and political reforms, as well as military reorganisation (Callaghy 1986, 222). By the end of the decade, over half of the national budget was devoted to debt service, while economic stability was sought by containing budget deficits, downsizing public sector and providing incentives for private sector investment (Trefon 2011, 24).

The end of the Cold War added to the dynamic of the waning state authority. As the Soviet Union was dismantling, the need for the West to support its former Cold War proxies as bulwarks against communism decreased (de Waal 2000, 15). In the case of Zaire, this meant that the Western external support was drastically cut, and any new loans was conditioned on political and economic reforms. According to Time Magazine

(24 June, 2001), Mobutu remarked the change in the U.S. attitude bitterly by stating that "*I am the latest victim of the cold war, no longer needed by the U.S.".* Soon, the IMF stopped practically all the loan payments to the Zairean government in 1991 as it regarded that the reforms it insisted did not proceed satisfactorily.

By the early-1990s, the growing international pressure, combined with an increasing discontent among the population, forced Mobutu to adopt a new policy that increased political freedoms: a new constitution was adopted, which allowed multi-party elections and limited the presidency terms (Collier 2009, 17). The president, however, while reluctantly acquiescing to such reforms to keep the economy from collapsing, did his best to preserve the patrimonial system. The shrinking state resources were centralised nearly completely under his personal command (Reno 1998, 153), security troops were used to harass the emerging opposition parties, and dissident politicians were sought to be bought off to keep the opposition fragmented (Naniuzeyi 1999, 681).

In order to divert the accusations away from the failures of his own regime, the president decided to capitalise on the growing anti-Rwandophone sentiments. In 1991, the National Sovereign Conference, established by the president to consider potential political reforms, rejected the 'non-indigenous' groups' representation (Autesserre 2010, 140). Throughout the 1980s, there had been low-level violence with occasional sporadic clashes between the 'natives' and the Rwandophone all over the Kivus, and by the early-1990s, tensions had grown extremely high. Mobutu started now promoting the principle of '*indigeneity*', discriminating the allegedly '*non-indigenous'* groups, such as the Rwandophone people of the Eastern Zaire, and blocking their access to political power (Vlassenroot 2000, 79). As a result of the deepening tensions, the different ethnic groups in the Kivus started forming their own self-defence militias to protect themselves, and to defend their demands for land and authority, making the Eastern Zaire fertile ground for rebellion.

At the national level, the socio-economic conditions kept plummeting: By mid-1990s, the inflation had risen to an absurd 23,000 percent (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996, 19), and unemployment had escalated while poverty was increasing rapidly (Trefon 2011, 24). In 1995, there was virtually no more public spending to social services as a

result of privatisation and due to the effective centralisation of the remaining state resources under the president (Reno 1998, 153–154).

The under-resourced *Forces Armées Zairoises* (FAZ), the national army, of which salaries were often unpaid, had become highly dysfunctional and disorganised. Soldiers became increasingly dependent on alternative ways of generating income to "*make their ends meet*" (Reyntjens 2009, 108). They began to live off the population, and particularly off those segments not belonging to Mobutu's clientelist networks. In other words, they increasingly became a security threat to the population that they were supposed to protect. Naniuzeyi (1999, 669) observes the following:

> On the socioeconomic level, the lives of the Zairian people under the Mobutu regime kept deteriorating day after day. Public employees were not receiving their salaries for months or even years, and the army and police that were supposed to protect citizens became, on the contrary, citizens' nightmares. On many occasions, soldiers harassed and terrorized the masses while public services were performed on the basis of briberies or kickbacks. Under Mobutu, Zaire became a kind of jungle where the rule of law did not exist. In this context, some analysts did not hesitate to argue that the state was no longer existent in Zaire.

As a result of the eroding state authority and the downsizing of the public sector, the informal economy started expanding rapidly (Trefon 2011, 24). Not only did Mobutu's own patronage network begin to extract resources from the informal sector through activities such as clandestine trade, tax avoidance, money laundering, drug trafficking and passport sales (Reno 1998, 154), but new forms of trans- and sub-national authority had begun to emerge to replace the vacuum left by the waning state. For example, various self-defence militias and armed groups, organised around strong individuals such as wealthy local businessmen, started operating throughout the country, and particularly in the East. Such militias were increasingly connected to the globalising world market through illicit trade, and operated particularly through the trade of various minerals. For example, by late-1990s in Ituri district in the Eastern Congo, each

of the five major ethnic groups had its own militia, of which operations were also deeply linked to the economic interests of each group (van Puijenbroek 2008, 46–48).

The neighboring Rwandan civil war of the early-1990s, which led to the horrendous genocide of some 800.000 Tutsis in 1994, exacerbated the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Zaire too. After the new Tutsi-regime had seized power in Rwanda, between one and two million Rwandan Hutu flooded to the Eastern Zaire, which only destabilised further the already extremely tense situation in the Kivus (Autesserre 2010, 141). By then, the various militias on different sides already practically controlled large sections of the Eastern parts of the country, financing themselves often through clandestine activities, including cross-border trade of various minerals to Uganda and Rwanda.

Due to this fragmentation of the Zairean state authority and due to the long-lasting violent land conflicts of the Eastern Zaire, the Kivus then offered an ideal base for a larger rebellion to take place. In late-1996, a rebel group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), consisting of various smaller Tutsi and other militias, and heavily backed by the new Rwandan Tutsi-government (as well as Uganda), started advancing towards Kinshasa. In only six months, under the leadership of Katanga-born Luba Laurent Kabila, a former rebel leader already in the 1960s and a gold smuggler, the AFDL reached Kinshasa and ousted the president. Kabila was crowned as the new president and the 30-year-term of Mobutu Sese Seko as a head of state had come to conclusion.

However, rebuilding the Zairean state, which Kabila renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was not easy. Various political and ethnic groups were seeking to maximise their influence in the new government, and the accusations that Kabila was nothing but Rwanda's puppet were loud. In July 1998, Kabila dismissed his Rwandan chief of staff, James Kabarebe, and made him a mere military advisor. Soon after, he asked the Rwandan troops to leave the country. Only a few weeks later, Rwanda, together with Uganda and Burundi, launched another war to overthrow Kabila by channelling support to the various rebel groups of the Eastern Congo, as well as sending their own troops to fight alongside the rebels. This war, the so-called Second Congo War,

however, in which eventually eight African countries and numerous Congolese rebel groups took part, ensued with a stalemate. The war dragged on for four years, and saw the deaths of some 3.9 million Congolese (IRC 2007, 1). In 2002, a formal peace agreement between the four main belligerents, the '*Global and All Inclusive Agreement*' was signed, which led to the creation of transitional authorities. The four largest parties to the conflict were included to the new government, their leaders becoming the leaders of the different army units. This was followed by drafting a New Constitution in 2005, and organising the first democratic elections in the history of the country in 2006.

However, the ending of the Second Congo War meant all but an end to the violence and human suffering. The ending of the War had also left thousands of former combatants unemployed. Low-scale violence with sporadic eruptions continued particularly in the Eastern Congo, where numerous local militias and various armed groups have been disintegrating and reforming, periodically continuing fighting since the end of the war (Turner 2007, 1). By 2007, an estimated 5.4 million people, mostly in the Eastern part of the country, had died since the beginning of the war, due causes related to fighting and insecurity – from violence, disease and starvation (IRC 2007, 1).

For civilians, the role of militias in the production of security and insecurity has become controversial. While the militias consisting of the other communities' members obviously pose a serious threat to the security of civilians, so do the formal security providers, the army and the police (van Puijenbroek 2008, 45). In fact, in some districts, such as in Ituri, the Congolese formal security actors continue committing constant violations and are often regarded as the biggest threat to the population:

> The Congolese army, followed by the national police, is the main source of instability at the moment, with cases of harassment of the population and illegal arrests, torture and the looting of properties taking place on a large scale. Despite the partial re-establishment of the judiciary (there is a local court in every territory, except for Mambasa, and one higher court in the district's capital) impunity still prevails. Perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity are walking around freely.
>
> (van Puijenbroek 2008, 47)

The ethnic militias are therefore often regarded as providing protection to certain community, while simultaneously threatening other communities' security. In the absence of other survival strategies, militias often plunder other communities or get their funding through illicit economic activities, such as informal road tolls, or unregulated resource extraction and trade. The Ituri district, and the dynamics between the local communities and the various ethnic militias, are a good example of this (van Puijenbroek 2008, 45–48). In these circumstances, the line between community-protection groups and dangerous militias becomes increasingly blurred, especially as the local communities become increasingly dependent on the very same non-formal economic activities, such as resource extraction and cross-border trade, to ensure their survival.

4 EU'S INVOLVEMENT IN CONGO'S SSR: ACTUAL ACTIVITIES

4.1 Background of EU's SSR Action in Congo

As discussed earlier, since the turn of the millennium, the EU development and security policies had been rapidly merging, and becoming increasingly focused on conflict prevention and statebuilding. Following the extension of the ODA eligibility to cover a vast range of security-related activities; the drafting of the EU institutions' SSR policy concepts; and the rapid evolution of the EU's practical development and security policy tools, the concept of security sector reform was emerging as a key EU concept to address development and security challenges in fragiles states of the South.

All of this was coinciding with the escalation of violence in the DRC since the early-1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter – caused by a complex myriad of external and internal factors as well as by the changing dynamics between actors at various levels. Due to this coincidence, and due to the Congo's strategic importance for the regional stability, this fragile state became an ideal test case, or '*laboratory*', as Knutsen argues (2009, 456), for the EU to try out its new security and development policies. In particular, the Congo provided a good opportunity to try out the evolving comprehensive and human security-oriented SSR policy.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the establishment of EUPOL Kinshasa[28] in 2005 was the first time the EU sent a civilian CSDP mission to support SSR activities (Police reform) in Africa (More & Price 2010, 11). Furthermore, the creation of the EUSEC RD Congo a few months later, was the first time a CSDP civilian mission was supporting a third country's army reform anywhere (Clément 2009, 243). Moreover, the EU's involvement in the Congolese SSR was the first time when the different EU actors, particularly the Commission and the Council, had actually explicitly stated their willingness to coordinate their SSR actions jointly, showing a commitment to a holistic EU approach that aims to reform the security sector in a comprehensive manner (Keane 2008, 224).

As an explicit indication of a much-needed inter-institutional coordination, in April-2005 (just after the extension of the OECD ODA eligibility criteria and at the time when the

[28] EUPOL Kinshasa's mandate was later extended and it was renamed EUPOL RD Congo.

CSDP missions were being deployed), the High Representative of the CFSP (the Council Secretary General), Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, released a joint press release on the EU's support to the Congo's transition. In the document they emphasised the urgency to strengthen the Congo's '*good governance*', to rebuild the "*essential functions of the democratic state based on the rule of law"*, and to improve the security situation, by reforming the security sector through a multi-sectoral support (Solana & Michel 2005, 1–2).

Furthermore, in November 2006 (after the adoption of the joint-EU SSR Framework in June), for the first time in the history, the EU institutions adopted a joint-Council-Commission SSR document for any country, which presented the '*Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC*'. This happened soon after the EU Foreign Ministers had concluded in September that the EU (together with the UN) should play a coordinating role for SSR in the DRC, subject to an agreement by the DRC authorities. According to Keane[29] (2008, 224–225), the classified joint-paper emphasised three key principles for the EU SSR joint-action in the DRC:

1. Development of DRC nationally-owned concept designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

2. Strengthening governance of security institutions.

3. Enhancing service delivery in the security sector, ensuring that Congolese security actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for citizens.

(Keane 2008, 224–225)

The joint-document, which together with the EU SSR concepts forms the basis for the EU SSR action in the DRC, supports a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach, which focuses particularly on security governance and oversight aspects ("*designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, and respect for human*

[29] The joint-document itself is classified and despite several requests could not be fully accessed, so the stated objectives here are based on the partially accessible document, as well as on Rory Keane's (2005) article on the EU's involvement in the DRC's SSR. In 2006, at the time of the drafting of the EU's Comprehensive SSR Approach to the DRC, Keane had worked as the Commission's desk officer for the DRC in Brussels.

rights.' and 'strengthening governance of security institutions"). In addition, the paper particularly aims to improve the security of the Congolese people instead of just seeing strengthening the military as an objective per se ("*ensuring that Congolese security actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for citizens"*). In this sense, the paper once again repeated the normative EU policy objectives of the previously adopted EU SSR concepts. Furthermore, the document placed particular emphasis on the EU's inter-institutional coordination, as it noted that the EU will continue to support SSR activities in the DRC comprehensively through political dialogue with the government, through the CSDP missions' action, through the EC action, and through the Member States' bilateral efforts (ibid. 2008, 224–225).

4.2 EU Actors in the Congo's Security Sector Reform

4.2.1 Overview of EU Actors

Due to its pioneering nature, the EU SSR support to the DRC provides an ideal case to analyse the EU's increasing involvement in the third countries' security sector reforms, and to evaluate the implementation of the EU's normative policy-approach.

By 2012, the EU SSR support to the DRC has evolved to include the two above-mentioned CSDP civilian missions, which were complemented by the European Commission's development assistance. While the Commission started supporting the SSR right after ending of the war, the two CSDP civilian missions[30] were established by Council Joint Actions in December 2004 (EUPOL) and May 2005 (EUSEC), after the Transitional Government's President Joseph Kabila had sent a letter to the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, formally inviting the EU to assist with the Congolese SSR (Weiler 2009, 10).

These two actors, the CSDP missions and the Commission, are responsible for the actual EU SSR support in the Congo's SSR, and are therefore in the main focus of this study. Until the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, the

[30] In addition to the CSDP civilian missions, the Council has also established two CSDP military missions, the French-led military operation Artemis in 2004 to secure Bunia territory (in Ituri district) with 1.500 soldiers at the request of the UN Secretary General, which supported a safe return of the refugees to the town before the UN MONUC troops returned to safeguard the area, and a short-term EUFOR military operation in April 2006 to Kinshasa to support the election process.

Commission was represented in the DRC through its EC Delegation. Since 2010, the Delegation is formally the EU Delegation, but the Commission's development support continues to be allocated through the Delegation (More &Price 2011, 15).

The EU support has been complemented by the activities taken bilaterally by the Member States (MS), as well as by the EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region (EUSR), who had a supporting role for the CFSP/CSDP action in the DRC until August 2011. The EUSR belonged to the CFSP framework, and he/she was mandated, in addition to his/her other tasks[31], to provide political insight to the EU actors from a regional perspective, to coordinate the CFSP/CSDP missions' SSR actions in the DRC, to provide advice and assistance for SSR in the DRC, and to put political pressure on the implementing parties when required. Furthermore, the EUSR was responsible for promoting overall EU political coordination and ensuring a coherent EU action at the political level. However, as the EUSR's mandate concerned only the CFSP framework, he/she did not have any formal leverage on the EC action, and therefore the hierarchy between the EUSR and the EC 'remained unclear'. (More & Price 2011, 18–19)

Lastly, since the establishment of the EEAS in 2010, the Head of the EU Delegation has been an EEAS official. As the EEAS represents the whole EU external action (including formally both the Council and the Commission), this change is expected to boost the diplomatic role of the Delegations, as well as to improve coordination between the EU institutions. Among else, the mandate of the Head of the EU Delegation is wider than that of his/her predecessors, and in particular more political. While it has not been officially stated by the EEAS, the Head of the EU Delegation has practically also been seen as replacing the EUSR. Therefore the role of the EEAS, particularly in the lead of the CSFP/CSDP, has been growing since its establishment in December 2010. While not in the main focus of this thesis, the role of the EEAS is increasingly relevant for the

[31] The EUSR for the Great Lakes Region was mandated to support the further stabilisation and consolidation of the post-conflict situation in the whole Great Lakes region, and to provide "*regional dimension"* to the EU stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction action, meaning that his duties comprised not only the DRC, but also Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. However, support to the DRC's post-transition phase, and a "*particular emphasis on the reform of the security sector*" were defined as "*a key objective"* for the EUSR (Council Joint-Action 2006).

success of a coordinated and comprehensive EU approach. (More & Price 2011, 17, 24, 43)

The following is a brief overview of the key EU actors' roles and activities in the DRC's security sector reform until mid-2012, namely in the fields of police reform, army reform and judicial reform, as of mid-2012.

4.2.2 Police and Justice Reform: EUPOL and the Commission

After the War, the Congolese Police was in a terrible condition: Officers were not only incapable of investigating crime but actually lacked training, were poorly resourced, received a minimal salary, worked under poor conditions, and were reported of committing human rights abuses and corruption on a continued basis (Davis 2009a, 19–20). The United Nations' MONUC mission had began to give basic training to the Congolese police in 1999, aiming to provide it to some 50.000 territorial police officers before the elections, to ensure a smooth election process. To support the objectives of MONUC, the European Commission decided to provide some funding to train officers for a new Kinshasa-based specialised unit called '*Integrated Police Unit'* (IPU), charged with the protection of the institutions and the political leaders of the new transitional government in the run-up to the national elections. In particular, the Commission was providing technical assistance, basic equipment and training for the IPU, financing the activities through EDF and Rapid Reaction Mechanism (predecessor of the IfS). (Martinelli 2006, 390)

The CSDP civilian mission EUPOL Kinshasa was deployed in the Congolese capital in February 2005, initially to take over the responsibilities from the Commission in training the IPU. The mission was mandated to support the establishment and the training of the IPU (Council 2004). The objective was to train 1008 officers for the IPU, and to provide them with equipment and mentoring. In other words, the main objective was to make the IPU fully operational by strengthening it as an operational unit (Martinelli 2006, 391). The IPU officers were deployed in Kinshasa and the unit was supported by the EU, until its command was handed to the Congolese in 2006.

For the EU external action, the training of IPU also represented a historical point, as it was the first time, when an EU SSR project had been divided into two parts to be

implemented by two EU institutional actors: the Council with a CSDP approach and the Commission with a Community approach (Martinelli 2006, 390). However, it was clear that a more comprehensive police reform was needed in the DRC, and with the termination of EUPOL Kinshasa, the Council established a new mission in June 2007. The new mission was named EUPOL RD Congo and its mandate was extended to cover the whole Congolese territory, and to contribute to the massive task of reforming the ill-functioning and fragmented Congolese national police PNC. Furthermore, the mission's mandate was also enlarged to include improving the interaction between the police and the criminal justice system, and ensuring the coherence between EU's SSR support for military, police and justice sectors (Vircoulon 2009, 222–224). Later, the mission's mandate has also been expanded to provide support for the restoration of law and order in the eastern Kivu provinces, as well as to strengthen the border police and the police inspectorate (ibid. 2009, 225). The Council presents the key tasks of the mission as follows:

> Its [the mission's] purpose is to contribute to the restructuring of the Congolese police by supporting the establishment of a police force that is civilian, professional and respectful of human rights. The mission also aims to help improving the interaction between the police and the criminal justice system, thus contributing to the fight against the impunity of sexual violence and human rights abuses. The mission cooperates closely with the EUSEC RD Congo, the European Union delegation in DRC and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in its efforts to help ensure that all SSR efforts deployed are consistent. (Council 2012b)

By 2012, EUPOL had grown to consist of 50 international experts, most of whom are police and criminal justice experts. Nearly all of them are deployed in Kinshasa. According to the Council, these experts advise their Congolese counterparts in *technical aspects of the police reform*. In particular, the mission has been supporting three Congolese authorities: the Police Reform Monitoring Committee (CSRP), the General Commissariat of the Congolese police (CG-PNC), and the General Inspection of the Congolese police (IG-PNC). (Council 2012b)

The purpose of the CSRP is to bring together the concerned authorities with an aim to draft a national police reform strategy for the Congolese police. A key objective of the planned reform strategy would be improving training and professionalism for all the Police units. Furthermore, the strategy would possibly aim at integrating the various independent police units into the national police (PNC). Another key task that that the body has already engaged with has been the promulgation of the organic law on the organisation and functioning of the Congolese police. (Council 2012b)

The two other authorities, CG-PNC and IG-PNC, are bodies belonging to the Congolese National Police PNC. The General Commissariat of the Congolese Police is basically the structure responsible for implementing the police reform. The General Inspection of the Congolese Police, in turn, is the inspection and audit body of the PNC, covering the criminal, administrative and financial offences committed by the police. The role of the EUPOL in relation to these authorities is to provide strategic advice, particularly in the creation of the training and education facilities for the Congolese police. (Council 2012b)

In addition to the support provided to the Congolese authorities, EUPOL has aimed at strengthening the operational capacities of the Congolese police by training of trainers and police officers of the PNC. In addition to providing further training to UPI, the new mission has also supported the training of other specialised police units, such as the Police d'Intervention Rapide (PIR) and the Groupe d'Intervention Mobile (GMI). EUPOL has also supported specific projects. For example, before the 2011 elections the mission was providing technical assistance to projects that were designed to support the security of the 2011 elections in the DRC. This was done through training crowd control units in Kinshasa and by supporting awareness raising campaigns carried out by the IG-PNC. (Council 2012b)

Regarding its justice-interface, EUPOL has been seeking to improve the coordination between the police and judicial fields in the reform process. It has provided training to the Judiciary Police and to the Technical and Scientific Police in conduction of criminal investigations and liaison with the judicial actors. Furthermore, the mission has aimed to put special focus in its training on cross-cutting issues of SSR, such as human rights, gender, victims of sexual violence, as well as protection of children in armed conflict

(Keane 2008, 221–223). In practice, in 2010 the mission deployed a small team to North Kivu in the Eastern Congo that has focused "*in the areas of human rights, gender equality and protection of children in armed conflicts*". This team is collaborationg with the Congolese authorities in the region, aiming to "*provide training and raise awareness among police officers, justice and civil society experts*". The mandate of the EUPOL was originally supposed to expire in June 2008, but it has been extended several times[32]. Between December 2008 and May 2010, EUPOL's budget was EUR 81.4 million, increasing annually as the mission kept expanding. (Council 2012b)

The Commission's efforts to support the DRC's SSR are, in turn, carried out mainly through its development assistance instruments (particularly through EDF, IfS and EIDHR), and make up therefore only a part of the larger EC development support for the DRC. The EC development assistance for the DRC was restarted[33] in January 2002, as the first CSP and its National Indicative Programme (NIP) were signed, as a result of a "*positive evolution"* in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5). While majority of the EDF support for 2002–2007 was directed to rebuildinging of the country's neglected infrastructure, improving the health sector, and to the organisation of the national elections, support was also given to certain SSR activities.

In the field of police reform, the Commission's contributions have been allocated through the 9th and the 10th EDF, as well as through the IfS. The support to the training of IPU by mid-2005, before the EUPOL Kinshasa took over the activities, was funded through EDF with EUR 6 million. The RRM/IfS was also used to finance the rehabilitation of the UPI's operational base in Kinshasa. This contribution was around EUR 1 million. Furthermore, the Member states contributed some EUR 2.3 million to this project, in cash and in kind (weapons and law enforcement equipment) (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 10).

SSR-related EC support continued during the 10th EDF, covering the period of 2008–2013. Under the 10th EDF, SSR support activities fell under the '*Governance' support*, one of

[32] The latest mandate of the EUPOL Congo expired in September 2014 and the mission was terminated.
[33] Since 1992, all the EU's development assistance for Zaire had been interrupted (excluding humanitarian aid) due to the increasing conditionalities, as discussed earlier, and particularly due to "*the lack of progress in the political democratization, the high degree of corruption, the economic mismanagement and the differences between the Member States in their policy towards Zaire"* (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5).

the three priority areas the current framework, which made up 25 percent (some EUR 130 million) of the total EDF DRC budget of EUR 514 million. Of this, some EUR 22 million was allocated to police and justice reform support (Commission 2008, 38).

Regarding activities funded through the EC action, the Commission has among else supported the establishment of the police reform committee CSRP. The Commission's DRC CSP for 2008–2013 makes clear (similarly to the EUPOL's mandate) that defining a clear role for the CSRP and ensuring that it is operational is a priority for the EU support to SSR in the DRC in future. However, by far the most funding is reserved for supporting the operational and technical aspects of the Congolese Police. In particular, the Commission's instruments have been used to "*develop systems within the police*", particularly in areas of human resources management and auditing the members of the police service, including in the collection of biometric data (Davis 2009a, 28). The 2008–2013 CSP specifically identifies "*human resource management*" of the Congolese Police as a priority for the EC police reform support (More & Price 2011, 15). In other words, tackling corruption has been a key priority for the EC police reform support in the Congo.

Finally, the Commission's support to the DRC police reform has also included some funding for the civil society. Together with some EU Member States, such as the Netherlands, UK, Belgium and Sweden, the Commission has funded projects designed and implemented by international and Congolese NGOs. These NGOs include IDASA, Search for Common Ground, RCN Justice et Démocratie, and Pax Christi Netherlands, as well as their national partners. Their projects have aimed, among else, at facilitating community interaction and dialogue with the police, sometimes in conjunction with training. (Davis 2009a, 28)

Finally, of the EU Member States, particularly the United Kingdom and France have had their own police reform programs, through which they have supported the various activities in the police reform, including provision of equipment and training for certain specialised police units (Vircoulon 2009, 225, 228; Justaert & Keukeleire 2010, 18).

Regarding justice reform, the Commission has been the largest single donor in this sector since the Transition Period (More & Price 2011, 16). The findings of a comprehensive audit conducted for the justice sector with EC funding in 2004, revealed

that the sector was institutionally weak, procedurally incoherent and severely lacking in equipment, infrastructure and training (Keane 2008, 220). There were not enough judges to serve the needs of the country, and even the existing judges had received only a minimal judicial training. Furthermore, the judicial system lacked independence from the government almost completely, and due to economic failure and poor governance it had operated well below minimum standards for decades. For example, in the region of South Kivu in 2005, an estimated less than one percent of all the rape cases were reported to justice authorities, and 80 percent of those reported were granted bail and never faced a justice official again (Davis 2009a, 21). This was the situation in the early-2000s, when the international community, including the EU, started to engage with the Congolese judicial reform.

As a result of the findings of this audit, the government and the donors agreed on a structured reform programme. The reform was to follow the EU-funded Justice Reform Action Plan, which was drafted in 2004, and validated eventually in 2007. Later in 2009, the government turned the plan into a "*ministerial roadmap*", which set out the priorities for the justice reform (More & Price 2011, 16).

The EU support to the justice sector has been allocated mainly through the Commission's development support instruments, particularly the EDF. The Commission has supported both a general justice reform in the DRC, as well as directed some short-term "*emergency support*" to the most conflict-ridden regions of the East (More & Price 2011, 16). Under the 9th EDF, the general justice support programme received some EUR 28 million, while the short-term programme for '*Restoration of the Judicial System in the Eastern Congo*' (REJUSCO) was funded with some EUR 8 million (European Commission, EU@UN website on the EC support to Rejusco, accessed 20 April, 2012).

General judicial reform support has similarly continued during the 10th EDF. As mentioned above, '*Governance*' was one of the three priority areas of the EC programme in the DRC during the 10th EDF, receiving some EUR 130 million. Of this some EUR 22 million was allocated to police and justice reform support (Commission 2008, 38), '*bringing the Commission financing to the justice sector up to EUR 60 million since 2003'* (EEAS website on the EU Relations with the DRC, accessed 20 April, 2012).

The EC support to the general justice reform has included a number of institutional programmes. These programmes have supported, among else, "*the construction and rehabilitiation of courts, the audit services provided by the Ministry of Justice, support to the administration of justice, and the promotion of universal access to justice and of women's rights*". Apart from supporting the actual workings of the justice system, the EC support has also been allocated to the creation of '*Comité Mixte de Justice'*, the central coordinating structure for justice reform. (More & Price 2011, 16)

The REJUSCO programme, in turn, started initially as a pilot project for the restoration of the judicial system in the town of Bunia, and was later expanded to cover most of the Eastern Congo. The programme has been supporting the judicial system, covering all aspects of criminal law. It has intended to reinforce the judicial institutions (police, courts, prisons), as well as those professionally involved, including the criminal police, judiciary, lawyers, court registrars and prison officers. The programme has also provided support to witnesses and defendants of victims. Some Member States, including Belgium, the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands, have also contributed to REJUSCO (Justaert & Keukeleire 2010, 21). France has also provided support to the DRC's justice reform through its rule of law programme (More & Price 2011, 17).

Two mechanisms to address the human suffering during the past conflict have also been created with the EC support as a basis of transitional justice: an Amnesty Law and Trust and the Reconciliation Commission. However, there has been criticism that these have been completely inadequate to address all the violations that have happened during the recent conflicts, including human rights abuses, political crime and victimisation. (Keane 2008, 220–224)

4.2.3 Defence Reform: EUSEC and the Commission

After the Congo Wars, many of the army brigades were inadequately trained, lacked basic equipment, and often even basic services, such as health care or proper housing. Furthermore, the coordination between the different units was poor, and corruption was seen as a major obstacle, payments and even food often disappearing before reaching the ground level (More & Price 2011, 5–6). As has been discussed earlier, the signing of the peace treaty had united the largest fighting groups into a national army

(FARDC). However, a lot of effort would be needed to make the soldiers of the new national army to act in a professional and coordinated manner, protecting the people instead of threatening them. This is also recognised in the Council's Concept of Operations for the DRC CSDP missions (See for example, Council 2011a, 7–8), which identifies the Congolese army as a major human rights violator and therefore calls for a comprehensive SSR.

By the request of the DRC government, the '*EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo*' (EUSEC) was mandated to provide advice and assistance in security sector reform. The mission was launched on 8 June 2005[34], and according to the Council press statement concerning the mandate and the objectives of EUSEC, the general aim of the mission is to "*support the Congolese authorities in rebuilding an army that will guarantee security throughout the country and create the conditions for making economic and social development possible again*". This should be done in a way that promotes policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law (Council 2012a).

EUSEC has been operating mainly in Kinshasa, and by mid-2012 it composed of around 50 European military and civilian personnel. Some experts have also been deployed in the Eastern Congo field detachments, and two project sites have been established in Lower Congo (School for non-commissioned officers, Infantry School and Artillery School of Kitona) and Kasai Occidental (Military Academy and School of Administration). Similarly to EUPOL, EUSEC has had a coordinating function for projects by the Member States. (Council 2012a)

The main objective of EUSEC has been to support in the integration of the fragmented, weak and malfunctioning Congolese army: The mission has tried to assist the Congolese authorities in integrating, restructuring and rebuilding the army (Council 2005b). This has included advising and assisting the Congolese authorities in the planning and conduction of military reform. In particular, the mission has given advisory support to

[34] The mandate of EUSEC has been repeatedly renewed and at the time of writing the latest mandate is going to expire on 30 June, 2015.

the Congolese authorities in drafting a revised strategic plan for the army. Furthermore, the mission has tried to support the creation of a Steering Committee that would guide and coordinate the military reform.

Apart from supporting the integration of the army, EUSEC has aimed at strengthening its administration by supporting the human and financial resources management of the army (Martinelli 2006, 392–393). In particular, the mission has been advising the Ministry of Defence, the FARDC high command and the general inspectorate, to consolidate the administration of human and financial resources, to support the consolidation and alignment of the training system and to support the reconstruction of the logistics system. A "*flagship project*" for EUSEC, according to the Council press release concerning the mission, has been the biometric census of troops carried out by the Congolese military FARDC with the EU support (Council 2012a). This census has allowed a proper assessment of the number of the Congolese soldiers, and has therefore been a cornerstone of personnel administration and financial reform. The census was followed by a distribution of military identity cards and reduced the number of "*ghost soldiers*" by tens of thousands. (Clément 2009, 243; More & Price 2011, 14).

Since completing the census, the mission has provided technical advice and guidance in the reform of the chain of payment of the army itself. In practice, the mission has supported the Congolese authorities to decouple the chain of payment from the army chain of command, by assigning the former to the administration of the Defence Ministry. After this, EUSEC experts have been supervising the monthly disbursements of wages to the Congolese soldiers. The aim of this initiative has been to reduce corruption and misuse of army resources, and to ensure that the payments actually reach the foot soldiers. (Council 2012a)

Furthermore, the mission has supported the training of the Congolese soldiers, particularly in *financial* and *human resources management*. By mid-2012, these courses have been attended by around 1 800 officers. In addition, the FARDC has reopened the Administrative School with EUSEC support after a break of 24 years. The school building has been renovated with the EU support, and the school now has a capacity for 140 students. The mission has also supported opening of other training facilities. Moreover,

EUSEC has supported the establishment of territorial computer networks to support human resources management, by connecting the capital Kinshasa to the main sites of the military regions. Finally, the mission has supported small projects that have been aiming at promoting gender equality. For example, the mission implemented a project that has supported families and dependants of the national army soldiers. (Council 2012a)

With regards to the Commission's action, as discussed earlier, the ODA-eligibility requirement has continued to limit the Commission's use of its instruments to *directly* engage in the field of defence reforms. In the DRC, the Commission has been complementing EUSEC's activities by financing the construction of the '*centres de brassage'*, the facilities used in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process during the army integration (Gourlay 2008, 86; 100). In addition, the Commission has allocated some EUR 20 million of financing to the World Bank-managed Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) through the 9th EDF (Hoebeke et al. 2007, 5).

Some Member States have also been active in the defense reform. Of these, Belgium and France have been the most active EU states. They have, for instance, provided training to the Congolese army (Clément 2009, 246). In fact, Belgium was funding the Congolese army's integration even before the launch of EUSEC (Justaert & Keukeleire 2010, 15), and its activities have in particular aimed at reinforcing the Congolese military's operational capacity (More & Price 2011, 17).

5 EU AND HUMAN SECURITY-FOCUSED SSR IN CONGO

5.1 Analysing Implementation of EU Action

The previous chapter presented an overview of the actors and activities of the EU support in the DRC's security sector reform. By looking at the achievements of the EU SSR action by mid-2012, it can be argued that the overall results have so far been rather modest: The high level of violence and insecurity particularly in the Eastern Congo continues, the army and the police remain fragmented and the judicial system remains malfunctioning.

Nevertheless, it is clear that there are some positive developments regarding the EU SSR engagement in the DRC. For example, the efforts by the different EU institutions to coordinate and collaborate in the field of SSR in the policy level represent a positive development for the EU external action. Furthermore, some of the training initiatives, such as training of the IPU of the Congolese police, have also apparently succeeded in improving the conduct of this specialised unit. Other activities both in police and army reform to address corruption have most likely improved the human resources management of the Congolese formal security providers. Conducting the census of the police and the army are other positive achievements that have most likely improved the management of these sectors. Provision of training facilities and equipment to the army and the police, as well as provision of training, might similarly have strengthened the operational capabilities of these actors. Moreover, the conduction of the audit to assess the current state of the judicial system, and the drafting of the action plan to address its needs, represents a positive and important achievement in the field of justice reform. The Commission's financing to the general justice reform and the support to the restoration of the judicial system in the Eastern Congo are surely greatly needed as well.

At the same time, not all the supported projects have succeeded particularly well. For example, according to the interviewed EU officials, the processes to establish coordination mechanisms for the Police and the Army have been particularly slow and challenging. In fact, the creation of a coordination structure for a comprehensive army reform had not succeeded by the time when the data was collected, despite continuous efforts. Furthermore, by mid-2012, the interviewed officials explained that the organic

law to determine the status of the military had been pending for approval by the Congolese authorities for a long time.

More seriously, however, the various reports continue to assess that the state security forces commit human rights violations on a regular basis, including sexual violence, torture and arbitrary killings. For example, a report by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) from May 2013 details victim and witness accounts of "*mass rape, killings and arbitrary executions, and violations resulting from widespread looting*", as the fighting intensified between the government forces and the new rebel group M23. The report noted that "*particularly systematic and violent abuse was committed by some FARDC elements as they retreated from the towns of Goma and Sake*" (United Nations 2013). Unfortunately this is just one example of similar reports and articles, frequently published by various organisations.

However, the main focus of this study is not to examine certain individual projects funded by the EU, or to assess their success or failure against the expected results. Rather than evaluating or assessing the EU activities against their project proposals, the aim here is to find out how well the EU action has succeeded in following the adopted normative policy objectives. To return to the main objective of this study, the aim here is to answer the research questions presented in the beginning of this study: To find out whether the rhetorics of the EU SSR policy documents has turned into practice by asking *to what extent the EU action has succeeded in understanding and adopting an approach that focuses on security system thinking and that endorses the concepts of broad security and human security, in its engagement in the Congo's SSR*.

One way to analyse how well the EU has succeeded in adopting its normative policy approach is to assess the extent the officials implementing the EU support actually understand the key policy objectives, and the extent they support these. Therefore, througout the current chapter, the focus is not only in analysing to what extent the implementing officials have *adopted* an approach that supports human security and endorses security system thinking and the concept of broad security – but also in finding out how the EU actors *understand* these policy level objectives.

At first the chapter examines the extent to which the EU actors have implemented an approach that focuses on system-thinking and endorses the concept of broad security, and how the implementing officials themselves regard and understand the importance of this approach. This is followed by an analysis regarding the extent to which the EU support actually strengthens the human security of the Congolese, and how the EU officials see the importance of promoting human security in the context of the Congo. Then, before explicitly answering the research questions, the chapter seeks to shed light on the factors that the EU officials identify as explaining the chosen approach, and the reasoning behind the prioritisation of certain activities over the others.

5.2 EU Actors and System-Focused Reform

5.2.1 "*Statebuilding the Only Option*"

In order to answer the question that how well the EU has succeeded in supporting a system-focused security sector reform, it is important to analyse how the EU actors themselves see the importance of reforming the whole *security system*, and of addressing the various formal and non-formal security actors at different levels.

When reflecting the actual supported activities in the Congolese SSR to a system approach, it becomes clear that the EU approach is actually rather rather traditional: The EU support in the Congo focuses solely on *formal security providers* and the building of their capacity. All the activities seek to strengthen the state security actors and there are hardly any activities that try to directly address the informal or non-state actors. In fact, the line of thought among the EU officials is rather hostile towards the non-state actors. In practice, the only way the non-state actors should be treated, according to the officials, is by minimising their role to the extent possible. For example, one of the interviewed EU officials who works for a CSDP mission in Kinshasa explains the following, when asked to elaborate on the greatest security challenges in the Congo:

> I would say that today there is no direct external threat, all the threats are internal, and they have to due with the weakness of the state. The weakness of the chain of command in the army, and in fact for us, and for the reform of the army – that is a big problem.

> -- It is not easy of course, because as I said already, the army is very weak, and the solution when you think about it, looks easy: '*get rid of the foreign and internal armed groups and have an integrated army*'. But to put that in place is a little more difficult, when you consider the size of the country…
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

> --And a problem is also that because the state is weak – although it is saying that it is strong and [that] it won't accept that and that – finally it accepts everything, and it accepted even these people [the various non-state armed groups that were integrated in the army after the war] in the army. And we have a problem when these people are accepted into the army. And all this is linked to the weakness of the army and this weakness is also linked to the low level of good governance, and the lack of financing the public affairs. So you cannot consider the reform of the army independently from the context. And the context is that.
>
> (Official from EU delegation)

Similarly, an official from the EU Delegation states that "*the greatest challenge for the Congo is the lack of financial resources, due to the weakness of state*" (Official from EU delegation). Furthermore, the official continues by saying that he/she does not see any way the EU should engage with the informal sector. At the end of the day, for this official, there is only one way to proceed:

> I'm going to be very conservative in my own thought, sorry, but again, the main strategic act is the strengthening of the state. This is the only way. Today we see there is disintegrity in the army. It cannot even protect the citizens, it is not even united.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

When talking to the EU officials, it becomes very clear that the only option for them to address the existing security problems that the Congo is facing, is *through building a*

strong state, and strengthening the state-controlled armed forces so that they gain a position of monopoly over violence in the entire territory of the Congo.

This should not be very surprising, however. Statebuilding is of course a key concept for the EU development policy, together with SSR. Furthermore, even the EU policy concepts that are based on the OECD DAC Guidelines do acknowledge that state security, in addition to human security, is a goal in itself. In fact, the policy documents can be interpreted of taking a view that these two should go hand in hand. For example, as discussed earlier, the OECD approach does argue that "*the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing*" (OECD 2004a, 11). This seems to be also the argument of many the EU officials: Building a strong state is the best, and the *only* way to ensure security of the people.

However, as discussed in length earlier, all the EU policy concepts, following again the OECD approach, nevertheless emphasise that the EU approach should endorse a *system-thinking* to security – and to take all the actors that are part of the production of security into account in the reform action. This is exactly the major difference with the OECD SSR approach compared to a traditional approach to security that focuses on state security and national security. When conducting a comprehensive security sector reform in a given context one needs to understand *how security is produced* in that particular context and what different actors, formal or informal, are involved in that production, and then take this into account in the actual reform process.

5.2.2 Neglectance of Informal Actors

How then, the EU actors in Kinshasa regard the role of the informal actors, be them the non-state security providers or the NGOs working on security-related issues? In practice, and consistent with their view to see statebuilding as a panacea to all security problems in the Congo, most of the interviewed EU officials saw the non-state actors as either categorically insignificant actors, or somehow *dubious* or even *criminal* forces. In any case, it was a common view that the EU's practical engagement in the Congolese security sector reform should not engage with the local level actors but to focus on strengthening the state and the formal security actors.

To begin with the various informal security forces and militias of the Eastern Congo, all the interviewed officials were holding a view that the EU should not collaborate with these forces in any level: Such actors were categorically seen as criminal and a part of the problem, and the only correct way to deal with them would be to get rid of these forces. For example, an official from a CSDP mission explained the following:

> There is no action with the armed groups by the EU, we are only working with the state actors like the Ministry of Defence and the official army. We have no implication and we don't have any contacts with armed groups, who are real problems. And one of the the real challenges with these armed groups is that there is sometimes in the Congolese policy a promotion of these armed groups, you know. You are in the East, you are poor, you don't have work, you contact 30 people and you create a Mai-Mai group, and you are training the people, during one week, two-weeks, maybe one month. And then they are going to rape women, they are going to steal from people, they are going to make trouble in the area, and then the solution is that '*oh, we are going to integrate these people in the army, their leader is going to be a colonel or a commander*', and it's always like that! You make trouble for a few weeks, one month and then you become an officer in the Congolese army. That's the only solution what they have – the integration into the Congolese army. You make widows, you rape women, and then you become a commander in the military. What we try to do is to say that you cannot take these people to the army, it is not the way to manage the army, it is not the way to manage an institution, a security institution, so stop it. But their answer is that it is the only solution we have, it is the political solution, and the army is paying the price of the insecurity in this country.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

Interestingly, this official acknowledges that the non-state armed groups are a "*real problem*". Nevertheless, for the official it is clear that the EU should not take any action with them. On the contrary, the official actually strongly criticises the pragmatic decision taken after the war to integrate some of the armed groups into the Congolese military.

In other words, the only solution for this official seems to be strengthening the military to a level that no other force can challenge its power in the Congolese territory. Another CSDP official puts the same even more directly, completely rejecting the legitimacy of any informal security actors and seeing them as "*enemies*":

> These are no community defense groups. They have been created simply to improve the conditions of certain groups, not to defend communities… These are gangs that have been founded to rob, not to defend. This is the logic of the armed groups in the Congo: never to defend, always to rob. These are gangs that live by their own logic. The only way to stop violence would be by getting these gangs in line… I completely agree that these militias are enemies.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

However, the problem is that as the informal security organisations are *de facto* controlling large areas in the Eastern Congo, these groups simply cannot be ignored. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, some communities in the Eastern part of the country do see the state security providers as a *threat* to their security, not as a solution, and this has been the trend since the colonial times. The situation is even further complicated by the fact that for some communities, informal security and justice mechanisms have always been the most, and practically the only source of security. This cannot be changed easily, particularly if such informal mechanisms are not included in the reform activities in some way or another, and certainly not before the formal security providers begin to be seen as providers of protection and security by the local communitie, instead of looting and raping them.

A somehow different approach among the EU officials applies to such local level actors that are not necessarily direct security providers but could nevertheless have an important role in a successful security system reform. Such actors include the local NGOs and CSOs that have a role to play in the reform activities, and particularly in security management and oversight functions of the reform.

While not seen directly as "*enemies*", the interviewed EU officials, and particularly the officials of the CSDP missions, regard the civil society organisations either as rather

insignificant actors, or as some sort of troublemakers. For example, one CSDP official who was specifically tasked to work on issues that required close collaboration with the Congolese civil-society, and was somehow positive regarding to the role of the civil society, explains that within the missions, "…*NGOs are seen as problematic and troublemakers, or as insignificant actors without real power*... *Within the CSDP missions there is a very stereotypical view regarding the role of the NGOs: They are seen as some sort of zealots*" (Official from CSDP mission). The Official goes on explaining on an effort to attend a funeral service of a well-known Congolese human rights defender to which the official had been invited to attend, which was eventually rejected by the Head of Mission as it was not seen as important for the mission's mandate.

Another interviewed official from the EU Delegation, in turn, explains the following, when asked about the EU's practical cooperation and engagement with the Congolese civil society on the security sector reform action:

> The EU is an institutional power player. There are NGOs that work in the local level. The European Union cannot do that. ...And I know there are a lot of good things that are done in the local level with NGO actors who are doing some good work. And we [the EU Delegation] are doing some calls for proposals, we are working with those NGOs. But we also need to be an institutional power player. This is the general agreement and this who we are. This is also the reason why our programmes are always in tune with the policy of the government. We go through the government to implement them. It can provide challenges because we cannot say that we work outside the government spectrum but we have to respect the Government.
>
> (Official from EU delegation)

The official further explains that sometimes the EU Delegation does engage politically or "*even through funding*" the civil-society organisations, "*in the view that they will actually lobby their own government*". But practically, for the interviewed official, this seems to be the only way the EU can cooperate with non-state actors in the security sector reform support, and the main message is that the EU is an "*institutional power player*" that needs to focus on working with the more important state-level issues.

While the EU Delegation does work with the civil society particularly on certain development projects, the contribution of the civil society regarding the SSR does not seem to be appreciated even to the same extent by some of the interviewed CSDP officials. On the contrary, the responses provided during the interviews by the interviewed officials show that the work of the civil society does not enjoy a great respect. For example, one interviewed CSDP official argues that the EU should not engage with the civil society, and suggests that the EU Delegation might currently be working even *too much* on local-level development-related issues:

> I think that the EU Delegation, that they are already involved in lot of [local-level] projects and maybe they should focus less on these issues and just to focus on some key points like education and good governance. And less perhaps on some bottom-up projects and bottom-up issues...
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

By looking at these answers, it becomes clear that the EU actors who are involved in the Congo's SSR support, and particularly the representatives of the CSDP missions, do not think that the EU should be focusing significantly on local level dynamics: Practically all the given SSR support and activities are directed at the national level and to the formal security providers, whereas initiatives that would possibly seek to include the local and informal level actors are seen as either irrelevant or even potentially harmful.

As discussed earlier, the EU SSR concepts call for adoption of a system approach that takes all actors into consideration. For example, the Council Concept states the following: "*Following the OECD guidelines there is a need to take a broad approach, engaging all these actors in reform efforts. Rather than focussing on a limited number of key sectors, a holistic, multi-sectoral approach is advocated*" (Council Concept 2005, 8). The reference point for the EU concepts, the OECD DAC Guidelines, in turn, explains the following regarding the role of the civil society:

> A strong civil society capable of carrying out its policy analysis and '*watchdog*' role is important in creating the needed checks and balances of democratic governance and ensuring that security system reform meets the needs of the

> broader public. Civil society groups should not be simply seen as alternative service providers or channels for donor assistance. Support for civil society should place greater emphasis on encouraging the development of independent policy interlocutors, including women's groups who can contribute to and raise awareness on security decision-making. Given the weaknesses of state capacity in many countries, it is particularly important that civil society groups develop the capacity to go beyond denouncing governments for their failings and make practical suggestions that will help to sustain the reform process.
>
> (OECD 2005, 39)

Therefore, by disagreeing to acknowledge the significance of the local level actors, such as the informal security provision mechanisms and the civil society organisations, or to engage such actors for other reasons, the extent in which the EU and particularly the CSDP missions actually succeed in adopting a system-focused SSR approach becomes rather questionable. In fact, by refusing to collaborate with the local-level actors, the EU is practically denouncing its own approach of a holistic and context-specific system-focused reform. By looking at the EU policy documents that call for a security system thinking, and by following Kalyvas and Autesserre's system-focused model of analysis regarding the rootcauses of insecurity, the EU's action in the Congo can hardly be seen as supporting a system-focused security sector reform. In fact, it becomes rather questionable whether the officials implementing the EU support even understand the concept of a system-focused SSR.

One way to explain this is to say that the practice of ignoring the local level follows a more traditional approach of trying to support the building of a Weberian state that secures the rights of the people. Through a monopoly to violence, this state can uphold the Rule of Law, and ensure that all citizens are protected from violence. In this thinking, anything that challenges this monopoly to violence is seen as hostile and unwanted. Indeed, as mentioned above, even the EU policy concepts do give some support to an approach that sees state security and human security as *mutually reinforcing*.

By analysing the answers given by the EU officials implementing the EU support, this seems to be their way of thinking. The objective for the interviewed officials is to strengthen the state and the formal security actors so that they could provide security to the citizens. This is of course an incredibly massive task, as the Congolese state is fundamentally an artificial colonial creation and its formal security forces currently often the "*citizens' nightmares*" rather than their protectors. Such a starting point makes it extremely difficult to carry out a successful reform and to turn the Congolese formal security forces into true security providers.

Nevertheless, while the chosen approach is not really the system-focused approach advocated in the OECD Guidelines, perhaps the EU action could advance human security if the EU support to the Congolese formal security made sure than the formal security providers actually achieve a position of monopoly over violence, and use this monopoly for the protection of people. In other words, instead of just strengthening these actors, the EU should also support their transformation into providers of security to the citizens. For example, Davis (2009a; 2009b) has called for a justice-sensitive approach to the Congolese SSR that seeks to ensure that the formal security providers that gain from the EU support become a source of security instead of a threat to the ordinary people. Here the focus should be, among else on addressing the impunity and the human rights violations committed by the security forces, and strengthening the military justice system so that it prosecutes and punishes the perpetrators.

5.3 EU Support and Human Security: Policy and Practice

5.3.1 EU Actors and Rootcauses of Congolese Insecurity

If the EU actors who are implementing the SSR support activities in the DRC regard all the non-state actors either as irrelevant or illegitimate and focus solely on supporting statebuilding and the formal security sector actors, how does the EU support to the state security providers then seek to promote human security?

It is clear that advancing human security is a strong policy priority for the EU. As presented earlier, all the three EU SSR policy concept documents, based on the OECD DAC SSR Guidelines, follow an approach that aims to promote human security. Similarly, the EU joint-approach to the Congolese Security Sector Reform, also presented earlier,

which is supposed to guide the EU's comprehensive action in the country, repeats the normative objectives of the EU policy concepts. As presented by Rory Keane, the EU joint-paper focuses on three key principles that include developing a DRC nationally-owned concept designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law, and respect for human rights; strengthening the governance of security institutions; as well as enhancing service delivery in the security sector and *ensuring that the Congolese security actors become a source of security rather than insecurity for citizens* (Keane 2008, 224–225). These three principles, as agreed by the Commission and the Council, are bound to guide the EU action in the DRC's SSR support.

How do the EU actors on the ground then implement the policy objective of advancing human security in the Congo? To begin with, it is important to understand what the EU actors regard as the rootcauses of insecurity and chaos in the Eastern DRC and how they understand the concept of human security, as well as one of its key underlying assumptions, the inter-connectedness between development and security.

When asked about the rootcauses of insecurity in the Congo, many of the interviewed EU officials do show a level of understanding between the development failures and the prevalence of insecurity. For example, as discussed earlier, the EU officials from both the EU Delegation and from the CSDP missions generally see statebuilding as a panacea to the Congo's development and security problems. Consequently, they regard the weakness of the state as the main challenge for the Congo. As was already presented, one of the CSDP officials stated that "*all the threats are internal, and they have to due with the weakness of the state",* and that "*all this is linked to the weakness of the army and this weakness is also linked to low level of good governance, and the lack of financing the public affairs*" (Official from CSDP mission). An official from the Delegation similarly explains in a lengthy manner how improving the security situation is inherently dependent on the progress in building of a state and organising the finances of the state:

> I would say the greatest security threat is the weakness of the state to bring weak and unaccountable security forces on the ground in certain parts of the country. This is the case, you have an absence of the state in some parts of the country and you can have different groups that terrorise people in certain parts

> of the country. And also it is true that the security forces are not paid very well, sometimes they act wrongly on the population. And there might be a police officer on the roads in Kinshasa trying to take ten dollars from you because he is only paid forty dollars per month and nobody can live on that so he takes ten dollars from you so that he can let his family to be fed. So the reason for this situation are the war and the destruction of the infrastructure and the lack of resources, particularly the resources dedicated to the state. In my mind statebuilding is then the only viable option. Because you can do whatever you want in the provincial level and maybe it will work better and maybe even in Ituri things will go great, but you know today, we have a huge country that needs a state to get to be unified and that is what you need…
>
> (Official from EU delegation)

Furthermore, in addition to seeing statebuilding as the only possible way to address the Congo's security and development needs, some of the interviewed EU officials also presented certain specific issues related to the lack of development such as *lack of education*, as rootcauses to the Congolese insecurity. For example, one of the interviewed CSDP officials explains such rootcauses as follows:

> I think the rootcause of the insecurity is the lack of education, poverty, greed – actually I think that the lack of education is the main issue because when you go to school, when you are educated, you will have the sense of public interest – and there is a real lack of this in the Congo. The Congolese don't understand the public interest, so there are leaders who are greedy. Especially the leaders of the army in the east and the local commanders of the armed groups. So, this is the real challenge of the Congo.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

Another CSDP official explains how the conflict economy and the trade of conflict minerals sustains insecurity and violence in the Eastern Congo:

> …It is a massive set of problems. If we were completely pragmatic, we should focus on the trade of minerals and get it under control. The basic problem is

> that the trade [of minerals] is unmonitored and uncontrolled. If mineral trade was made legal and controlled the soldiers would lose their jobs and eventually their profession would cease to exist. It would become an extinct profession and the illegal business would stop.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

By looking at these answers it can be argued that the EU actors do have some level of understanding regarding one of the core assumptions behind the concept of human security, that security is also linked to "*freedom from want*" – the more development-oriented needs of the people.

However, in practice, as has been presented earlier, the type of SSR support that has been given to the Congolese formal security actors has been mostly *technical* in nature, focusing very much either on enhancing the technical aspects of the security forces to conduct their core operations (e.g. through building of training facilities), or on administrative reforms (such as reducing the level of corruption in the armed forces by separating the chain of payment from the chain of command). According to the OECD DAC Guidebook, while this type of technical support is needed, it is not alone enough to achieve a comprehensive human security-promoting reform that the EU policy is aiming to achieve:

> The task of enhancing the professionalism of security forces – including the military, intelligence and police services – has both a normative and a technical component. It is important to differentiate between this *normative* component and the *technical* one. In the first case, this includes strengthening adherence to democratic principles – especially accountability to the elected civil authorities and, through legislatures, to the public. Other normative elements include building respect among the security forces for international humanitarian law, internationally-accepted human rights standards, gender issues (including sensitivity to issues of violence affecting women), and basic codes of conduct that relate to the security force in question. In the second case, building professionalism relates to improving the technical proficiency of security forces to carry out core operational functions. These kinds of activities

> might include doctrinal development (in the military) or the development of skills for confronting, arresting and investigating criminals (in the police), including the use of force in the line of legitimate duty.
>
> (OECD 2005, 39–40)

In other words, the EU support in the Congo has focused by and large on "*improving the technical proficiency of security forces to carry out core operational functions*", while the more normative, and the more political component, and its elements of *accountability*, *respect on human rights*, and *impunity of the security forces*, has not received such a strong focus.

This argument that the EU action has not substantially addressed some of the more political aspects of the security sector reform is also shared by Laura Davis, whose *justice-sensitive approach* was presented earlier. Her point is that by strengthening the state security actors and by making them more capable to manage their resources or to carry out their operations "*without addressing the abusive nature of the state*" will not alone or automatically mean that human security of the ordinary Congolese is strengthened (Davis 2009a, 18–19). On the contrary, by strengthening the perpetrators and making them more capable and efficient without focusing on security governance and impunity, one might only make them stronger and more efficient in committing such violations.

In the context of the Congo, where the formal security actors are among the worst human rights perpetrators, as discussed earlier, this is particularly relevant. The brutality of the Congolese formal security actors is also admitted by both the EU Concept of Operations for the Congolese CSDP missions (see, for example Council 2011a, 7–8), as well as many of the interviewed EU officials. Logically, as Davis (2009a, 32–34) suggests, as the police and the army officials often pose a threat to the citizens, a significant focus should then be placed on preventing the violations of the security forces through proper vetting and training processes, and addressing impunity by investigating such violations and punishing the culprits.

In practice, the EU support to the army and the police has hardly prioritised such aspects. As the answers of the interviewed EU officials reveal, the focus has been very much on providing the Congolese formal security forces technical assistance and supporting their training, with an ultimate objective of making the army more proficient in carrying out their operations. The eventual implicit objective here is that the formal security actors achieve a position of monopoly regarding the use of force in the Congolese territory. Here is one example of this reasoning:

> In the East we see that things are very unstable. It is very hard to tell what in the next 20 years will become, but we can hope for a greater strength of the army, we can hope for reduction of the armed groups.
>
> (Official from EU delegation)

5.3.2 EU Actors and Surreality of Human Security

Why then the EU support to the Congolese security sector reform has focused particularly on technical capacity building rather than addressing the normative and the more political aspects of the reform? This is a rather complicated matter and some of the reasons explaining the chosen approach will be discussed in the following sections. One obvious explanation can however be found through examining what the actors implementing the EU's Comprehensive Approach in the DRC in fact think about the concept of human security. By simply posing this question, it might be possible to find out the underlying assumptions towards the concept of human security of the key actors who implement the EU support in the field.

When actually asking this question, some of the answers of the interviewed EU officials are rather surprising. Despite the EU's firm support to the concept on the policy level, the implementing actors themselves seem in fact to be *rather sceptical* towards the concept. For example, an EU Delegation official explains in a lengthy manner how the the reality is "*very complicated in the Congo*", and this makes it very difficult to apply the concept of human security. Furthermore, as the interview moves on, the official undermines the concept by arguing that the main challenge in the Congolese security sector reform is not accountability of the army but creating a unified state with a functioning army.

> …[B]ut you know today, we have a huge country that needs a state to get to be unified and that is what you need. And that is why the concept of human security is workable, of course, but it is not as easy to be used as in the Eastern European countries in the 90s, because the main challenge is not to make the security forces more accountable and more in tune with the well-being of the people. It [the main challenge] is of course, almost to create a state and to create the security forces so we are doing it with the best intentions in the framework of human security concept and in the framework of democratic and human rights ideals which are all there. But when you go talk to the Congolese about human security when you are supporting the SSR, you will see how it looks like. So this is how it is, it is a workable concept. I am not saying it is not to be used or to be misused but we have to also understand the limitations of the concept in this context.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

While the statement does follow the logic of building a state with a strong army, it is nevertheless somehow surprising: A senior EU official, supposed to defend the chosen EU approach – the one building heavily on the concept of human security – actually undermines the very concept. To follow this official's logic of reasoning, though stated behind the veil of anonymity, the army is currently so weak that the main focus should be placed on strengthening the army and making it more efficient – rather than focusing on accountability and addressing impunity. When comparing the message of this statement to the language of the EU concept documents it becomes clear that the actors who have drafted the policy and the ones implementing it disagree on a rather fundamental level.

A senior CSDP official, similarly confirming speaking anonymously, actually goes even further. First, the official acknowledges of not knowing much about the concept of human security, before continuing on criticising the EU policy level actors who demand on a human security approach, calling such demands *surrealistic*:

> [W]ith regards to the Members States, I must say that there are two things that are a little contradictory, which is perhaps not surprising, of course, as there

> are 27 countries, and they want us to work on issues of human rights, impunity, gender, sexual violence and things like that. And, we agree, of course, we do whatever they want, but in fact, sometimes when we are at the PSC, for example, it is a little surrealistic, because some countries, especially from the north, insist on priority to fight sexual violence. Okay, we can do something of course, but if we focus on that and if we use a lot of our energy on that, in fact we are just treating the symptons but not the sickness. The sickness is the fact that this is not an army, it is just a group of people who arrives and abuses them and does whatever they want without any order, and that is it. --If you do not have a working hierachy, if you do not have discipline, it will not work. --But the way, sometimes, some Member States, ask us to work, and it is nonsense, but they want it, and we will do something about it of course…
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

From the above comment it becomes rather clear that the interviewee agrees with his/her colleague from the EU Delegation in that the priority should be on strengthening the capacity and administrative structures of the armed forces, instead of focusing on the "*nonsense*" of human security and addressing impunity, which are seen as mere "*symptoms*" of the inefficient, weak and poorly trained army. After this, it hardly is surprising that another CSDP official is even blunter by stating, among else, that "*human rights, it just does not work*" (Official from CSDP mission). Later on, this official also proposes that "*perhaps the EU should give up its human rights objectives*", and instead focus only on very technical projects and capacity building.

One of the interviewed CSDP officials also explaied that the missions generally, and particularly one of the former Heads of Mission, did not take very seriously the reports that the Congolese armed forces were heavily involved in raping women. The official also explaied that the "*social project*" that aimed to support the spouses and families of the soldiers was regarded as "*a hobby horse of the General*" – a project which main purpose was to gain positive publicity for the mission.

The above comments show that the actors implementing the EU's SSR support activities in the Congo do not genuinely value the concept of human security. Despite all the

normative language regarding the promotion of human rights and addressing impunity, the implementing actors themselves do not consider these aspects crucial for a successful SSR, or at least these are not prioritised high among the key tasks.

Furthermore, if it is true that "*human rights projects*" are generally regarded as the generals' hobby horses that only seek to polish the missions' image, it is indeed questionable how much these projects in practice have impact on the ground. If the implementing officials do not even themselves believe in the officially stated expected outcomes of such projects, how likely it is that those outcomes will be met in practice? It also seems that some of the interviewed key actors were not even aware of the provisions of the EU SSR policy objectives regarding the promotion of human security. If this is the case, how could one even expect them to implement something they perhaps do not even properly comprehend?

While lack of understanding and/or disagreement with the guiding principles of the EU SSR concept might in some extent explain why the EU actors are not implementing a comprehensive, system-focused approach that prioritises human security, there are also other factors that can partially explain the chosen approach. This became apparent during the interviews as the EU officials reasoned why the DRC's comprehensive SSR has been a rather challenging task, and why certain sensitive political level questions have not been addressed and advocated. The next section will briefly discuss some of these factors – which will be followed by an effort to answer the original research questions.

5.4 Other Factors Explaining Incoherence between Policy and Action

5.4.1 Difficult Context and Lack of Resources: Need to Prioritise

One of the factors that the interviewed EU officials often cite as a reason why the EU action has not supported a comprehensive security sector reform in the Congo and why resources have not been directed in advancing human security, is simply the combination of an extraordinarily *difficult context* and the *scarcity of resources* that forces the EU actors to prioritise.

As discussed in the chapter focusing on the historical context of the Congo and the production and reproduction of its insecurity, the Congo is an enormous country with a

bleak colonial legacy, possessed by large-scale problems related to lack of development and security. Among such problems are also the legacy of Mobutu's patrimonialism, the predatory nature of the state, an ill-functioning security sector, and unbearable poverty. In other words, Congo is per se an extremely challenging context, an artificial country, where any statebuilding effort would be an incredibly challenging task. This is exactly the argument made by many of the interviewed EU officials, as they explained the successes and challenges, and the chosen approaches and priorities, of the EU action in the Congo.

For example, one CSDP official argued that statebuilding in the context of the Congo is extremely difficult. Among else, the official explained how the "*fundamental problem*" might well be the effort to try to "*build a European state in the Congo*".

Another CSDP official went further as he/she explained his/her version of the history of the Congolese state, emphasising how the country is actually initially an artificial construction, "*created by foreigners*", "*invented outside*", and how "*nobody ever before 1885 in this area thought about something like [the conteporary] Congo*". The official went on explaining how the independence of the Congo happened very suddenly without proper preparation, which meant that completely incompetent people started running the country, including its security organisations. For the official, this is still the fundamental problem of the Congo: The country is not unified or organised, and nobody really knows "*how to deal with such a big country*". The official tells an anecdote of the neighbouring, organised Rwanda, explaining how the Congolese call this small country a meaningless "confetti" that can nevertheless invade its huge neighbour due to its high level of organisation: "*Do you know what a confetti is? It is a very-very small piece of paper that you throw around in carnivals, a very small piece of paper...and they [the Congolese] think of Rwanda often saying that 'this confetti – how could they invade a big country like this?' 'Okay, because they are organised and you are not!' Well you cannot say that publicly of course, but that's the problem.* Finally, the official explains how difficult task it is to reform the security sector in a context of a weak and failing state that "*accepts everything*" – even the militias that were integrated into the army after the war. He/she finishes his/her lengthy contribution by concluding that "*…in*

Congo, it's terrible. They have no idea, they have no idea, really. I have a lot of sympathy and lots of Congolese friends but they are lost."

A key point for these officials is that due to the troubled history and the massive challenges facing the country today, it will take a long time and considerable resources to complete the statebuilding exercise in the Congo, and to implement a sustainable and comprehensive SSR as part of this endeavour. Furthermore, in addition to this difficult context, the Congo is but one of the countries in Africa for which the EU provides support, and the resources allocated to any reform activity remain limited. For many of the interviewed officials this combination, *an extremely difficult context* and *scarce resources*, makes a comprehensive security sector reform a rather challenging task, despite all the emphasis it has gained on the policy level. For example, a CSDP official explains that the budget of the Congo's state for conducting a security sector reform is insignificant, which means that a lot of prioritisation is required: "*We understand that there are many things they have to do and they have to prioritise, and that it is sometimes difficult for them too. I don't want to give excuses for them, but I understand that they also may have a lot of difficulties*" (Official from CSDP mission).

Similarly, many of the interviewed officials explain how the missions constantly need to choose and prioritise as their resources are limited:

> So the lack of resources…is a big problem for us. And of course in some extent we do understand why it is like that – because there are many priorities also for Europe, but a mission (EUSEC) which budget last year was 13.6 million euro, and we had 51 European officials, when you consider the size of the country and all that, to some extent I would even say it cannot be achieved, it cannot really be achieved what we have to do here, but I think we can do it anyway. But it is very, very difficult to achieve what we have to do. So these are real difficulties.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

This argument is also shared by some other analysts who have studied the EU's support to the Congolese SSR. For example, Weiler (2009, 6) has focused on the effectiveness

and the internal coordination of the EU's support to the Congo's SSR, and notes in his paper that the scarcity of resources remains one of the key challenges for the EU, as it tries to engage in such a massive task as supporting a comprehensive SSR in the Congo. Hoebeke et al. (2007, 11), present a similar conclusion: The EU's resources have simply not been sufficient to support a comprehensive reform in the Congo.

While it can and should be questioned whether 51 European officials and a EUR 13.6 million annual budget equals as a "*lack of resources*", this certainly seems to be a fundamental problem for the interviewed officials. The argument here is that in order to reform the whole security system, or even substantially transform the functioning of any of the formal security providers, significant resources are needed. The Congolese army remains disintegrated and corrupted, and perceived as posing a threat to some segments of the population, instead of providing them security from such threats. A vast amount of resources would be needed to generate a comprehensive change. At the same time, the army does not even have the control of the whole territory of the Congolese State, and a part of its forces are actually constantly in operations in the Eastern Congo, making it very difficult to carry out a comprehensive military reform. Therefore, constant prioritisation is required.

Furthermore, as became clear from the comments presented earlier, despite the importance given to the concept on a policy level, not many EU officials seem to regard advancing human security as a key priority for the EU action. On the contrary, as discussed earlier, many of them see a creation of a strong and functioning army as a higher priority. It is then not surprising that as the officials need to prioritise, they will prefer to use their scarce resources to finance projects that are seen most important, such as provision of training to the soldiers or tackling corruption, and ignore the less important "*social projects*" and the "*surrealistic*" concepts that "*are not easy to be used*" in the context of the Congo, such as human security.

To conclude, the difficult context in the Congo, the scarce resources available for the reform, and the EU officials' need to prioritise – combined with their general suspicion towards the concept of human security – are among the factors explaining the chosen approach.

5.4.2 "*Some Get Caught, Others Don't*"

Another common factor appearing in the EU officials' answers as they explain why a system-focused and human security-promoting approach has not been followed in the EU support to the Congolese SSR is the *lack of political will* among the Congolese authorities. For example, an official from the EU delegation explains that the Congolese do not want to follow the EU approach: "*What I could say is, for example, that it has been really difficult for the Congolese authorities to own a concept of security sector reform, which is a pretty sophisticated concept, [and] which is based on the concept of nation state in European countries, as you know*".

The reasoning here is that the EU has not been successful in advancing human security in the Congo's SSR partly due to the fact that *the Congolese authorities have not been interested in such an approach*. Furthermore, the EU officials argue that an adoption of a system-focused approach does not seem appealing to the local authorities. For example, according to one official, the EU has been advocating for drafting of a comprehensive "*security strategy*" that would at least in some extent follow a security system thinking – but that this has *de facto* been blocked by the Congolese authorities who do not wish to work in a comprehensive way:

> In fact, one could say that they [the Congolese] have not been really interested in developing a broader institutional framework. So there is no security strategy or security sector reform approach. There is a separate strategy for the police sector, for the justice sector, for the military sector…
>
> -- The Congolese preferred to work separately in each sector and maybe later they will be thinking a wider strategy.
>
> (Official from EU delegation)

Furthermore, EUSEC officials explain how the EU has tried to support the establishment of a Steering Committee that would guide a more comprehensive military reform and improve coordination between the various actors involved in the military reform. However, according to the officials, the Congolese have not been interested in creating such a mechanism either.

This suggested unwillingness of the Congolese to follow an approach that the EU has chosen actually raises an important question related to the principle of *national ownership:* If it really is the case that the Congolese authorities do not wish to adopt certain approaches or ideas, such as the concept of human security, and if they, for whatever reason, want to work in a less comprehensive way, should they not be allowed to do so? This is a point that one of the interviewed EU officials raises:

> There are two ways [to handle the lack of political will by the Congolese]. Either you try to confront or you try to bypass. So what I think is that first we were trying to deal with a limited political will. But again, I dont think we should judge them for not doing what we are writing in our policy papers. It is also that we have to understand the context and the history of this country in a way that you cannot achieve everything you want. But we are working, and there has been a lot of progress in the recent years.
>
> (Official from EU delegation).

Arguing that the concept of a comprehensive and human security-focused security sector reform is not what the Congolese authorities want, is actually supported by some other observers who have assessed the EU support to the Congolese security sector reform. For example, Vines (2010, 1097) argues that the Congolese government has not been fully committed to a comprehensive security sector reform and has therefore not prioritised reform activities in its policies. For Vines, the EU has failed in obtaining the Congolese ownership in its SSR support, which also partially explains why the reform has not been particularly successful.

Local ownership, the first principle of the OECD Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness policy document, is of course one of the key principles of any EU development support initiative. If the Congolese do not actually want to follow a comprehensive or human security approach, why should the EU even try to push for it? While answering this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to see how the EU officials then defend the actual activities that they have been supporting, some of which have certainly not been openly welcomed by the Congolese stakeholders either.

For example, key projects for the CSDP missions have included the separation of the payments from the chain of command, as well as elimination of thousands of "*ghost soldiers"* from receiving salary payments through conduction of a military census. In other words, eradication of corruption has been a priority for the EU, and many of the interviewed officials presented these projects as some of the success stories of the EU SSR support. However, the EU officials also explained how there has been significant "*resistance*" among the Congolese authorities to implement the reforms that seek to tackle corruption. In fact, "*political problems*" related to unwillingness of the Congolese authorities and "*resistance to the operation*" were presented as points to emphasise the EU's successful action. Despite this resistance, the EU had managed to push this reform activity through, and to create a system that prevents corruption. Interestingly, actions resisted by the Congolese that try to address corruption are justified, and actually identified as success stories by the interviewed officials. At the same time an approach that aims to promote human security can be neglected due to the same resistance.

Nevertheless, corruption and lack of political will of the Congolese authorities are indeed regarded as key obstacles for a successful EU SSR support in the Congo. Some interviewed EU officials actually take this argument even further, in explaining how the Congolese officials, and particularly the army officers, are a key reason for the unsuccessful implementation of the EU approach. For example, an official who has previously worked with EUSEC, explains how the Congolese army is "*completely criminal*", and suggests that the EU should not actually be working with the army at all. The official describes the army officers as "*bastards*" and "*bandits*", and concludes by saying how "*some of them get caught [from their misbehavior], while some do not*".

(Official from CSDP mission)

This reflects the line of reasoning promoted by many scholars who have focused on the role of the predatory state in the Congo's history: King Leopold's brutal colonial state and its feared '*Force Publique'*, as well as the post-colonial state guided by Mobutu's patrimonialism and divide and rule policies, have certainly influenced how the role of the state, and the role of its security forces in particular, are described in the literature focusing on the contemporary Congo. For example, Froitzheim, Söderbaum & Taylor

(2011), who have discussed the challenges of the Congolese SSR, use the concept of *neopatrimonialism* to explain how the elites are now using the state to their own advantage, including in the efforts to reform the security system. According to them, the rulers of today's Congo, similarly to the rulers of the Congo since the colonial days, are not committed in achieving a comprehensive security sector reform or establishing effective coordination among the donors but rather aim to divide the donors and work separately in each sector to fill their own pockets (Froitzheim et al. 2011, 62). Gambino, who has also focused on the challenges in the Congolese SSR and particularly on the EU's role in it, agrees with Froitzheim et al., concluding that the EU SSR support to the Congo has "*foundered fundamentally due to the Congolese' bad faith*" (Gambino 2008, 19).

Similarly to Froitzheim et al. and Gambino, a common line of thought among the interviewed EU officials seems to be that the local authorities, including the officials in the ministries, the commanders in the army and the police, and the local elites in general, are either not interested in implementing "our" (human security) approach, or perceived as rather corrupted or even criminal. This, in turn, according to the interviewed officials, makes it difficult to implement a system-focused, comprehensive human security approach: Either the Congolese do not want it (which might actually be well justified due to the principle of local ownership, as argued by the above official), or they are simply so corrupted and criminal that they make following such an approach extremely difficult. In either case, it is the Congolese authorities who are seen as hampering the implementation of the EU's comprehensive SSR approach, thus making it practically impossible to follow a "*security system*" thinking or to promote human security through the EU support.

5.4.3 EU's Internal Problems

As discussed earlier, a lot has been done in the policy level to adopt a comprehensive EU SSR approach, and the Congo is the country where this has been taken the furthest. Adoption of the joint-Council-Commission SSR Framework; creation of various short- and long-term instruments and tools to address conflict prevention and fragility; the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS; and a specific joint-EU-comprehensive approach paper for the EU's SSR in the Congo, are all significant

developments that have taken place since the turn of the millennium. As a result of the increasing merger between the EU's security and development policies, the EU has today a wide range of security and development tools and instruments available to support third countries' security sector reforms in a broad, and human security-focused manner.

However, this has by no means been an easy endeavor and there have been significant challenges on the way. As discussed earlier, within the EU's previous pillar system, development policy traditionally belonged to the Commission's competence, whereas primarily security-related actions have belonged to the Council, and conducted through the CFSP/CSDP. Despite the increasing merger in the recent years and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, this still practically continues to be the case, and the two institutions have not been willing to give up their competencies easily, as the previously mentioned SALW case, and the arguments over the scope of the IfS' short-term component, showed (Gourlay 2008, 96).

In fact, some experts argue that such tensions between the EU institutions continue to affect the internal operation and effectiveness of the EU action in the Congolese SSR. For example, according to Froitzheim et al. (2011, 48), the institutional incapacity and the continuing rivalry between the EU institutions have indeed limited the EU's effectiveness to support a comprehensive SSR in the Congo. Weiler (2009, 22) very much agrees, arguing that the inter- and intra-pillar coordination continues to remain one of the most important problems for the EU's SSR action on the ground.

According to the interviewed EU officials, such observations are not completely unjustified. While insisting on anonymity, many of them speak surprisingly openly about the internal problems the EU action has been facing in the Congo. For a Master's student writing a thesis on the EU's support to the Congolese SSR this is highly interesting, particularly as this type of finger-pointing may in itself be an indication that the mutual loyalty and trust among the various EU actors in the Congo is not particularly strong.

Perhaps the clearest challenge for the interviewed CSDP officials in this respect relates to the nature of the CSDP missions' mandate: As discussed earlier, the missions have very much a restricted, technical mandate, and cannot therefore have anything to do

either with development support or the political aspects of the reform. The EU Delegation, and in particular the EEAS, (and previously also the EUSR), are in charge of the political support, and within the Delegation, the Commission deals with development support (More & Price 2011, 18–19). The CSDP missions in the Congo, however, are not even located in the Delegation, and are strictly providing technical assistance to the police and the military.

However, as the OECD DAC Guidelines point out, conducting a comprehensive and a human security-focused army or police reform requires a significant engagement in the political level (OECD 2005, 28). As security sector reform very much affects the existing power relations it is therefore by nature a political process, which cannot be achieved without addressing the political sphere. Acknowledging this, the Council SSR Concept (2005, 9) stresses the importance for SSR reforms to address the "*issues of how security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled*" – all inherently political questions by nature. Furthermore, political dialogue, together with principles such as good governance, the rule of law, respect of human rights, civilian oversight of the security sector, and accountability, is similarly identified as among the key principles in the EU joint-SSR concept (Council 2006a, 2–3).

In the context of Congo, addressing the political level seems to be particularly relevant: As was discussed earlier, the EU officials identified the lack of political will among the Congolese authorities as a key obstacle for a successful SSR in the Congo. They saw the Congolese authorities as unprofessional or corrupted, and often blocking the initiatives that sought to ensure a comprehensive human security-focused and system-oriented reform process. Furthermore, all the interviewed officials spoke about the importance of addressing the political level in order to achieve the objectives of the reforms. For example, an official from the EU Delegation stated how they have "*realised that to do a security sector reform you need to have political will because it is a political issue*" (Official from EU delegation).

For the CSDP missions' officials, the incapacity to address the political level seemed to be particularly problematic. As the missions themselves are *technical* by nature, they do not possess tools to address the political level directly. This was among the biggest

practical challenges that the CSDP officials identified as hampering the effective implementation:

> We are a technical mission and our mission is to advice and to support the army in the reform process, in training of military and logistical issues, so we are technicals and technicians, we are not politicians, and actually we don't have the mandate to make pressure on the political level here in Congo, so we try to coordinate with the EU delegation whose role is to be a leader in the political aspects here in the Congo. But this is one of the main lacks of EUSEC. We are a technical mission but the problems that we need to deal with are political problems, and we don't have the tools to solve the problems actually. (Official from CSDP mission)

> Of course the biggest challenge [in the defense reform] I would say is the lack of political will from the Congolese side, but also the European side. For example, the Member States have been informed since September last year [2011] that we have had this problem concerning the non-promulgation of the law on the status of the military but there has been no political demands at any level concerning that towards the Congolese authorities. And of course our mission is a technical mission, so we can go to make demands at the level of generals, but we cannot go to the Congolese ministries and raise those issues, that is something that should be done by the Member States. So for that we need a position taken by the EU at a higher level, it should be done by Mrs. Ashton for example, or by some foreign affairs ministers of the Member States. We cannot do it, we can just inform and advise. So when I speak about the lack of the political will, it is also on the European side.
>
> (Official from CSDP mission)

For these interviewed CSDP officials, a key problem seems to be the technical nature of the missions: They simply cannot raise political level questions with the Congolese authorities at an adequate level as their mandate is not sufficient for this. Referring to the historical division of competencies between the EU institutions, the interviewed officials also make it clear that they do not expect this to change in the near future. For

example, one of the interviewed officials (Official from CSDP mission) would welcome a more political role for the missions but argues that the "*Brussels is not listening*", and that it would be never accepted "*in Brussels*". Another CSDP official shares this view, explaining how the "*view of the Commission and some of the Member States is certainly not to give more political power to CSDP missions*" (Official from CSDP mission).

As discussed earlier, improved EU coordination and coherence has been a specific objective for the EU's SSR approach, including for the adoption of the EU SSR joint-concept in 2006 and the DRC-specific EU comprehensive approach joint-document. How this cooperation between the EU institutions is then implemented in the Congo? As the missions completely rely on the EU Delegation to address the crucial political level questions, and as is emphasised in all the EU policy documents, it could be expected that this cooperation takes place smoothly. In practice, however, at least in mid-2012 when the interviews took place, this did not seem to be the case.

While the officials acknowledged that there have been some improvements in the mutual coordination [35], particularly the CSDP missions' officials felt that the EU Delegation and the Member States are not keen on pushing forward some of the issues that the missions regard important. For example, several CSDP officials complained that the EU Delegation has not always been interested in raising the missions' issues with the Congolese authorities. According to the officials, neither the EU Delegation nor the Member States have been active in supporting the missions politically regarding the promulgation of the earlier-mentioned law on the status of the military: "*The first thing to do, and they (the EU Delegation and the Member States) are not doing it right now, is to raise the issue with them. They are not speaking about it with them, and they should do it*" (Official from CSDP mission).

Sometimes the problems related to coordination are actually related to personal relations. This has apparently been the case in the past, according to one of the officials, when the Head of Delegation and the EUSR did not get along very well:

[35] For example, the officials explained that nowadays there are regular comprehensive approach meetings between the EU actors in which information is shared, as well as other informal information-sharing between the CSDP missions and the EU Delegation.

> I have been working in the Congo for nine years now and I have a lot of experience, and it [the lack of coordination] was also [due to] personal relations in some extent. With the head of the EU during the transition period until 2007 there were no problems at all. He worked hand in hand with the EUSR, they appreciated each other and there were no problems. When a new Head of Delegation arrived in late-2007, he started to think that '*I am the representative in the Congo, why do I have to meet this EUSR every two months coming here and going to see the President - I am the representative of the EU'*. So it was a little personal. And he did not like that and that didn't help…

According to the officials, similar problems surface occasionally also with certain Member States, as sometimes their priorities and interests conflict with the ones of the EU. Furthermore, on a very practical level, there have been problems related to communication. For example, as explained by the interviewed EU officials, the CSDP missions and the Commission have been using separate communications systems for classified documents, which has practically prevented the effective sharing of classified documents by email.

The above examples, shared by the EU officials, show that the internal EU cooperation and coherence, despite all the progress made in the recent years, has still been affecting the EU action, and possibly hampered the implementation of a comprehensive, human security-focused SSR in the Congo.

If the problems in the Congolese SSR, as argued by the EU officials, are in large part related to the political level, the EU should then raise the political questions in order to contribute to a sustainable reform. However, if the actors mandated to work on the political level do not raise the problems faced by the purely technical CSDP missions, as argued by some of the CSDP officials, such problems are hard to overcome.

5.5 Answering Research Questions: EU support and Human Security

The aim of this thesis has been to find out in what ways and to what extent the EU has managed to implement its normative SSR approach in the DRC. In particular, the study has been trying to shed light on how the EU action has succeeded in understanding and adopting an approach that focuses on security system thinking and the concept of broad

security. Related to this, the thesis has been asking how well the EU security sector reform support action has managed to understand and implement its objectives regarding the concept of human security.

By now it is clear that the implementation of the ambitious EU SSR policy has not entirely succeeded. Despite clear progress regarding the development of the policy concepts, tools and instruments, which could enable the EU to address security sector reform comprehensively, the EU action in the Congo can hardly be seen as having managed to adopt a broad, system-focused, human security approach.

In practice, the EU support to the DRC's SSR has been mostly *technical assistance* and capacity building. The SSR has been regarded as an essential part of the Congo's statebuilding endeavour, and therefore it has focused particularly on supporting the formal security providers, the police, the military and the formal justice-system. At the same time, the action has by and large ignored the non-state security actors and the various informal security provision mechanisms. However, by rejecting a possibility for nearly any collaboration with non-state actors, the EU action has basically abandoned system-thinking to security sector reform. Finally, the EU action has focused particularly on supporting the training of the formal security actors, and improving their administration and human resources management, with an implicit objective of strengthening the technical proficiency of state security forces to carry out core operational functions. At the same time the normative, or political aspects of the reform, have not been adequately addressed.

Therefore, the EU SSR support in the Congo can hardly be regarded as following a context-specific system approach that tries to address the security system holistically, and to focus on how security and insecurity are produced in a particular context. Any initiative that seeks to include the local and informal level actors is practically seen as either illegitimate or even potentially harmful. By following Kalyvas and Autesserre's system-focused model of analysis regarding the rootcauses of insecurity in the Congo, the EU action can hardly be seen as supporting a system-focused SSR. On the contrary, there seems to be a certain disconnect between the EU SSR policy and its actual implementation in the Congo: by ignoring the informal actors and by refusing to

collaborate with them, the EU is practically denouncing its own approach of a system-focused reform that would take into account both the state and the non-state actors.

A similar disconnect seems to exist regarding to promotion of human security: As the EU's SSR approach is examined on a policy level, advancing human security is regarded as a key priority for the EU's SSR support. Practically all the relevant EU policy papers, including the DRC-specific comprehensive approach joint-document, have a normative, human security-focused approach. In practice, however, the EU support is not particularly human security-focused. The EU actors implementing the EU support do seem to understand some of the inter-connections between development and security – the so-called development-security nexus – a core assumption behind the concept of human security. However, this understanding does not seem to significantly influence the type of support the EU is providing to the Congolese SSR. As discussed, the support provided is mostly of a technical nature, and it focuses largely on improving the efficiency of the formal security providers to carry put their operational functions. This is far from the normative, human security-focused support the OECD DAC SSR Guidebook and the EU SSR concept documents are advocating.

According to the EU concept documents, in addition to focusing on the technical aspects of the reform, the EU action should also target at addressing questions that are political by nature, including issues of how the security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled. Currently only few of these aspects, such as the resource-management of the security forces, have gained particular attention, while others have been rather neglected. In fact, the type of support the EU has been giving to the Congolese security actors, has practically not been that far from a "traditional" security sector support that focuses only on strengthening the formal security providers, and seeks to ensure that they possess a monopoly over the use of force.

However, particularly in such a context where the formal security actors are among the worst human rights perpetrators, producing insecurity rather than security to some of the ordinary citizens, the reform activities should place a significant emphasis on adopting of what Davis calls a justice-sensitive approach. Among else, the support should aim at preventing the security providers' abuse, addressing their impunity, and

supporting human rights and gender-sensitive training. While there have been certain activities that have, at least on paper, sought to promote human rights and address sexual and gender-based violence, such projects have been rather small in scale and scope. Furthermore, as discussed above, such "*social projects*" seem to be seen as a mere visibility tools for the missions, according to some of the interviewed officials.

Perhaps somehow surprisingly, many of the interviewed EU officials actually expressed clear doubts towards the concept of human security, therefore undermining one of the basic foundations of the EU SSR approach. In most cases, the interviewed officials were either not aware of the human security provisions of the EU SSR concepts, or did not regard such provisions as important in their work. As discussed, among the officials, the concept of human security and an EU approach based on this concept, were seen as "*surrealistic*", "*impossible to work*", or "*not as a main priority*" in the context of the Congo. One official even accused "*some of the Member States from the North*" for bringing such an idealist concept in the EU policy. These responses clearly show that the EU officials implementing the SSR support in the Congo do not in practice consider human security as a priority in their work. Therefore it is no longer surprising that the EU approach is not particularly human security-focused either.

The tendency to prioritise statebuilding together with the low understanding and low interest regarding the concept of human security can certainly explain why the EU approach has not been particularly system-focused or human security-promoting. However, as was discussed earlier, there are also certain other factors that partially explain why the EU officials have not regarded human security as a key priority for the EU SSR action, and why they have not followed a truly system-focused approach in their support.

For example, many of the officials explained how the extremely *challenging context* in the Congo combined with *low resources* they possessed, forced them to prioritise. As the Congolese state is an artificial structure with a particularly violent history and a completely ill-functioning security-system, and as resources are finite, the officials have to select the activities they regard as the most important. Promoting human security through accountability of security providers is not regarded as important priority as, for

example, creating a unified army with a functioning human resources system. As a result, and as the concept of human security is regarded suspicious, activities focusing on the concept are not prioritised.

Furthermore, the interviewed EU officials regarded the *Congolese authorities* as a major obstacle to the implementation of a system-focused human security-promoting support. Either the Congolese officials were not interested in such an approach or they were seen as deliberately seeking to prevent its implementation, possibly in order to promote their private gains. In fact, particularly the army officials were regarded as criminal by some of the CSDP missions' officials, and it was even questioned whether the EU should be collaborating with them in the first place. In such an environment, and due to the requirement "to respect the local ownership" it becomes challenging for the EU officials to advance concepts that are seen as Western and not supported by the local authorities.

Finally, the EU's ineffective internal coordination was identified as among the factors affecting the implementation of a comprehensive approach. This relates to the long inter-institutional rivalry between the EU institutions and to the historical division of competencies between the actors responsible for security and development policies. While it seems that there has been significant improvement in this regard due to the recent merger of the security and development policies and the establishment of tools, policies and institutional frameworks to allow a comprehensive and coordinated approach, the interviews with the EU officials proved that the implementation in the field has not completely succeeded. For example, the EU officials told about the problems related to the practical coordination between the EU actors. In particular, as the CSDP missions – the main implementing EU actors on army and police reforms – are technical missions, they have been relying completely on the EUSR and the EU Delegation regarding to the political aspects of the reform. In a difficult context such as the Congo, in which the local authorities are regarded as particularly uninterested in reforming the security sector, a successful reform is seen as impossible without addressing the political level. However, the CSDP officials often complained that the EU actors responsible for the political side have not been particularly interested in raising

the missions' issues with the Congolese authorities, which in turn has affected the implementation of the EU support to these sectors.

To conclude, despite the significant important efforts in the recent years regarding the development of EU SSR policies, frameworks and instruments, the EU's comprehensive approach in the Congo has not been particularly system-focused or human security-promoting. Therefore its comprehensiveness can be questioned. There are various factors that partially explain the chosen approaches in the field, including the difficult context; the insufficient resources; the need to prioritise; the lack of political will among the Congolese authorities; as well as the challenges related to the EU's inter-institutional set-up and division of competencies. While not all of these are factors that the EU actors can easily change, at least some of them could be addressed.

6 CONCLUSION: Many Questions, Few Answers

This study has focused on the implementation of the normative aspects of the EU SSR policy through a case study on the DRC. The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of this study is that the practical implementation of the EU SSR approach does not correspond to the normative aspirations spelled out in the policy. This is hopefully also the greatest value of this particular study: to reveal some of the shortcomings and gaps in the EU SSR policy implementation in order to help the practitioners to improve their action.

As was discussed in the previous chapter, there are several factors that partially explain these shortcomings. Moreover, based on these factors, some recommendations can be presented how the EU could possibly improve its engagement in the Congolese DRC. This could be done, among else, through integrating and mainstreaming human security into reform activities; through training and sensitisation of the EU officials; through improving its internal cooperation and coordination; through ensuring that there are adequate resources to address questions related to oversight, impunity and accountability of the security actors; and simply through higher priorisation of the normative aspects of SSR in the policy planning and implementation.

At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that not all the failures regarding the Congo's SSR can easily be put on the EU's shoulders. On the contrary, as discussed in length in the chapter focusing on the context of the Congo, and as identified by many of the EU officials, the Congo is an incredibly difficult and complex context to implement a comprehensive reform. Moreover, as a comprehensive SSR requires addressing the political questions that deal with the division of resources and power, it will necessarily be a very long process. This is true particularly in the context of the Congo, where the security system has been so ill-functioning for so long time.

In addition to possibly identifying shortcomings for the use of practitioners, the author of this thesis has hoped to contribute to the more general discussion around *statebuilding*, *security sector seform* and *human security*. To start with, by focusing on the *system approach* and the context-specific production and reproduction of security in the Congo, the author has hoped to raise thoughts regarding approaches to

statebuilding. Following Autesserre and Kalyvas, in the system approach the production of security is approached by analysing the various factors that contribute to the scrutinised phenomenon, and the different levels in which actions and events take place. For example, it is crucial to understand how the various global-level *structural* processes might affect the developing countries' statebuilding capabilities, as well as the nature of their security systems. As discussed in this study, in the context of the Congo, such structural processes could include, for example, *globalisation,* the imposition of *new public management*, or the ending of the *Cold War*. Similarly, by focusing solely on the national level dynamics and ignoring how the different *local-level* mechanisms and events might contribute to the production of security in a given context, such important factors might not be taken into account in the reform process. In the context of the Congo this kind of one-eyed focus on the state level can be particularly tragic.

Furthemore, applying a system-focused analysis in the production of security allows us to understand that statebuilding and SSR in the Congo are particularly difficult for the fact that the Congo is not really a *state*. As was noted in the Introduction, the Weberian concept of nation state is based on the model of European nation states. The capabilities of such state include a monopoly of *legitimate* violence within its boundaries. The Congo, in turn, is practically an artificial state, a huge area with various ethnic groups who did not have much in common before the creation of the colonial state. Moreover, in the context of the Congo, the security system has always been used by the ruling elites to advance their own gain, instead of providing actual security to the Congolese citizens. In fact, the formal security providers have never been regarded as *legitimate* providers of security to some parts of the population, and various informal security-provision mechanisms have always been emerging particularly in the East.

Therefore, a critical question is whether it is even possible to transfer a liberal democratic state into the context of the Congo, where the history of state is rather contradictory and sad, and if so what is the best way to achieve this? In particular, is the simple focus on the state level, and building the *operational capacity* of the formal security actors really the best way to achieve a comprehensive security system reform in a context where the formal actors do not enjoy a particularly high level of trust among the population? Furthermore, how justified it is to focus one-eyedly on the national

level statebuilding, and ignore the possible local-level rootcauses of violence, as well as the local-level security-provision mechanisms and other security-related actors? How well-advised it is not to incorporate the local perspectives to the security sector reform, for instance through wide public consultations, as doing so could help to find flexible and practical strategies for the reform process?

While these questions are partly beyond the scope of this thesis, it should, at a minimum, be understood that any statebuilding or SSR activity cannot succeed if the state or the security actor in question does not become seen as *legitimate* by the population. In the context of the Congo, a reform of the currently predatory security system cannot be achieved without trying to transform the system into a one that actually produces security to the Congolese people. Even if it was taken for granted that building a state is the most important long-term strategic objective in the DRC, as advocated by some of the EU officials, it should at least be asked what kind of a state the EU is helping to build, and what type of support the EU should give to the Congo. If the EU is obliged to regard the Congolese state as the only legitimate provider of security to the Congolese people, how should the EU then support the Congolese formal security providers in order to ensure that the formal actors actually become a source of security and protection to the Congolese people?

The point of view of the author is that without addressing the the normative aspects of the SSR, the reform cannot succeed. Here the concepts of human security and broad security are particularly useful. As mentioned earlier, the very concept of human security is of course closely linked to the discussion on the inter-connection between security and development, *the security-development nexus*. The problem here is, as mentioned briefly earlier, that the concepts of *development* and *security* are very broad and elusive, and the mechanisms that affect the production of the two complex. More work is therefore needed to understand the actual linkages between the two.

At a practical level, there is still use for an approach that understands development and security as the two sides of the same coin, however. In particular, through a system approach, at least some of the interlinkages between the production and reproduction of security and development can possibly be revealed. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the

system approach sees the whole social reality as a holistic system, in which everything affects everything. Therefore, for example, through figuring out how the grievances at a certain level have affected the nature of conflict in various levels over the time, can reveal some inter-connections between the two. Furthermore, when looking at our case study of the Congolese SSR, the usefulness of a human security approach at a practical level becomes evident: while the traditional approach to security is only focusing on the external security of a particular state, the human security approach sees that it is not enough to focus solely on the state survival, particularly in a context where the state is of a predatory nature. The focus in the SSR is therefore in its normative aspects, and the security of the people.

While beyond the scope of this thesis, a few words should be written regarding to another hurdle concerning the implementation of the normative aspects of the EU SSR approach. In particular, there is a contradiction between the EU development policy principle of *local ownership*, and the promotion of the normative aspects of reform, including demands to reduce corruption or promote human rights. The argument presented by one of the interviewed EU officials was that the EU should perhaps not to try implement an approach that seeks to promote human security. Instead, the EU should respect the Congolese ownership, and the Congolese authorities are simply not interested in this type of approach.

It was already discussed earlier that at the same time the EU officials were often seeing the Congolese as *corrupted* and even *criminal*, and it was also presented that the projects that were addressing corruption were seen as justified and as success stories. This was despite the fact that they were regarded as challenging to implement *due to the Congolese resistance*. This might to some extent propose that a respect of the national ownership is not necessarily an overarching guiding principle for the EU action. A good question here is that should *national ownership* even be an overarching principle in a context such as the Congo?

In the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, the donor countries commit to "*respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it*" (OECD 2008, 3). But an important question here, and particularly relevant for the discussion on

human security, is whether the *country leadership* actually represents the interests of the citizens. The concept of ownership is interpreted as the ownership of the *country leadership*, the ownership of the state, but if the state is controlled by corrupted officials of which "*some get caught, while some do not*", should their capacity really be "*helped to be strengthened*"? In particular, can it be expected that the country leadership could ensure the interest of the people in a country that has for most of its history been misruled and abused by its ruling classes and elites, and where the state security machinery has been used to prey on its citizens instead of protecting them? On the other side of the scale there is, of course, the burden of a colonial legacy that the EU will always continue to carry in its engagement in Africa. This makes any political or normative demands and conditions particularly difficult.

Finally, there is one more difficult but practical question that has emerged during the writing of this thesis. This concerns the line between pragmatism and idealism regarding the *integration of militias* and *addressing impunity*. In particular, the question here is at what expense can peace be bought? Currently, as discussed earlier, strengthening of the government and the eradication of the militias are seen as the main strategic actions by the EU officials. However, if the government is not capable to defeat the militias, and if granting an amnesty and integrating them into the national army were the only way to stop the fighting and violence, should demands for justice be given up to achieve the ending of hostilities? In particular, should persons who have committed human rights violations, whether they were part of the state or the non-state forces, be integrated to the army if this was a way to end fighting? This, and many of the above questions raised here are however left unanswered, to be hopefully responded by more intelligent people in future.

REFERENCES

Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. 2007. *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

Autesserre, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge.

Ayoade, J. 1988. 'States without Citizens'. In D. Rotchild & N. Chazan (eds.). *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Bailes, A. 2008. 'Introduction'. In Spence, D. & P. Fluri (eds.). *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). John Harper Publishing. London. Pp. xiv-xxi.

Berkeley, B. 2001. *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa*. Basic Books. New York.

Bloching, S. 2011, 'Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: Addressing Current Needs'. *Communicate, Coordinate and Cooperate: A series of papers on the A-Z of Cohering EU Crisis Management in the post-Lisbon Era*. Brussels.

Braeckman, C. 1999. *L'enjeu Congolais: L'Afrique Centrale Après Mobutu*. Fayard. Paris.

Bueger, C. & P. Venneson. 2009. *Security, Development and the EU's Development Policy*. European University Institute – Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole.

Buxton, I. 2008. 'The European Community Perspective on SSR: the Development of a Comprehensive EU Approach'. In Spence, D. & P. Fluri (eds.). *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). John Harper Publishing. London. Pp. 27–36.

Callaghy, T. 1986. 'The International Community and Zaire's Debt Crisis'. In Nzongola–Ntalaja, Georges. *The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities.* Africa World Press, Inc. New Jersey. Ch. 14.

Clément, C. 2009. 'EUSEC RD Congo'. In Grevi, G, D. Helly & D. Keohane (Eds.). *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Paris. Pp. 243 –254.

Collier, P. 2009. *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. Harper Collins. New York.

Council of the European Union 2012a. *EUSEC Factsheet 2012*. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/pdf/26122012_factsheet_eusec-rd-congo_en.pdf. Accessed: 20 April, 2012.

Council of the European Union. 2012b. *Eupol Factsheet 2012*. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede290512factsheeteupolcongo_/sede290512factsheeteupolcongo_en.pdf. Accessed: 20 April, 2012.

Council of the European Union. 2012c. Letter sent by the Council to Mr. Matti Karvanen. Signed for the General Secretariat by Mr. Jakob Thomsen. Dated 22 May 2012. 12/0543-ws/jj. Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2011a. *The EU Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the extended CSDP SSR Police Mission and its interface with justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).* 13159/10, EXT 1. Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2011b. *EU Police Mission for the DRC*. CFSP Press Release. January 2011. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110106%20Factsheet%20EUPOL%20RD%20Congo%20-%20version%2011_EN.pdf. Accessed: 10 May 2012.

Council of the European Union. 2006a. *Draft Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform*, 9967/06. 6 June 2006. Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2006b. Council Joint Action 2006/122/CFSP of 21 February 2006, OJ L 49 on the European Union Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region. Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2005a. *The EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*. 12566/4/05, REV 4. 13 October 2005. Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2005b. Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (EUSEC DR Congo).

Council of the European Union. 2004. Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL 'Kinshasa'). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2003a. *EU Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World* December 2003. Brussels.

Council of the European Union. 2003b. *The Use of Resources from the Long-Term Development Envelope of the Ninth EDF for the Creation of a Peace Facility for Africa*. Council Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003.

Council of the European Union. CSDP website on EUSEC DRC. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=909&lang=EN. Accessed: 10 April, 2012.

Davis, L. 2009a. *Justice-Sensitive Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Initiative for Peacebuilding, Security Cluster. Brussels.

Davis, L. 2009b. *The EU's Role in Promoting Justice in Peacemaking in DRC*. Initiative for Peacebuilding, Security Cluster. Brussels.

de Waal, A. (ed.). 2000. *Who fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian action in Africa*. Africa World Press. New Jersey.

Derks, M. & S. More. 2009. *The European Union and Internal Challenges for Effectively Supporting Security Sector Reform – An overview of the EU's set-up for SSR support*. Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael). Security and Conflict Programme. Conflict Research Unit. Hague.

Devine, F. 2002. 'Qualitative Methods'. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. Palgrave MacMillan. New York. Pp. 197–215.

Doelle, P. & A. Gouzée de Harven. 2008. 'Security Sector Reform. A Challenging Concept at the Nexus between Security and Development'. In Spence, D. & P. Fluri (eds.). *The European Union*

and Security Sector Reform. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. John Harper Publishing. London. Pp. 38–79.

Doyle, M. 2012. *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays.* Routledge. New York.

Duffield, M. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. Zed Books. London and New York.

Economist Intelligence Unit. 1996. *Zaire*. 1st Quarter, 1996. London.

European Commission. 2014*. International Cooperation and Development: Fighting Poverty in a Changing World*. Luxembourg Publications Office of the European Union: http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/development_cooperation_en.pdf. Accessed: 5 January, 2015. Brussels.

European Commission. 2011. *Statement of Estimates of the Commission for 2012 (Preparation of the 2012 Draft Budget).* Document 1: Political Presentation on 20.4.2011 in Brussels. SEC(2011) 498. Brussels.

European Commission. 2008. Republiqe démocratique du Congo – Communauté européenne. Document de stratégie pays et Programme indicative national du 10e FED, 2008 –2013. Brussels.

European Commission. 2006a. *A Concept for European Community Support for SSR*. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 24 May 2006. Brussels.

European Commission. 2006b. *The Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development*. COM(2006)421. Brussels.

European Commission. 2005a. *Communication from the Commission on Policy Coherence for Development.* COM(2005) 134, 12 April 2005. Brussels.

European Commission. 2005b. *The Communication on a Strategy of the External Dimension of Freedom, Security and Justice*. [COM(2005) 491, 12.10.2005. Brussels.

European Commission. 2003. *Communication on Governance and Development*. COM(2003) 615, Brussels, 20 October 2003. Brussels.

European Commission. 2001. *Commission's 'Communication on Conflict Prevention*. COM(2001) 211, Brussels, 11 April 2001. Brussels.

European Commission. 1996. *The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond*. SEC (96) 332 final. 6 March 1996. Brussels.

European Commission website on African Peace Facility (APF). http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm. Accessed: 4 April, 2012.

European Commission website for the EIDHR. http://www.eidhr.eu/whatis-eidhr. Accessed: 20 April, 2012.

European Commission. EU Delegation to the United Nations (EU@UN) website on the EC support to Rejusco. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_6062_en.htm. Accessed: 20 April, 2012.

European Commission, Parliament and the Council. 2005. *Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union entitled "The European Consensus"*. Brussels.

European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 2006. Inter-Institutional Agreement on the EU's Financial Framework for the Period of 2007-2013. Brussels.

European Commission & the Council. 2006. *Comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo.* COREU 2473/COR 1 of 13 November, 2006. Brussels.

European External Action Service, EEAS website on the EU Relations with the DRC. http://eeas.europa.eu/congo_kinshasa/index_en.htm. Accessed: 20 April, 2012.

Froitzheim M., F. Söderbaum & I. Taylor. 2011. 'The Limits of the EU as a Peace and Security Actor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. *Africa Spectrum*, 46, 3, 45–70.

Gambino, A. 2008. Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress. Council on Foreign Relations. Center for Preventive Action. *Council Special Report*. No. 40. October 2008. New York.

Gourlay, C. 2008. 'The Difficulties of a Donor: EU Financial Instruments, Security Sector Reform and Effective International Assistance'. In Spence, D. & P. Fluri (eds). *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. John Harper Publishing. London. Pp. 80–107.

Hewitt, T. 2000. 'Half a Century of Development'. In Allen T. & A. Thomas (eds.). *Poverty and Development into the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Hirsjärvi S. & H. Hurme. 2008. *Tutkimushaastattelu, teemahaastattelun teoria ja käytäntö*. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

Hirsjärvi S., P. Remes & P. Sajavaara. 1996. *Tutki ja kirjoita*. Tammi. Helsinki

Hochschild A. 2004. *Kuningas Leopoldin haamu: Kertomus ahneudesta, terrorista ja ankaruudesta siirtomaa-ajan Afrikassa*. (*King Leopold's ghost: a Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa*). Tammi. Helsinki.

Hoebeke H., S. Carette & K. Vlassenroot. 2007. EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo. IRRI-KIIB. Brussels.

Hänggi, H. 2004. 'Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction'. In Bryden, A. & H. Hänggi (eds.). *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

International Rescue Committee (IRC). 2007. *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis*. In collaboration with the Burnet Institute, Australia.

Justaert, A. & S. Keukeleire. 2010. 'The EU's Security Sector Reform Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, In Vanhoonacker, S., H. Dijkstra & H. Maurer (eds.). *Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy.* European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 1, Vol. 14.

Kaldor, M. 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Polity Press. Cambridge.

Kalyvas, S. 2003. ’The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil Wars’. *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 1., no. 3. Pp. 475–494.

Keane, R. 2008. ‘Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Role Played by the European Union’. In Spence, D. & P. Fluri (eds.). 2008. *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. John Harper Publishing. London. Pp. 217–226.

Knutsen, B. O. 2009. ‘The EU's security and defense policy (ESDP) and the challenges of civil–military coordination (CMCO): the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’. *European Security.* Vol. 18, Issue 4, 2009. Pp. 441–459.

Koponen, J. 2010. ‘The security-development nexus, state fragility and state building’. In H. Alava (ed.). *Exploring the Security-Development Nexus: Perspectives from Nepal, Northern Uganda and ’Sugango’*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Development Communication. Helsinki.

Law D. and O. Myshlovska. 2008. ‘The Evolution of the Concepts of Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance: The EU Perspective’. In Spence, David & Philipp Fluri (eds). 2008. *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. John Harper Publishing. London. Pp. 2–26.

Le Vine V. 1993. ’Administrative corruption and democratization in Africa: Aspects of the theoretic agenda’. *Corruption and Reform: An International Journal*. Volume 7 No.3 1992/93.

Mamdani, M. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton University Press. Princeton.

Martinelli, M. 2006. ‘Helping Transition: The EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) in the Framework of EU Policies in the Great Lakes’. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 11/2006. Kluwer Law International.

Merlingen M. & R. Ostrauskaite. 2006. *European Union Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy*. Routledge. New York.

More S. & M. Price. 2011. *The EU’s Support to Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Perceptions from the Field in spring 2010*. Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael). Hague.

Naniuzeyi, M. 1999. ‘The State of the State in Congo-Zaire: A Survey of the Mobutu Regime’. *Journal of Black Studies*. 1999, 29.

OECD. 2008. *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action*. Paris.

OECD. 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance*. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris.

OECD. 2004. *The OECD DAC Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice.* OECD DAC High Level Meeting on 31 March 2004, DCD/DAC(2003)30/REV3.

Prunier, G. 2008. *Africa’s World War. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Reno, W. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Colorado.

Reyntjens, F. 2009. *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics*. 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press. New York.

Santiso, C. 2002. *The Reform of EU Development Policy*. CEPS Working Document. No. 182. March 2002. Brussels.

Solana, J. 2005. *Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa*. S377/05. 21 November 2005. Brussels.

Solana J. & L. Michel. 2005. *Javier Solana and Louis Michel launch EUPOL and reiterate EU support for Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Press Release. S173/05. 30 April 2005. Brussels.

Spence, D. & P. Fluri (eds.). 2008. *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. John Harper Publishing. London.

Time Magazine. June 24, 2001. *Leaving Fire in His Wake.* Article of A. Z. Gbadolite. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,161061,00.html. Accessed: 12 April, 2012.

Treaty on the European Union. 1992. Signed on 7 February, 1992. OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992. Brussels.

Trefon, T. 2011. *Congo Masquerade": The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure*. Zed Books. London and New York.

Turner, T. 2007. *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*. Zed Books. London and New York.

United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO). *UN Denounces Sexual Violence, Other Serious Violations in Eastern DRC*. Press Statement. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/UNJHROMay2013_en.pdf#sthash.qXgbBJ14.dpuf. Accessed: 2 February, 2015.

United Nations General Assembly. 2005. *World Summit outcome document*. Paragraph 143. A/60/L.1. 15 September 2005.

van Eekelen, W. 2012. 'Opportunities to Support Security and Development: International Organisations' Evolving SSR Approaches'. In A. Schnabel and V. Farr (eds.). *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Lit Verlag. Berlin. Pp. 271–292.

van Puijenbroek, J. 'Human Security from Below, a Case Study from the Ituri District, Democratic Republic of Congo'. *Security and Human Rights*. 2008, No.1. Brill Academic Publishers. Leiden.

Vines, A. 2010. 'Rhetoric from Brussels and Reality on the Ground: the EU and Security in Africa'. *International Affairs.* 86: 5, 2010. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Oxford. Pp. 1091–1108.

Vircoulon, T. 2009. 'EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo'. In G. Grevi, D. Helly & D. Keohane (eds.). *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009)*. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Paris. Pp. 221–230.

Vlassenroot, K. 2000. 'The Promise of Ethnic Conflict: Militarization and Enclave Formation in South Kivu'. In Didier Goyvaerts (ed.). *Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa*. Institute for the Study of Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa. Tokyo.

Weber, M. 1964. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* Free Press. New York.

Weiler, Q. 2009. *The European Union and Security Sector Reform in Africa: a Leader in Theory, a Laggard in Reality?* Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers. 1/2009.

Wilén, N. 2015. *A window of opportunity for reforms in the Congo's security sector?* http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2015/01/07/ssr-2-0-brief-no-2-a-window-of-opportunity-for-reforms-in-the-congos-security-sector/. Accessed: 27 January, 2015.

Wouters, P. 2008. *Balancing Defence and Security Efforts with a Permanently Structured Scorecard*. Academia Press. Brussels.

Wrong, M. 2000. *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*. HarperCollins. New York.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Information Sheet for Participants

The European Union Involvement in the Security Sector Reform of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Advancing Human Security by Building a Robust State?

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Thank you for showing an interest in this project.

What is the Aim of the Project?

The aim of this project is to examine the EU's increasing engagement in the third countries' Security Sector Reform (SSR) through a case study on the EU's involvement in the SSR of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). More specifically, the focus is on the implementation of the coordinated, comprehensive and context-specific 'human security' approach that the different EU SSR concept papers in general, and the EU action in the DRC's SSR in particular, have adopted.

Through interviews with the key EU stakeholders, both with the Commission as well as Council/CSDP officials, the project will seek to find out in what ways the EU's normative and holistic SSR approach has been implemented in practice, and in which extent it has contributed to the human security of the Congolese. Furthermore, through an analysis of the possible implementation gaps, the project seeks to identify possible grounds for a more efficient SSR engagement in future.

You are being asked to participate because you belong to the identified key stakeholders: The EC officials or the CSDP civilian missions' officials. We expect to interview between 10-20 EU officials who work in the planning or implementation of the EU DRC SSR action, either in Kinshasa or in Brussels.

The project is being undertaken as part of the requirement for a Master's degree in Development Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland.

What will you be asked to do?

The interviewees are asked to participate in an interview that will last between 30–45 minutes, via telephone or skype, and which will be recorded. During the interview you will be asked questions regarding your views on the root causes of the Congo's insecurity, the success of the EU's SSR action to improve the Congolese human security, and the challenges for the implementation of the EU comprehensive SSR approach in the DRC, as well as some related questions that might arise over the course of the interview. The

precise nature of the questions have not been strictly predetermined in advance, but will depend on each interviewee's personal responsibilities and the mandate of his/her organisation, as well as the way the interview develops. However, the following areas are covered over the course of the interview:

The efficiency of the EU action and the challenges for implementation of SSR projects:

- In which ways the interviewee regards the EU action, and the particular reform projects she/he is involved, as having contributed improving the security situation in the DRC?
- What has possibly not succeeded as effectively as intended?
- What are considered as the biggest challenges with regards to the implementation of a comprehensive EU SSR approach, and/or the particular projects that the interviewee is involved?

Rootcauses of the Congo's 'human insecurity' & the EU's holistic approach to tackle it:

- What do you regard as the biggest security challenges in the Congo today?
- What kinds of factors are regarded as having caused/causing the contemporary insecurity?
- How is the EU action tackling these security threats/root causes, and what factors are considered possibly as preventing the EU from tackling such threats?
- Why the chosen actions have been prioritised over others?

EU's Coherent and Coordinated Approach:

- In which extent are the other EU institutions/Member States' SSR efforts complementing the interviewee's organisation's SSR action, and the vice versa?
- How well is coordination with regards to the EU SSR-action taking place between the CSDP-missions and the EC-action (EDF, IfS, EIDHR-instruments) in the field?
- How is communication and coordination taking place between the EU action and the other donors, and with the Congolese authorities?

In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

What personal information will be collected and how will it be used?

You will be asked to share your age, gender, name of the Organisation in which you areserving/served, length of service, and nationality, as well as list your core responsibilities/duties in your organisation. As mentioned above the interviews will be recorded and portions of them will be transcribed. Each recording will be given an alias associated with the personal data on the form. After that point your name will not be associated with your interview.

The information you share will be used to write a thesis and potentially other papers and reports. Fragments of your interview may appear in the final report, but will only be identified by alias and the name of the mission or project. Your name will not be used in

any publication, paper or report. For example, in the final report you could be referred as an ‘EUPOL official’, or ‘Commission Official in Kinshasa’.

The interviews will be partially transcribed. The researcher is a post-graduate student and his supervisors may also be able to listen to the interviews and read transcripts and summaries.

The results of the project will be available in the University of Helsinki Library. You are also welcome to request a copy of the thesis.

If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact:

Matti Karvanen, masa.karvanen@gmail.com, tel: +358 (0)41 533 0366.